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ABSTRACT
More than a half-century after the civil rights era, people of
color in the United States remain disproportionately impoverished and
incarcerated, excluded and vulnerable. Legal remedies rooted in the
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection remain elusive. This arti-
cle argues that the "racial realism" advocated by the late Professor
Derrick Bell compels us to look critically at the purposes served by ra-
cial hierarchy. By stepping outside the master narrative's depiction of
the United States as a "nation of immigrants" with opportunity for all,
we can recognize it as a settler state, much like Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand. It could not exist without the occupation of Indigenous
lands, and those lands could not be rendered profitable without im-
ported labor. Employing settler colonial theory, this article identifies
some of the strategies of elimination and/or subordination that have
been-and continue to be-used to subjugate Indigenous peoples,
Afrodescendants, and migrants of color in order to further settler state
goals and maintain a racialized status quo. It suggests that further
analysis of these strategies will help us find common ground in the
diverse experiences of those deemed Other within the United States,
and that exercising our internationally recognized right to self-deter-
mination-a primary tool of decolonization-may prove more effective
than formal equality in dismantling structural racism.
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INTRODUCTION
How do we rectify a system that so brilliantly serves its intended
purpose?
-Dorothy E. Roberts'
Reflecting on the legacy of the civil rights movement, the late
law professor Derrick A. Bell Jr., said in 1992 that "[a]ll too many of
the black people we sought to lift through law from a subordinate sta-
tus to equal opportunity, are more deeply mired in poverty and despair
than they were during the 'Separate but Equal' era." 2 He observed that
the successful elimination of formal, visible, racial barriers encourages
White society to dismiss racism as a historical anomaly while leaving
Black Americans in "anguish over whether race or individual failing"
accounts for their continued exclusion.3 "Either conclusion," he noted,
"breeds frustration and eventually despair."4 Professor Bell's starkly
worded conclusion-one he claimed "many will wish to deny, but none
can refute" 5-was that "[b]lack people will never gain full equality in
this country."6
More than twenty years later, and a half-century after some of
the most celebrated victories of the civil rights movement,7 American
1. Dorothy E. Roberts, Constructing a Criminal Justice System Free of Racial Bias:
An Abolitionist Framework, 39 COLUM. Hum. RTS. L. REV. 261, 265 (2007).
2. Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 372 (1992); see also Donald F.
Tibbs, From Black Power to Hip Hop: Discussing Race, Policing, and the Fourth Amendment
Through the "War on" Paradigm, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 47, 54-55 (2012) (noting that
Black youth raised in the post-civil rights era face conditions worse than those contested
during that era).
3. Bell, supra note 2, at 374. Other than in direct quotations, I capitalize the term
"Black" because, as Kimberl6 Crenshaw observes, "Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other
'minorities,' constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper
noun." Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988). Although
"indigenous" is a descriptor that applies to a relationship peoples have to their lands, rather
than a "racial" or "ethnic" group as such, see infra note 24, I have capitalized it when it is
used to reference a collective identity. I capitalize "White" where it refers to those of (pur-
portedly) exclusively European descent, because the privileges attending "Whiteness" have
led those who so identify to regard themselves as having a particular "group" status in
American society. See infra note 22. While an analysis of Whiteness is beyond the scope of
this article, it must be noted that certain subgroups of the White population have been
subordinated in significant ways. See, e.g., COLONIALISM IN MODERN AMERICA: THE APPA-
LACHIAN CASE (Helen Matthews Lewis et al., eds., 1978).
4. Bell, supra note 2, at 374.
5. Id. at 373.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (finding segregated public
schools to be inherently unequal); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241,
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-7 (2006); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-
2014 3
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society continues to be divided by what W.E.B. Du Bois famously de-
scribed as "the problem of the color-line." The wishful thinking of
those who proclaim this to be a "postracial" era9 is belied by the persis-
tence of starkly racialized disparities in health, education, income, and
incarceration rates, and the harsh realities, material and psychologi-
cal, of life in impoverished communities of color.' 0 There is no social
consensus that it is a crime for vigilantes or police officers to kill un-
armed Black youth walking down the street just a few blocks from
their homes." Simultaneously, young people of color, especially young
men, fill the prisons while remaining conspicuously absent in institu-
tions of higher education.12
Much of the energy generated by the social movements of the
mid-1950s to early 1970s has dissipated-or, perhaps more accurately,
been crushed-along with hopes of realizing both formal equality and
community empowerment.' 3 Legal efforts to remedy racial injustices
have, for the most part, been framed in terms of the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection, but the successes we have had in achiev-
ing formal equality have had little discernible impact on the disparities
110, 79 Stat. 437, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2006); Fair Housing Act of 1968 [Title VIII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1968], Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1988).
8. W.E.B. Du Bois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 1 (Cosimo Inc., 2007) (1903). The term
"American" is used throughout this essay with reference to the United States. It is an inac-
curate term, as the United States is but one of many states in the Americas, but I have been
unable to find a suitable alternative.
9. "Post-racialism" references the perspective that "racial discrimination is rare and
aberrant behavior as evidenced by America's and Americans' pronounced racial progress."
Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Trina Jones, A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98
GEO. L.J. 967, 968 (2010); see also john a. powell, Post-Racialism or Targeted Universalism?,
86 DENv. U. L. REV. 785, 788-91 (2009). See generally Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IowA L.
REV. 1589 (2009) (providing a theoretical and historical critique of post-racial ideology).
10. See infra notes 54-66 and accompanying text. The term "racialization" is used to
encompass the dynamic "set of practices, cultural norms, and institutional arrangements
that are both reflective of and simultaneously help to create and maintain racialized out-
comes in society." powell, supra note 9, at 785.
11. See, e.g., Aya Gruber, Race to Incarcerate: Punitive Impulse and the Bid to Repeal
Stand Your Ground, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 961, 963-64 (discussing debate over the initial
failure to charge George Zimmerman for the shooting death of 17-year-old Trayvon Martin);
Julie Bosman & Monica Davey, Ferguson Waits Uneasily for Grand Jury's Decision, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2014, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/us/ferguson-
missouri.html?_r=0 (noting fears of civil unrest related to expectations that the officer who
shot and killed 18-year-old Michael Brown would not face criminal or civil charges); see also
Karlyn Bowman & Jennifer Marsico, Black and White Opinions About the Justice System in
America, FORBES (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bowmanmarsico/2014/08/22/
black-and-white-opinions-about-the-justice-system-in-americal (noting the racial divide in
attitudes about fairness in policing and criminal justice).
12. See infra notes 61, 66 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 36-39, 45-53, 71-78 and accompanying text.
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that continue to define the material and psychological conditions of life
for most people of color in the United States.14 As Derrick Bell pre-
dicted, "[e]ven those herculean efforts we hail as successful will
produce no more than temporary 'peaks of progress,' short-lived victo-
ries that slide into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that
maintain white dominance," a description that, based on our histories,
applies equally to all communities of color in the United States.' 5 Ac-
cording to Bell, only the acknowledgement of this reality, an approach
he termed Racial Realism, "frees us to imagine and implement racial
strategies that can bring fulfillment and even triumph."' 6
This article explores the liberatory potential of racial realism, a
perspective that I believe "implicitly suggests a settler colonial frame-
work for understanding legal reform," as Indigenous scholar Andrea
Smith has observed.' 7 I begin from the premise that the forms of
racialization we confront today cannot be separated from the roles and
restrictions that have permeated social, cultural, political, economic,
and legal institutions throughout U.S. history. In other words, while
race-based distinctions may manifest in different ways over time, they
are deeply institutionalized.' 8 Effective change will require institu-
tional restructuring which, in turn, requires an accurate analysis of
the structural dynamics and relationships at issue. If, as Dorothy Rob-
erts observes, the system "brilliantly serves its intended purposes,"' 9
the challenge we face is to understand those intended purposes, and
the role racialization plays in furthering them, so that we can effec-
tively rectify the injustices it perpetuates.
Most remedial options, legal and political, are framed within a
dominant narrative that describes the United States as a democracy in
14. See infra notes 54-66 and accompanying text.
15. Bell, supra note 2, at 373.
16. Id. at 374.
17. Andrea Smith, The Moral Limits of the Law: Settler Colonialism and the Anti-Vio-
lence Movement, 2(2) SETTLER COLONIAL STUDIES 69, 71 (2012), available at http://www.
tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/2201473X.2012.10648842#.VQDVNfnF98E [hereinafter
Smith, The Moral Limits of the Law].
18. As noted by the Minnesota Council on Crime and Justice, "the racial bias in the
justice system lies primarily in institutional policies and practices, rather than individual
racism. The result, however, is still the same." COUNCIL ON CRIME AND JUSTICE, REDUCING
RACIAL DISPARITY WHILE ENHANCING PUBLIC SAFETY: KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
14 (2006), available at http://www.crimeandjustice.org/researchReports/RDI%20Final%20
Report.pdf; see also Jesse J. Norris, State Efforts to Reduce Racial Disparities in Criminal
Justice: Empirical Analysis and Recommendations for Action, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 493, 494
(2011-2012). On the abundance of social science literature recognizing institutionalized ra-
cism, see William M. Wiecek & Judy L. Hamilton, Beyond the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
Confronting Structural Racism in the Workplace, 74 LA. L. REV. 1095, 1102 n.23 (2014).
19. See Roberts, supra note 1.
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which all persons-or, at least, all citizens-are afforded equal
rights.20 That narrative suggests that, because racialized barriers to
citizenship and political participation have been formally abolished,
on-going inequities are attributable to some combination of individual
or cultural characteristics or, in the most generous reading, to disad-
vantages resulting from past discrimination. 2 1 One can, however, look
at our history-our histories-through a very different lens.
This article proposes that if we are to be "real" about contempo-
rary manifestations of racism, another narrative can provide a more
accurate understanding of the persistence of racial domination and
subordination. It begins by acknowledging that the "founding fathers"
were Anglo-American settler colonists. 2 2 Unlike their brethren who
colonized much of Africa and Asia, they did not come to extract profit
from the land, labor and natural resources of their colonies and then
return home. Instead, like those who established settler states in Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, and Canada, they came to stay. 23
20. See Allan H. Macurdy, Rights Respiration: Disability, Isolation, and a Consti-
tutional Right of Interaction, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 737, 738 (2007) (noting how the
equal protection doctrine effectively "disconnects equality from rights, proceeding as if they
are conceptually independent legal theories"). For a nuanced discussion of the paradigms
undergirding the scholarship of race, see generally Richard Delgado, Centennial Reflections
on the California Law Review's Scholarship on Race: The Structure, 100 CAL. L. REV. 431
(2012) [hereinafter Delgado, Centennial Reflections]. On the dangers of focusing solely on
redress for past historic wrongs without assurance of structural change, see generally Max-
ine Burkett, Reconciliation and Nonrepetition: A New Paradigm for African-American
Reparations, 86 OR. L. REV. 99 (2007).
21. See generally R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality
in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803 (2004) (discussing the attribution of such negative char-
acteristics as racial stigma). For a specific example, see generally Theresa Glennon, Race,
Education, and the Construction of a Disabled Class, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 1237 (1995) (ad-
dressing the construction of African American school children as intellectually or
behaviorally disabled).
22. See WALTER L. HIxsON, AMERICAN SETTLER COLONIALISM: A HISTORY 1-2 (2013).
Anglo-American settler colonists constructed Whiteness as a means of protecting their priv-
ilege. See generally IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
(rev'd ed. 2006); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1709 (1993)
[hereinafter Harris, Whiteness]; GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN WHITE-
NESS: How WHITE PEOPLE PROFIT FROM IDENTITY POLITICS (1998). Because my intent is to
emphasize the structural implications of identification with the settler class, I generally use
the term "settler" rather than "White." I am grateful to Maori legal scholar Moana Jackson
for pointing out that "settler" can be a deceptively benign substitute for "colonizer" or "in-
vader." Keeping this caution in mind, I employ "settler" because I believe a cognitive shift
from "White" to "settler" in the context of discussions about race can help pierce the general
unwillingness to analyze the United States as a settler colonial state.
23. Paradigmatic examples of settler states include Australia, New Zealand, Canada,
the United States, Israel, and South Africa. See HIxsoN, supra note 22, at 4. Some scholars
include Latin American states such as Argentina and Brazil. See id.; see also Richard Gott,
Latin America as a White Settler Society, 26(2) BULLETIN OF LAT. Am. RES. 269-289 (2007).
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They came to stay. This article explores the implications of this
very simple truth. Coming to stay meant occupying the land; in turn,
this meant disappearing the peoples indigenous to that land. 2 4 It
meant making the land profitable, which required the importation of
labor-voluntary and involuntary-and establishing structures for
controlling that labor. 2 5 It meant settlers who came with a presump-
tion of their own sovereign prerogative. They did not come to join
someone else's society; they came to establish a state over which they
could exercise complete control. 26 This included determining who
would be allowed to remain within the boundaries claimed by the set-
tlers, who could enter from without those boundaries, which peoples
would be accorded particular civil or political rights, and the extent to
which settler privilege would be promoted and protected by the state. 2 7
These relations were enshrined in the American legal system, which
continues to be utilized to ensure that each person remains in his or
her "place," literally and figuratively. 28
Indigenous peoples' lands are still occupied and the racialized
hierarchy established by the early Anglo-American settlers persists.
Amending the Constitution to abolish slavery and provide formal
equality changed the discourse within settler society, but did little to
disrupt the fundamental premises of the settler state. Racialized injus-
tice continues to shape the lives and limit the potential of each
Others exclude Latin America because of the effect "hybridity" has had on its social and
political dynamics. See LORENZO VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM: A THEORETICAL OVER-
VIEw 30 (2010) (citing Maria Josefina Saldafia-Portillo, "How many Mexicans [is] a horse
worth?" The League of United Latin American Citizens, Desegregation Cases, and Chicano
Historiography, 107(4) SOUTH ATLANTIC QUARTERLY 809, 812 (2008)) [hereinafter VERACINI,
SETTLER COLONIALISM].
24. See infra notes 127-31 and accompanying text. There is not a universally accepted
definition of Indigenous identity and "[g]enerally, indigenous peoples have insisted on the
right to define themselves." Robert A. Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers of Interna-
tional Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the
World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660, 663 n.4 (1990) [hereinafter Williams, Encounters]. According to
James Anaya, former UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, "[t]hey
are indigenous because their ancestral roots are embedded in the lands on which they live,
or would like to live, much more deeply than the roots of more powerful sectors of society
living on the same lands or in close proximity. And they are peoples in that they comprise
distinct communities with a continuity of existence and identity that links them to the com-
munities, tribes, or nations of their ancestral past." S. JAMES ANAYA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 1 (2009).
25. See PATRICK WOLFE, SETTLER COLONIALISM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF ANTHRO-
POLOGY 1-2 (1999) [hereinafter WOLFE, SETTLER COLONIALISM].
26. See VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 53-74.
27. See id. at 32, 67.
28. See generally Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geogra-
phy in Legal Analysis, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1841 (1994).
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generation of children in this country. There is little, if any, evidence
that the United States is postracial or postcolonial. 29 A new narrative
will not change these realities. However, understanding the United
States as a colonial settler state explains a great deal about the appar-
ently intractable relations of racialized privilege and subordination
that characterize life in this country. As a third generation Japanese
American, with immediate family members who are Black, White, and
American Indian, I am particularly interested in the implications of
settler colonial theory for non-Indigenous communities and write in
the hope of contributing to an on-going conversation about race that
will "free[ ] us to imagine" remedial options framed in the context of
decolonization and self-determination.3 0
Part I sets the stage by recalling the activism that swept com-
munities of color in the United States in the 1960s-movements for
social change that often framed their analyses in terms of colonialism
and the right to self-determination-and considering how we moved
from the energy and optimism of that era to the despair associated
with the seemingly intractable poverty, racial disparities, and injus-
tices these communities face a half-century later. Part II provides a
brief overview of settler colonial theory, laying the groundwork for my
argument that it helps us to understand why racial hierarchy in the
United States is so persistent and begin to envision strategies for social
change that go beyond the limits of constitutional equal protection.
Because our "stories" frame our understanding of remedial op-
tions, the dominant narrative of American history as gradually
progressing toward a "multicultural" society is contrasted in Part III
with an alternate perspective on migration, settlement, and the con-
struction of racial hierarchy in the United States. Part IV looks more
specifically at some of the strategies used to consolidate and maintain
the American settler state, from attempts to eliminate Indigenous peo-
29. On postracialism, see supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text; on postcolonialism,
see Patrick Wolfe, Race and the Trace of History: For Henry Reynolds, in STUDIES IN SETTLER
COLONIALISM: POLITICS, IDENTITY AND CULTURE 272-96 (Fiona Bateman & Lionel Pilkington
eds., 2011) (discussing problems with the term "postcolonial") [hereinafter Wolfe, Race and
the Trace].
30. See Bell, supra note 2. I use the term "American Indian" to refer to peoples indige-
nous to the contiguous territory in North America claimed by the United States but more
often employ the term "Indigenous" as it also encompasses Native Hawaiians and Alaska
Natives. I have avoided "Native American" because for some it connotes "those individuals
of Indigenous ancestry who seek to assimilate into and become a part of American society."
Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native Americans:
Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship upon Indigenous Peoples, 15
HARv. BLACKLETTER L.J. 107, 108 (1999) [hereinafter Porter, Demise].
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ples to the subjugation of African Americans and the subordination
and manipulation of other peoples of color.
The inadequacies of remedies for racialized injustice available
within the American legal system are discussed in Part V. I suggest
that the "dynamic of difference" common to settler societies, whereby
the full assimilation of those not part of the settler class is both prof-
fered as the end goal and perpetually precluded, requires us to look
beyond our legal system. Part VI considers some ways in which inter-
national law can help us challenge racial and colonial subjugation,
noting both the potential and limitations of international legal rights
and remedies. Part VII concludes this article with some thoughts on
how we might contribute to the decolonization of American society.
I. DREAMs DEFERRED 3 1
We woke up each day to serve the people and went to sleep analyzing
what we had accomplished, and at night we dreamed about the new
society that we would create, convinced that the richest country on
the globe had sufficient resources to make a better world.
-Iris Morales and Denise Oliver-Velez 32
A. Liberatory Visions
The construction of racialized identities and hierarchy has long
been understood by many American Indians as a manifestation of
ongoing colonization.33 Other peoples of color in the United States have
also described their communities as internally colonized and framed
their efforts to redress racialized injustice in terms of the right to self-
determination. 3 4 In recent decades, however, this paradigm-particu-
larly as applied to African American communities-has increasingly
been regarded as, at best, an analogy employed to emphasize the ongo-
ing deprivations and disparities that shape the lives of so many. 35 In
revisiting the notion of colonial relations as providing insight into cur-
rent racial realities, it is worth considering why contemporary
analyses of racialized privilege and subordination are so rarely framed
31. This phrase comes from Langston Hughes' poem Harlem, which asks, "What
happens to a dream deferred? Does it dry up like a raisin in the sun? . .. Or does it explode?"
THE COLLECTED POEMS OF LANGSTON HUGHES 426 (Arnold Rampersad ed., 1994).
32. Iris Morales & Denise Oliver-Velez, Why Read the Young Lords Today?, in THE
YOUNG LORDS: A READER Xii (Darrel Enck-Wanzer ed., 2010).
33. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
35. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
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in terms of internal colonialism. Was it because the organizations that
advocated self-determination were effectively repressed? Was the the-
ory itself flawed?
The 1960s to the early 1970s was an era of tremendous tumult
and energy, as movements for independence and fundamental social
change swept the planet.3 6 In 1957, under Kwame Nkrumah's leader-
ship, Ghana had won its independence from British colonial rule, and
in 1960 alone, the independence of eighteen former African colonies
was recognized by the United Nations (UN).37 Anti-colonial struggles
and mass movements against military dictatorships swept across
much of Asia and Latin America and inspired student and youth upris-
ings throughout Europe and North America.38 The liberatory potential
of a new world order was palpable. As Argentine journalist Adolfo Gilly
observed in his introduction to political philosopher Frantz Fanon's
Studies in a Dying Colonialism, "The whole of humanity has erupted
violently, tumultuously onto the stage of history, taking its own
destiny in its hands."3 9
In the United States, the civil rights movement of the 1950s and
early 1960s had accomplished certain of its legislative and judicial
goals, most notably the acknowledgment that legally mandated
apartheid violated the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection, as
well as the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting
Rights Act. 4 0 Nonetheless, very little had changed for most people of
color in the United States,41 and hundreds of urban rebellions occurred
36. For some representative examples, see generally THE THIRD WORLD IN THE GLOBAL
1960s (Samantha Christiansen & Zachary A. Scarlett eds., 2013); on the impact of African
liberation movements on African American organizing, see Theodore M. Shaw, The Race
Convention and Civil Rights in the United States, 3 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 19, 23-26 (1998).
37. See JAMES H. MERIWETHER, PROUDLY WE CAN BE AFRICANS: BLACK AMERICANS AND
AFRICA, 1935-1961 150 (2002); The United Nations and Decolonization, Trust and Non-Self-
Governing Territories, 1945-1999, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/
nonselfgov.shtml (last visited Apr. 9, 2015).
38. See generally GEORGE KATSIAFICAS, THE IMAGINATION OF THE NEw LEFT: A GLOBAL
ANALYSIS OF 1968 (1987).
39. Adolfo Gilly, Introduction to FRANTZ FANON, STUDIES IN A DYING COLONIALISM 1-2
(1965).
40. See supra note 7.
41. See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990s 101 (1994) (quoting psychology professor Kenneth Clark's
1967 observation that "[t]he masses of Negroes are now starkly aware that recent civil
rights victories benefited a very small number of middle-class Negroes while their predica-
ment remained the same or worsened.").
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in U.S. cities over the next few years. 42 Analyzing these "riots," the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, better known as the
Kerner Commission, determined that their primary causes were "per-
vasive discrimination and segregation in employment, education and
housing" and the resulting "frustrations of powerlessness" which per-
meated the "ghettos."4 3 Significantly, the Commission-composed of
powerful political and business leaders appointed by President Lyndon
Johnson-bluntly acknowledged that "White institutions created [the
racial ghetto], White institutions maintain it, and White society con-
dones it."44
Against this backdrop, powerful movements emerged in African
American, American Indian, Chicano, Puerto Rican, and Asian Ameri-
can communities that identified themselves, to some degree or
another, as internally colonized peoples, and it was not uncommon for
scholars of color to also articulate this perspective. 4 5 Invoking a long
tradition of describing African Americans as a "nation within a na-
tion , "46 many leaders in the 1960s referenced emerging international
law that condemned genocide, racial discrimination and colonialism,
and defined their struggles in terms of the right to self-determina-
tion.4 7 Thus, for example, in 1966 the Black Panther Party for Self
42. For background, see generally URBAN RIOTS: VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE (Robert
H. Connery ed., 1968); CITIES UNDER SIEGE: AN ANATOMY OF THE GHETTO RIoTs, 1964-1968
(David Boesel & Peter H. Rossi eds., 1971).
43. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 10-11 (1968).
44. Id. at 1.
45. See, e.g., STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLIT-
ICS OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA 5 (1967) ("black people in this country form a colony, and it is
not in the interest of the colonial power to liberate them"); HAROLD CRUSE, REBELLION OR
REVOLUTION 74 (2009 [1968]) ("The Negro has a relationship to the dominant culture of the
United States similar to that of colonies and semi-dependents to their particular foreign
overseers."); ROBERT J. ALLEN, BLACK AWAKENING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA: AN ANALYTIC His-
TORY 2 (1969) ("The fact of black America as a semicolony, or what has been termed
"domestic colonialism," . . . [is] the most profound conclusion to be drawn from a survey of
the black experience in America."); Robert Blauner, Internal Colonialism and Ghetto Revolt,
16(4) SOCIAL PROBLEMS 393 (1969). Rodolfo Acuna described Chicana/os as internally colo-
nized, most explicitly in his first edition of OCCUPIED AMERICA: THE CHICANO'S STRUGGLE
TOWARD LIBERATION (1st ed. 1972). See also Tomas Almaguer, Toward the Study of Chicano
Colonialism, AZTLAN: CHICANO J. OF SOC. SCI. & ARTS 7 (1971); Mario Barrera, Carlos
Mufioz & Carlos Ornelas, The Barrio as an Internal Colony, 6 URBAN AFFAIRS ANN. REVS.
465 (1972).
46. See, e.g., KomozI WOODARD, A NATION WITHIN A NATION: AMIRI BARAKA (LERoi
JONES) AND BLACK POWER POLITICS 17 (1999) (quoting Martin R. Delaney and Frederick
Douglass).
47. This emphasis on international law was not new to the African American commu-
nity. See generally HENRY J. RICHARDSON, 111, THE ORIGINS OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN
INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008). On early post-World War II efforts, see CIVIL
RIGHTS CONGRESS, WE CHARGE GENOCIDE: THE HISTORIC PETITION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
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Defense issued a ten-point Platform and Program that began: "We
want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our Black
Community."48 After addressing employment, housing, education, mili-
tary service, police brutality, and criminal justice, as well as
restitution for slavery and genocide, it identified its "major political ob-
jective" as a plebiscite supervised by the United Nations "for the
purpose of determining the will of black people as to their national
destiny."49
These themes were echoed in the platforms of other organiza-
tions, including the Chicano Brown Berets, the Puerto Rican Young
Lords, and the Asian American Red Guards.50 In October 1971, some
ten thousand people responded to a call from the Young Lords to march
to the United Nations and demand, among other things, an end to the
United States' colonial occupation of Puerto Rico. 5 ' Emerging in 1968
from the broader Red Power movement, the American Indian Move-
ment (AIM) quickly expanded its focus from resisting police brutality
to struggles for land rights, treaty enforcement, and the protection and
promotion of traditional cultural and spiritual practices. 5 2 In the mid-
1970s, on the instruction of traditional Lakota elders, AIM was instru-
mental in organizing Indigenous peoples from North and South
America to demand recognition of their issues by the United Nations,
beginning a process that resulted in the international acknowledge-
ment of Indigenous peoples' rights.5 3
While these groups represent only a handful of the hundreds of
organizations that emerged during this period, they are regarded as
iconic, perhaps because of their ability to galvanize the popular imagi-
nation. Providing a liberatory vision of what could be, each had a
FOR RELIEF FROM A CRIME OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE NEGRO PEOPLE
(1970 [1951]); CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE AFRI-
CAN AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 1944-1955 (2003).
48. The Black Panther Party Platform & Program: What We Want, What We Believe,
reprinted in THE SIXTIES PAPERS: DOCUMENTS OF A REBELLIOUs DECADE 159-64 (Judith
Clavir Albert & Stewart Edward Albert eds., 1984).
49. Id.; see also LAURA PULIDO, BLACK, BROWN, YELLOW, AND LEFT: RADICAL ACTIVISM
IN Los ANGELES 168 (2006); Malcolm X, The Ballot or the Bullet?, in MALCOLM X SPEAKS:
SELECTED SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS 23-44 (George Breitman ed., 1965) (urging Black
Americans to take their case for human rights to the United Nations). See generally JEFFREY
O.G. OGHAR, BLACK POWER: RADICAL POLITICS AND AFRICAN AMERICAN IDENTITY (2004).
50. See PULIDO, supra note 49, at 282-84; Morales & Oliver-Velez, supra note 32, at 9-
13.
51. Morales & Oliver-Velez, supra note 32, at ix.
52. See Ward Churchill, American Indian Movement in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
INDIAN HISTORY 638, 640 (Bruce E. Johansen & Barry M. Pritzker eds., 2008).
53. See id. at 641-42; see also infra notes 467-73 and accompanying text.
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network of local chapters that established programs to empower com-
munities in their struggles for the basic necessities of life and
participated in local, national, and international coalitions tran-
scending the boundaries of race and ethnicity. Their analyses situated
their communities' problems and potential solutions within the global
context of anti-colonial movements and evolving interpretations of col-
lective rights under international law, particularly the right to self-
determination.
B. Persistent Disparities
Despite the hope and energy, theorizing and mobilizing, that ac-
companied these movements, some fifty years later it is clear that
neither racial justice nor community control was achieved. For all the
talk of this being a "postracial" era, the continuing reality of race-re-
lated privilege and racial hierarchy in the United States is evidenced
by virtually all measures of socioeconomic wellbeing, as well as statis-
tics reflecting the disproportionate criminalization of people of color.54
More than one-quarter of all Black, Latina/o, and American Indian re-
sidents live below the poverty line, compared to about one tenth of
White residents.5 5 As of 2010, the median income of Black households
was less than 60% of that of their White counterparts, a percentage
that has not changed significantly since 1972.56 Moreover, a majority
of African Americans born to middle-income families in the late 1960s
have been "downwardly mobile" since then.5 7 At the end of the 1990s,
"the average on-reservation [American] Indian citizen still had per cap-
ita income of less than $8,000, compared to more than $21,500 for the
average U.S. resident," making American Indians "the economically
54. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 41, at 50 (noting the need for a theory of "racial
formation" that accounts for "the extent to which U.S. society is racially structured from top
to bottom"). See generally Cho, supra note 9.
55. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVER-
AGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010 17 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2011pubs/p60-239.pdf; see also Alicia Parlapiano, 50 Years of Poverty, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/01/04/business/50-years-of-poverty.html
? r=0.
56. DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 55, at 6, 9.
57. JULIA B. ISAACS ET AL., GETTING AHEAD OR LOSING GROUND: ECONOMIC MOBILITY IN
AMERICA 5 (2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2008/02/economic
-mobility-sawhill; see also Barnes et al., supra note 9, at 986. The median wealth of White
households in 2009 was twenty times that of Black households and eighteen times that of
Hispanic households. Rakesh Kochhar et al., Wealth Gaps Rise to Record Highs Between
Whites, Blacks, Hispanics, PEw RESEARCH CENTER (July 26, 2011), http://www.pewsocial-
trends.org/2011/07/26/wealth-gaps-rise-to-record-highs-between-whites-blacks-hispanics/.
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poorest identifiable group in America."58 Similar disparities are found
in statistics relating to healthcare,5 9 housing,6 0 education,6 ' and em-
ployment. 62
The effects of poverty and unemployment are reflected in and
compounded by rapidly rising and disparate rates of arrest and incar-
ceration as well as instances of abuse and death at the hands of the
police.63 Since 1972, the American prison population has grown sixfold
to over 2.2 million people, giving the United States the dubious distinc-
tion of having the world's largest prison population and highest rate of
incarceration. 6 4 In addition, some 4.8 million people are being moni-
58. Rob Capriccioso, The State of Indian Economic Development, NEWS FROM INDIAN
COUNTRY (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.indiancountrynews.com/index.php/news/26-main
stream-politics/1615-the-state-of-indian-economic-development?showall=1.
59. See generally Centers for Disease Control, Fact Sheet-CDC Health Disparities and
Inequalities Report-U.S., 2011, available at http://www.cde.gov/minorityhealth/CHDIR/
2011/FactSheet.pdf. As of 2010, some 30% of Latina/os and American Indians and 20% of
Black and Asian Americans were without health insurance, as compared to about 12% of
Whites. DENAVAs-WALT ET AL., supra note 55, at 24-25; Minority Health: American Indian
& Alaska Native Populations, CDC, http://www.cde.gov/minorityhealth/populations/REMP/
aian.html#Disparities (last updated Feb. 3, 2015).
60. As of 2004, about three quarters of White families owned homes, as compared to
just under half of African American and Latinalo families, and subsequently homeowners of
color were disproportionately hurt by the mortgage crisis. Richard Marsico & Jane Yoo,
Racial Disparities in Subprime Home Mortgage Lending in New York City: Meaning and
Implications, 53 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1011, 1013 (2008-2009); see also Andr6 Douglas Pond
Cummings, Families of Color in Crisis: Bearing the Weight of the Financial Market
Meltdown, 55 How. L.J. 303, 303-12 (2012). On American Indian housing issues, see infra
note 202 and accompanying text.
61. In 2013, over 35% of the White population had a bachelor's degree or higher, as
compared to 22% of the Black population and about 15% of Latina/os. See Digest of Educa-
tion Statistics, NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT., http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/dl3/
tables/dt13_104.10.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
62. As of October 2014, the official Black unemployment rate was 10.7%, more than
twice the White unemployment rate of 4.6%. See Table A-2 Employment Status of the Civil-
ian Population by Race, Sex, and Age, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., available at http://www.bls
.gov/news.release/empsit.t02.htm. American Indian unemployment rates are dramatically
higher. See infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
63. Some 80% of all persons facing felony charges are indigent, and communities of
color are disproportionately poor. See Stephen B. Bright, The Accused Get What the System
Doesn't Pay for, in PRISON NATION: THE WAREHOUSING OF AMERICA's POOR 6 (Tara Herivel &
Paul Wright eds., 2003).
64. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS 8 (2010); Facts about Prisons and People in Prison, THE SENTENCING
PROJECT, http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc-Facts%20About%20Prisons.pdf
(last visited Apr. 1, 2015) [hereinafter Facts about Prisons]. On the racialized history of
mass incarceration, see generally Ian F. Haney L6pez, Is the "Post" in Post-Racial the
"Blind" in Colorblind?, 32 CARDozo L. REV. 807 (2011).
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tored under conditions of probation or parole. 65 Over 60% of the prison
population is comprised of racial or ethnic minorities, and almost 40%
is African American.66 In human terms, these statistics mean that,
among other things, communities of color are stripped of some of their
most vital human and economic resources and have diminished politi-
cal power due to the disenfranchisement of those with felony
convictions.6 7 As summarized by law professor Michelle Alexander,
"The stark and sobering reality is that, for reasons largely unrelated to
actual crime trends, the American penal system has emerged as a sys-
tem of social control unparalleled in world history."68
The history of the mass movements that propelled the resis-
tance of the mid-twentieth century has been virtually erased from
public consciousness and the resulting reforms are portrayed not as a
necessary first step toward substantive justice, but as its realization.69
We see occasional demonstrations protesting particularly egregious in-
cidents of police brutality, select executions, or draconian immigration
policies but no sustained mass movements challenging the racial ineq-
uities that still pervade American society.70 The absence of collective
vision and energy is palpable. What happened to that energy, and to
the analyses that linked the situations of communities of color in the
United States to global movements for decolonization, assessed their
material and psychological conditions in terms of internal colonialism,
65. NICOLE D. PORTER, THE STATE OF SENTENCING 2012: DEVELOPMENTS IN POLICY AND
PRACTICE 1 (2013), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/sen-State%20
of%20Sentencing%202012.pdf.
66. See Racial Disparity, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/
template/page.cfm?id=122 (last visited Apr. 1, 2015); Facts about Prisons, supra note 64
(also noting that 32% of Black men, compared to 6% of White men, serve time in prison).
67. See generally Nekima Levy-Pounds, Par for the Course? Exploring the Impacts of
Incarceration and Marginalization on Poor Black Men in the U.S., 14 J. L. SOCIETY 29
(2013) (noting that 38% of the prison population is African American).
68. ALEXANDER, supra note 64, at 8; see also Ted Sampsell-Jones, Culture and Con-
tempt: The Limitations of Expressive Criminal Law, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 133, 190 (2003)
(noting that "we should fear that the criminal law is functioning perfectly" in terms of
"mark[ing] others as inferior").
69. See Barnes et al., supra note 9, at 976 (likening the claim that America is postracial
to one senator's proposal that the United States simply declare victory and withdraw from
Vietnam).
70. On the failure of the Occupy movement, perhaps the closest we have seen to a mass
mobilization, to address racial issues, see generally Sandy Grande, Accumulation of the
Primitive: The Limits of Liberalism and the Politics of Occupy Wall Street, 3 SETTLER COLO-
NIAL STUD. 369 (2013), available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/
2201473X.2013.810704#.VQDrWPnF98E; see also Kenyon Farrow, Occupy Wall Street's
Race Problem, THE Am. PROSPECT (Oct. 24, 2011), http://prospect.org/article/occupy-wall-
streets-race-problem.
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and articulated political goals within the framework of the right of all
peoples to self-determination?
C. Retrenchment and Repression
The late author/activist Maya Angelou observed,
In these bloody days and frightful nights when an urban warrior
can find no face more despicable than his own, no ammunition more
deadly than self-hate and no target more deserving of his true aim
than his brother, we must wonder how we came so late and lonely
to this place.7 '
This sentiment rings as true today as it did in 1991, and Angelou's
question still haunts us.
Direct governmental repression is, no doubt, part of how we
came to this place, one that has not changed significantly over the past
several decades, despite the surge of optimism that accompanied Presi-
dent Obama's election in 2008.72 All of the movements of the mid-
1950s through early 1970s were subjected to intensive surveillance, in-
filtration, and the use of disinformation to create splits within
organizations and to discredit them in the public eye, most famously
through the COINTELPRO (counter-intelligence) operations of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).73 Organizations perceived as
the most "radical" also faced a barrage of criminal prosecutions that
relied on false testimony and planted evidence to divert their resources
and incarcerate their leaders. 7 4 In some instances, when these tactics
failed to accomplish their stated purpose of "neutralizing" threats to
the status quo, leaders such as Fred Hampton and Mark Clark of the
Chicago Black Panthers were simply assassinated. 75 In other cases, as
in the government's siege of American Indian Movement activists and
71. Maya Angelou, I Dare to Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1991, at E15, quoted in Bell,
supra note 2, at 375.
72. See Tibbs, supra note 2, at 48.
73. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA PATRIOT Act in
the Context of COINTELPRO and the Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent, 81 OR. L.
REV. 1051, 1078-104 (2002) [hereinafter Saito, Whose Liberty]. See generally WARD CHURC-
HILL & JIM VANDER WALL, THE COINTELPRO PAPERS: DOCUMENTS FROM THE FBI's SECRET
WARS AGAINST DISSENT IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 2002).
74. See Ward Churchill, "To Disrupt, Discredit and Destroy": The FBI's Secret War
Against the Black Panther Party, in LIBERATION, IMAGINATION AND THE BLACK PANTHER
PARTY 78, 82-106 (Kathleen Cleaver & George Katsiaficas eds., 2001).
75. See id. at 106-08; see also Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979),
rev'd in part, 446 U.S. 754 (1980), remanded 499 F. Supp. 640 (1980) (finding the killings
actionable). See generally JEFFREY HAAS, THE ASSASSINATION OF FRED HAMPTON: HOW THE
FBI AND THE CHICAGO POLICE MURDERED A BLACK PANTHER (2010).
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supporters at Wounded Knee in 1973, intense military force was
deployed, and military counterinsurgency tactics were subsequently
used to undermine support for AIM on the Pine Ridge Reservation.76
Despite being condemned as illegal and unconstitutional by no
less than a Senate oversight committee, no one was held responsible
for the violations of constitutional rights resulting from these opera-
tions, and many of their victims remain incarcerated.77 Organizations
that advocated self-determination for people of color under U.S. juris-
diction have been erased, for the most part, from mainstream history
and are portrayed in the popular media as "gangs" of criminals and
thugs.78 Many COINTELPRO tactics have been legalized in the "war
on terror,"7 9 and advocates of "separatism" are now classified as ex-
tremists and potential terrorists not only by the FBI, but also by liberal
organizations such as the Southern Poverty Law Center. 0 It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that Maya Angelou's "urban warriors" might
consider defending their communities and creating alternative institu-
tions to be, at best, exercises in futility.
Broader policies and programs, less explicitly targeting activ-
ists, also help explain some of what appears to be political apathy.8 '
Responding to the mass movements that swept the country in the
1960s, the urban rebellions, and the recommendations of the Kerner
76. See WARD CHURCHILL & JIM VANDER WALL, AGENTS OF REPRESSION: THE FBI's SE-
CRET WARS AGAINST THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT 140-
70 (2d ed. 2002); Ward Churchill, The Bloody Wake of Alcatraz: Political Repression of the
American Indian Movement During the 1970s, in AMERICAN INDIAN ACTIVISM: ALCATRAZ TO
THE LONGEST WALK 242-84 (Troy Johnson et al. eds., 1997).
77. See SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOV'T OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLI-
GENCE ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT: INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS,
S. Rep. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. bk. III, at 8 (1976) (declaring these programs "abhor-
rent in a free society") [hereinafter SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT].
78. See Michael K. Smith, "The Black Panthers: Revolutionaries, Not Thugs," Dissi-
DENT VOICE (Jan. 1, 2014), http://dissidentvoice.org/2014/01/the-black-panthers-
revolutionaries-not-thugs/.
79. See Saito, Whose Liberty, supra note 73, at 1104-28.
80. The Senate committee responsible for investigating these operations identified five
overarching categories of targets: the Communist Party USA, the Socialist Workers Party,
"White Hate Groups," "Black Nationalist Hate Groups," and the "New Left." SENATE SE-
LECT COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 77, at 4. The Southern Poverty Law Center,
dedicated to "seeking justice for the most vulnerable members of our society," lists "Black
Separatists" along with the Ku Klux Klan and Neo-Nazis as "extremist" hate groups. Who
We Are, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, http://www.splcenter.org/who-we-are (last visited
Apr. 9, 2015); Extremist Files, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, http://www.splcenter.org/
get-informed/intelligence-files/ideology (last visited Apr. 9, 2015).
81. See Tibbs, supra note 2, at 52 ("[F]rom 1966 through 1980, the state pursued two
primary strategies in repressing the Black liberation struggle: to criminalize Black expres-
sions of sovereignty and to criminally assault Black people everywhere.").
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Commission, the federal government instituted a wide range of pro-
grams intended to improve employment, education, the welfare
system, and housing in poor communities.8 2 Despite evidence that
these programs were making a difference and that crime rates were
not rising, the government's focus soon shifted to an ever-intensifying
"war on crime."8 3 As summarized by Christian Parenti, "Crime meant
urban, urban meant Black, and the war on crime meant a bulwark
built against the increasingly political and vocal racial 'other' by the
predominantly white state."8 4
By the early 1970s, the war on crime had morphed into the "war
on drugs," whose disproportionate effect on African Americans is well
documented and succinctly summarized in the fact that by 1999, Black
people comprised about 13% of the U.S. population and its drug users,
but 74% of those imprisoned for drug offenses. 5 The drug war was ac-
companied by a rise in the militarization of police forces throughout
the country, altering their character, in Kenneth Nunn's terms, "from
law enforcement agencies to military occupation forces."8 6 All of these
dynamics have intensified in the "war on terror," which is generally
associated with the attacks of September 11, 2001, but can be more
accurately traced, at least domestically, to draconian legislation passed
82. See Annie Lowrey, 50 Years Later, War on Poverty is a Mixed Bag, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
2, 2014, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/business/50-years-later-
war-on-poverty-is-a-mixed-bag.html.
83. See PETER EDELMAN, So RICH, So POOR: WHY IT'S So HARD TO END POVERTY IN
AMERICA 18 (2013) (noting that poverty in the U.S. was "cut in half between 1959 and 1973,"
at least in part because of President Lyndon Johnson's "war on poverty") [hereinafter
EDELMAN, So RICH, So PooR]; JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN AMERICAN
MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 26-30 (1996) (noting relative stability of crime
rates); see also ROBERT M. CIPES, THE CRIME WAR 3, 8 (1968).
84. CHRISTIAN PARENTI, LOCKDOWN AMERICA: POLICE AND PRISONS IN THE AGE OF CRISIS
7 (1999).
85. See Ira Glasser, American Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow, 63 ALB. L. REV. 703, 719
(2000); ALEXANDER, supra note 64, at 95-137. See generally John A. Powell & Eileen B. Her-
shenov, Hostage to the Drug War: The National Purse, the Constitution and the Black
Community, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 557 (1991). On government involvement in the influx of
drugs into Black communities, see generally ALFRED W. McCoy, THE POLITICS OF HEROIN:
CIA COMPLICITY IN THE GLOBAL DRUG TRADE (rev'd ed. 2003).
86. Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the
"War on Drugs" was a "War on Blacks," 6 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 381, 404 (2002). See
generally AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WAR COMES HOME: THE EXCESSIVE MILI-
TARIZATION OF AMERICAN POLICING (June 2014), available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/
default/files/assets/jusl4-warcomeshome-report-web-rell.pdf. This framing was not new, of
course. See ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, TARGET ZERO: A LIFE IN WRITING 127 (Kathleen Cleaver ed.,
2006) (noting that the Black Panther Party intended to "drive the occupying army of the
police out of the black community").
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in the 1990s.8 7 In the name of fighting drugs, crime and terrorism, gov-
ernmental power has dramatically expanded, constitutional rights
have been eviscerated, and immigrants' rights have been dramati-
cally-and retroactively-curtailed.I'
In the meantime, people of color have been particularly hard-hit
by the deindustrialization of the American economy and the attendant
shift from relatively stable manufacturing jobs to low-wage, part-time
service sector employment. 9 Welfare "reform" has virtually eliminated
any safety net with the result that-to give just one example-as of
2011, six million Americans had no income besides food stamps.90
These rollbacks had a disproportionate impact on people of color but,
as Peter Edelman has observed, were instituted with little explicit dis-
cussion of race because "welfare," like "crime," "had become a code
word for race."9 '
We are not talking simply about poverty or discrimination but
about an intensifying regime of "structural violence." 9 2 Under these
circumstances, it is not difficult to understand why the energy fueling
the movements of the 1960s has dissipated.93 When the dynamics of
oppression are apparent, or made conscious, it is easier to define one-
self in opposition to systemic subordination, as happened when people
of color mobilized against legally mandated apartheid in the United
States. 9 4 But resistance becomes much more complicated when the in-
stitutional dynamics are so deeply rooted that they no longer have a
human face, when they perpetuate themselves without any particular-
ized discriminatory intent, and it is easy to believe that we-or those
closest to us-are the primary source of our own problems.95
87. See Natsu Taylor Saito, For "Our" Security: Who is an "American" and What is
Protected by Enhanced Law Enforcement and Intelligence Powers? 2 SEATTLE J. FOR Soc.
JUST. 23, 40-45 (2003).
88. Id.
89. See Tibbs, supra note 2, at 55 (noting that as a result of deindustrialization "be-
tween 1965 and 1990, Black family income fell fifty percent, and Black youth
unemployment quadrupled").
90. EDELMAN, So RICH, So PooR, supra note 83, at xviii.
91. Peter Edelman, Welfare and the Politics of Race: Same Tune, New Lyrics?, 11 GEO.
J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y 389, 397 (2004).
92. Tibbs, supra note 2, at 53.
93. See id. at 65.
94. See ROBERT J. COTTROL ET AL., BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION: CASTE, CULTURE,
AND THE CONSTITUTION 49 (2003) ("Jim Crow was twentieth-century America's experience
with petty and not so petty apartheid.").
95. On the intensified psychological damage that results from this perception, see
WARD CHURCHILL, KILL THE INDIAN, SAVE THE MAN: THE GENOCIDAL IMPACT OF AMERICAN
INDIAN RESIDENTIAL SCHOOLS 71 (2004) [hereinafter CHURCHILL, KILL THE INDIAN]; see also
Ward Churchill, Kizhiibaabinesik: A Bright Star Burning Briefly, in LEAH RENAE KELLY, IN
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Limiting our consideration of remedies for racial inequities to
the due process and equal protection offered by constitutional theory
has proven futile, I believe, because this approach derives from a para-
digm that dismisses racial realities as exceptional. Racial realism is
another way of saying that we have to be willing to look honestly at our
histories and contemporary realities, foregoing the comfort of a narra-
tive that promises constant if gradual "progress." Racial realism also
requires that we see beyond "race," for, as Gerald Torres observes,
"race in the United States has consistently functioned as a proxy for
power."96 If the issues of day-to-day racism encountered by people of
color-the stereotyping, the exclusions, the micro-aggressions, and
even the physical attacks-are not the root of the problem but some of
its myriad manifestations, neither postracialism nor multicultural plu-
ralism will help us resolve these problems, for they do not address the
structural dynamics of power.
D. Racial Realism and Colonial Relations
What can be done to transform the self-nullification that results
from trauma and despair into creative and energized responses to po-
litical, economic, and sociocultural subordination? Theory will not
liberate us, but it can expand or constrain our ability to envision alter-
natives that have the potential to move us beyond the status quo. As
noted above, during the 1960s, it was fairly common for Black and La-
tinalo communities within the United States to be described by
political activists as internally colonized.97 In recent decades, a strong
body of scholarly analysis has emerged that assesses Indigenous peo-
ples within the United States as colonized.98 However, the situation of
MY OWN VOICE: EXPLORATIONS IN THE SOCIOPOLITICAL CONTEXT OF ART AND CINEMA 24-27
(2001).
96. Gerald Torres, American Blood: Who Is Counting and for What?, 58 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 1017, 1019 (2014).
97. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., ROBERT ODAWI PORTER, SOVEREIGNTY, COLONIALISM AND THE INDIGENOUS
NATIONS: A READER (2005) [hereinafter PORTER, SOVEREIGNTY]; Ward Churchill, The Indige-
nous Peoples of North America: A Struggle Against Internal Colonialism, in STRUGGLE FOR
THE LAND: NATIVE NORTH AMERICAN RESISTANCE TO GENOCIDE, ECOCIDE AND COLONIZATION
15-22 (2002) [hereinafter Churchill, The Indigenous Peoples]; HAUNANI-KAY TRASK, FROM A
NATIVE DAUGHTER: COLONIALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY IN HAWAI'I (1993) [hereinafter TRASK,
FROM A NATIVE DAUGHTER]; Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism,
Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1993);
Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trial of Decolonizing
and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 219 (1986).
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other peoples of color within the United States is rarely discussed,
much less theorized, in terms of colonialism.99
At least with respect to non-Indigenous peoples, internal coloni-
alism, as a theoretical tool, has come to be regarded, at best, as an
empowering analogy rather than a framework for meaningful struc-
tural analysis. 00 The demise of this approach has been attributed to
the systematic and violent repression of organizations and movements
that framed their goals in terms of national liberation, as well as the
(perhaps related) failure of mainstream social science to recognize it as
a legitimate inquiry.' 0 ' These developments, however, tell us only that
such an approach is perceived as a threat to the status quo; they do not
address the underlying question of whether ongoing colonization ac-
counts for significant aspects of contemporary American "race
relations."
Moving beyond social and political pressures to abandon the
construct of internal colonialism, I suspect that a major theoretical
weakness of this approach is that it has tended to employ the lens of
external or "classic" colonialism, as exemplified by European colonial-
ism in Africa and Asia. Settler colonialism is structurally distinct from
classic colonialism and, as a result, a model that relies on a classic colo-
nial framework can only yield analogies when applied to settler
states.1 02 While the United States has maintained external colonies, it
is first and foremost a settler society. In other words, the early colo-
99. But see Marissa Jackson, Neo-Colonialism, Same Old Racism: A Critical Analysis
of the United States' Shift Toward Colorblindness as a Tool for the Protection of the Ameri-
can Colonial Empire and White Supremacy, 11 BERKELEY J. AFR.-Am. L. & POL'Y 156, 159
(2009) (arguing that "to the extent racism exists in the United States, colonialism is also
present"); Anthony Paul Farley, The Black Body as Fetish Object, 76 OR. L. REV. 457, 518-19
(1997) (describing the "black inner-city" as "the Neocolony"); ROBERT STAPLES, THE URBAN
PLANTATION: RACISM AND COLONIALISM IN THE POST CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 9-28 (1987) (arguing
that the internal colony theory best explains race and class in America). See generally
Charles Pinderhughes, Toward a New Theory of Internal Colonialism, 25 SOCIALISM AND
DEMOCRACY 235, 235-56 (2011) (arguing that contemporary African American realities are
best understood in terms of internal or domestic colonialism); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's
Corrido: Race, Postcolonial Theory, and U.S. Civil Rights, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1691, 1718
(2007) (discussing Latina/os as an internal colony). For a brief argument that African
Americans, unlike Latina/os, should not be considered internally colonized, see Richard Del-
gado, The Law of the Noose: A History of Latino Lynching, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297,
306 n.65 (2009).
100. See, e.g., Robert L. Allen, A Reply to Harold Baron, 40-41 SOCIALIST REVIEW 121
(1978) (describing the "colonial analogy" as not having "take[n] us very far toward a theoret-
ical and programmatic understanding of our situation as black Americans").
101. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING PooR: AMERICA'S ENDURING CONFRON-
TATION WITH POVERTY 81-84 (2d rev'd ed. 2013).
102. On the distinctions between classic and settler colonialism, see VERACINI, SETTLER
COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 2-6.
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nists of North America came not simply to exploit its land, labor, or
natural resources and then return to their "mother country," but to set-
tle permanently and, as part of that process, to exercise sovereignty
over the territories they occupied. 0 3
In the past few decades, settler colonial studies has emerged as
a (sub)discipline in its own right, providing an immensely useful
framework for understanding the complex relations between popula-
tion subgroups in settler societies such as the United States, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Israel.1 04 Addressing the
most fundamental dynamic that defines relationships between the col-
onizer and the colonized, settler colonial theory has focused primarily
(and appropriately) on the relations between settlers and people indig-
enous to the lands being settled. Much less attention has been paid to
how peoples brought involuntarily or less-than-voluntarily onto Indige-
nous lands relate to the colonial settler state. 0 5 Understanding the
structural dynamics of the United States through the lens of settler
colonial theory can provide us with analytical tools that facilitate a re-
alistic assessment not only of the conditions currently faced by
Indigenous peoples, but also peoples brought to this country as en-
slaved workers, incorporated by virtue of territorial annexation, or
induced to migrate without the option of becoming part of the settler
class. Such assessments, in turn, allow us to contemplate an array of
remedial options for race-based injustices that are excluded from main-
stream discourse. The following Part II provides a basic framework of
colonialism that will be used to analyze American racial hierarchy in
the following Parts.
II. COLONIAL RELATIONS
What? Post-colonialism? Have they left?
-Bobbi Sykes' 0 6
103. See HIXSON, supra note 22, at 1-2 (characterizing the U.S. as the "most significant
example of settler colonialism in world history").
104. See generally Lorenzo Veracini, "Settler Colonialism": Career of a Concept, 41 J. OF
IMPERIAL & COMMONWEALTH HISTORY 313-33 (2013), available at http://www.tandfonline
.com/doi/abs/10. 1080/03086534.2013.768099?src=recsys#.U856xlBdVF9.
105. The only thorough application of the settler colonial framework to non-Indigenous
peoples of color in the United States of which I am aware focuses primarily on distinguish-
ing these groups from White working class settlers. See J. SAKAI, SETTLERS: THE
MYTHOLOGY OF THE WHITE PROLETARIAT (1989).
106. Quoted in LINDA TUHIWAI SMITH, DECOLONIZING METHODOLOGIES: RESEARCH AND
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 25 (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter SMITH, DECOLONIZING].
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A. Colonialism: An Overview
We live today with the legacy of the European colonization of
almost all of Africa, the Americas, and much of Asia that took place
between the late 1400s and the early 1900s.' 0 7 Just a century ago,
some 84% of the world's territory was under some form of colonial dom-
ination. 0 It should come as no surprise, therefore, that colonial
relationships persist in much of the world today, including settler soci-
eties like the United States that emerged from European colonial
expansion. 0 9
Colonialism has taken many forms, and has been described in
numerous ways. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a colony as "[a]
settlement in a new country; a body of people who settle in a new local-
ity, forming a community subject to or connected with their parent
state.""10 This captures the benign way early Anglo-American settler
colonists are routinely portrayed in mainstream histories."' It also er-
ases the fact that "'forming a community' in a new land necessarily
meant unforming or re-forming [or forcibly relocating] the communi-
ties that existed there already, and involved a wide range of practices
including trade, plunder, negotiation, warfare, genocide, enslavement
and rebellions."112
A key element of colonial ideology is its "civilizing mission," de-
scribed by Antony Anghie as "the grand project that has justified
colonialism as a means of redeeming the backward, aberrant, violent,
oppressed, undeveloped people of the non-European world by incorpo-
rating them into the universal civilization of Europe.""1 3  Such
redemption, in turn, has been the rationale for imposing extensive ad-
107. See generally Makau Wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Le-
gal Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1113 (1995); Diane A. Desierto, Postcolonial International
Law Discourses on Regional Developments in South and Southeast Asia, 36 INT'L J. LEGAL
INFO. 387 (2008).
108. See JOAN FERRANTE, SOCIOLOGY: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 11 (7th ed. 2010).
109. See Mutua, supra note 107, at 1160 ("[T]he post-colonial state is, in concept and
substance, the colonial state in another guise.").
110. THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 469 (1971).
111. See infra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
112. ANIA LOOMBA, COLONIALISM/POSTCOLONIALISM 2 (1998); see also VERACINI, SETTLER
COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 2-3 ("'colony' implies the localized ascendancy of an external
element," whether it is "a political body that is dominated by an exogenous agency" or "an
exogenous entity that reproduces itself in a given environment").
113. ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw 3 (2007); see also JURGEN OSTERHAMMEL, COLONIALISM: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 17
(Shelley Frisch trans., 2005) ("Rejecting cultural compromises with the colonized popula-
tion, the colonizers are convinced of their own superiority and of their ordained mandate to
rule.").
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ministrative structures intended to eradicate the cultures, languages,
and histories, as well as the social, economic, legal, and political struc-
tures and institutions of the colonized. This project is rendered more-
or-less permanent by what Anghie terms the "dynamic of difference,"
an "endless process of creating a gap between two cultures, demar-
cating one as 'universal' and civilized and the other as 'particular' and
uncivilized."11 4 Colonial domination is justified only to the extent that
"civilization" is being promoted, and, thus, the colonized must be ren-
dered perpetually inferior."15
"A triumphant colonial society," according to Lorenzo Veracini,
is one in which "the promised equality between colonizer and colonized
. . . is forever postponed, where colonizer and colonized know and ulti-
mately retain their respective places."" 6 This state of affairs is
achieved not only-or even primarily-by brute force, but by what
Kenyan scholar Ngaigi wa Thiong'o calls the "cultural bomb" that "an-
nihilate [s] a people's belief in their names, in their languages, in their
environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their ca-
pacities and ultimately in themselves," thus "mak[ing] them want to
identify with that which is furthest removed from themselves.""7
As European colonialism extended into Africa, Asia, and the
Americas, "race" emerged as a shifting political and social construct
that incorporated the notion of more and less civilized peoples and pro-
vided markers of the "difference" relied upon by colonizing powers to
justify their ventures."" Race had the added benefit, from the coloniz-
ers' perspective, of being considered a "scientific" descriptor of physical
characteristics, serving to perpetuate the "dynamic of difference" by
linking cultural traits-real or imagined-to relatively immutable bio-
logical factors."19 Thus, colonial powers could claim to be uplifting and
civilizing the colonized through assimilationist measures intended to
eradicate their identities, while simultaneously invoking allegedly im-
114. ANGHIE, supra note 113, at 4.
115. See OSTERHAMMEL, supra note 113, at 108 (describing the "construction of 'inferior
otherness"').
116. VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 22.
117. NGIJGI WA THIONG'O, DECOLONISING THE MIND: THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE IN AFRI-
CAN LITERATURE 3 (1986).
118. See generally RONALD SANDERS, LOST TRIBES AND PROMISED LANDS: THE ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN RACISM (1992).
119. For a nuanced discussion of race and colonial ideology, see LOOMBA, supra note 112,
at 104-83. On the (pseudo)science underlying theories of racial difference, see STEPHEN JAY
GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 30-72 (1981). See generally WILLIAM STANTON, THE LEOP-
ARD'S SPOTS: SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS RACE IN AMERICA, 1815-59 (1982).
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mutable, race-based characteristics to "cap" their political, social, or
economic rights. 120
Colonialism has taken different forms. Most commonly, the
term refers to external or "classic" colonialism, characterized by
Jtirgen Osterhammel as "a relationship of domination between an in-
digenous (or forcibly imported) majority and a minority of foreign
invaders."121 In classic colonial regimes, decisions are made and imple-
mented by colonial administrators in pursuit of interests often defined
in a distant metropolis and generally involve exploitation of the land,
labor, and natural resources of territories where, for the most part, the
colonists do not intend to settle permanently.1 2 2 By contrast, settler
colonists plan not only to profit from, but also to live permanently in
the lands they occupy.1 2 3 These divergent purposes have resulted in
distinct colonial narratives and forms of social organization. These dis-
tinctions help explain why the global movement for decolonization had
so little effect on settler colonial regimes, and why analyses of internal
colonialism that rely on models of classic colonial relations have been
inadequate to explain racialized domination and subordination in the
United States.
B. Settler Colonization
Settler colonialism can be seen as replacing classic colonialism's
hierarchical relationship of center to periphery with a triangulated
structure in which the colonizers reject the hegemony of the metropoli-
tan center or colonial "motherland," and directly assert control over
Indigenous peoples as well as those who are neither indigenous to the
land nor part of the settler class.1 24 The settlers arrive with a presump-
tion of sovereign entitlement, an unshakeable belief in their right to
establish a state under their exclusive control.125 Their primary pur-
120. See ANGHIE, supra note 113, at 103-04; VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note
23, at 22.
121. OSTERHAMMEL, supra note 113, at 5-7.
122. Id. at 11, 15.
123. See VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 20, 104; HIxSON, supra note
22, at 5.
124. Veracini terms the latter "exogenous Others." See VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM,
supra note 23, at 26-27. Jodi Byrd employs "arrivants-a term ... borrow[ed] from African
Caribbean poet Kaman Brathwaite to signify those people forced into the Americas through
the violence of European and Anglo-American colonialism and imperialism around the
globe." JODI A. BYRD, THE TRANSIT OF EMPIRE: INDIGENOUS CRITIQUES OF COLONIALISM XiX
(2011).
125. See VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 53-55. Aboriginal scholar
Irene Watson observes, "The myth of colonialism is that it carried with it and applied sover-
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pose is to establish a territorial base, for this is what allows them to
create and control a society of their own imagining, and to generate the
profits that enable them to consolidate and expand their sovereign
prerogative.126
Viewing the occupied lands as the site of their own reproduc-
tion, settlers see Indigenous peoples as obstacles to be overcome.
Settlers, in Mahmood Mamdani's words, "are made by conquest, not
just by immigration."'1 2 7 Or, as Patrick Wolfe observes, although settler
colonization relies upon the appropriation of Indigenous labor, it is "at
base a winner-take-all project whose dominant feature is not exploita-
tion but replacement."1 28 While warfare between Indigenous peoples
and settlers is central to the origin stories of most settler societies-
certainly that of the United States129-armed conflict results not from
the aggression of Native peoples, but from their mere existence. "Peo-
ple got in the way just by staying home," 30 as Deborah Bird Rose aptly
summarizes.
As Indigenous peoples have been "disappeared"' 3 ' in various
ways, settlers have turned to strategies of replacement, and what they
describe as putting their newly appropriated lands and resources to
"productive" use.1 32 This requires active recruitment of a critical mass
of settlers; development of a unique cultural identity; formation of in-
eignty. The truth is that state sovereignty was claimed and constituted through
colonialism." IRENE WATSON, ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, COLONIALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
RAW LAW 5 (2015) [hereinafter WATSON, ABORIGINAL PEOPLES].
126. See Patrick Wolfe, Structure and Event: Settler Colonialism, Time, and the Ques-
tion of Genocide, in EMPIRE, COLONY, GENOCIDE: CONQUEST, OCCUPATION, AND SUBALTERN
RESISTANCE IN WORLD HISTORY 102, 103 (A. Dirk Moses ed., 2008) [hereinafter Wolfe, Struc-
ture and Event]. On the Anglo-American colonists' imaginings, see GORDON S. WOOD,
EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-1815 6-14 (2009).
127. Mahmood Mamdani, When Does a Settler Become a Native? Reflections of the Colo-
nial Roots of Citizenship in Equatorial and South Africa (May 13, 1998), available at http://
citizenshiprightsinafrica.org/docs/mamdani%201998%20inaugural%201ecture.pdf
128. WOLFE, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 25, at 163.
129. See infra notes 154-63 and accompanying text.
130. DEBORAH BIRD ROSE, HIDDEN HISTORIES: BLACK STORIES FROM VICTORIA RIVER
DOWNS, HUMBERT RIVER AND WAVE HILL STATIONs 46 (1991).
131. I use the term "disappeared," as it has come to be recognized in international law,
to reference the state-sponsored or sanctioned arbitrary detention or killing of persons per-
ceived as socially or politically undesirable. See Nikolas Kyriakou, The International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance and Its Contribu-
tion to International Human Rights Law, with Specific Reference to Extraordinary
Rendition, 13 MELB. J. INT'L L. 424, 425-44 (2012).
132. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT:
THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 246-51 (1990) (discussing Anglo-American settlers' reliance
on the Lockean notion of transforming "wastelands" into valuable property) [hereinafter
WILLIAMS, AMERICAN INDIAN].
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dependent structures of governance and social control, including but
not limited to law; and maintenance of military and economic power
sufficient to sustain the settlers in these endeavors.13 3 Settlers also
perceive a need for labor, as well as strategies to subordinate and con-
trol the labor force.1 3 4 While some migrants are recruited as fellow
settlers, most come-voluntarily or involuntarily-to join someone
else's society, on someone else's terms. They bring with them no pre-
sumption of sovereign prerogative, and this distinguishes such
migrants from the settlers as well as from the peoples indigenous to
the lands being occupied.13 5
Settler states establish, maintain, and protect their hegemony
by exercising virtually complete control over Indigenous peoples, non-
Indigenous Others, and "deviant" members of the settler class.13 6 Set-
tlers presume a prerogative to determine who will be allowed to enter
and who may-or must-remain within their claimed boundaries,
which peoples will be accorded particular civil or political rights, and
the extent to which settler privilege will be promoted and protected by
the state.13 7 Many of these determinations are enshrined in the settler
state's legal system, which is also utilized to ensure that each popula-
tion subgroup remains in its assigned place, geographically, socially,
economically, and politically. 38 For all of these reasons, Wolfe ob-
serves that settler colonial "invasion is a structure not an event."13 9
The settlers depict these powers as prerogatives of sovereignty,
but their exercise remains in constant tension with the settlers' ideo-
logical justifications for that sovereignty-their superior civilization,
133. See generally VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 23; Patrick Wolfe, Set-
tler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native, 8 J. OF GENOCIDE RES. 387-409 (2006)
[hereinafter Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native].
134. See BYRD, supra note 124, at xxiv-xxv (cautioning that a focus on labor needs can
subsume Indigenous issues).
135. See VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 3; see also James Belich,
The Rise of the Anglo World: Settlement in North America and Australasia, 1784-1918, in
REDISCOVERING THE BRITISH WORLD 39, 53 (Phillip Buckner & R. Douglas Francis eds.,
2005) (noting that an "emigrant joined someone else's society, a settler or colonist remade
his own").
136. See VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 67. On the perceived need to
control the settler population as well, see NATSU TAYLOR SAITO, MEETING THE ENEMY: AMER-
ICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 66-68 (2010) [hereinafter SAITO, MEETING
THE ENEMY].
137. See VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 32, 67.
138. On the relationship between law and social control, see generally DONALD BLACK,
THE BEHAVIOR OF LAw (Special ed. 2010). On spatial "assignment," see generally Ford,
supra note 28.
139. See Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native, supra note 133, at
388.
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their democratic and humanitarian values, the leading role they play
in their own narrative of progressive human development.1 4 0 On the
one hand, settler society is presumed sacrosanct and the inclusion of
Others cannot be allowed to corrupt it; on the other, it needs to demon-
strate, continuously, that humanity at large will benefit from accepting
its social and political structures and internalizing its worldview. This
tension is mediated by the dynamic of difference41-i. e., the construc-
tion of racial identities in a manner that ensures that the
assimilationist vision proffered by the settlers will remain just out of
reach-and this explains much about the construction and perpetua-
tion of racialized hierarchy in the United States.
C. Triangulation
As noted above, the prime directive of settler colonization to se-
cure a territorial base requires-from the settlers' perspective-the
elimination of those who, since time immemorial, have lived on, de-
fined themselves in terms of, and taken responsibility for that land.1 4 2
Two central points emerge from this foundational premise. The first is
that settler societies, including the United States, cannot continue to
function as such without continuously enforcing their jurisdiction, po-
litical and military, over their claimed territories and doing everything
in their power to ensure that their assertion of sovereignty is accepted
as legitimate within the larger global order, notwithstanding any ille-
galities involved in the acquisition of the lands at issue.1 4 3 The second
point is that settler colonial states cannot be decolonized unless their
underlying territorial claims are challenged.1 44 Reforming settler soci-
eties to be kinder, gentler, more environmentally sustainable, or more
inclusive legitimizes and, therefore, entrenches the underlying colonial
relationships; such reforms do not deconstruct settler hierarchies of
power and privilege.
Moving from a settler-Indigenous binary to a triangulated anal-
ysis that distinguishes migrants who are not intended to become part
140. On this dynamic in colonial relations generally, see ANGHIE, supra note 113, at 96-
97; with respect to European colonization, see generally ANTHONY PAGDEN, LORDS OF ALL
THE WORLD: IDEOLOGIES OF EMPIRE IN SPAIN, BRITAIN AND FRANCE c.1500-c.1800 (1998); on
its utilization by Anglo-American settlers, see SAITO, MEETING THE ENEMY, supra note 136,
at 18-34.
141. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
143. For an explication of this premise in U.S. history, see generally SAITO, MEETING
THE ENEMY, supra note 136.
144. See Wolfe, Structure and Event, supra note 126, at 103.
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of the settler class from both settlers and Indigenous peoples runs the
risk of glossing over the centrality of territorial occupation, thereby
reinforcing settler hegemony. For this reason, Native Hawaiian scholar
Haunani-Kay Trask insists that portraying immigrants to Hawai'i as
anything other than the functional equivalent of settlers means that
"[t]he history of our colonization becomes a twice-told tale," with the
political and economic "success" story of Asian immigrants who labored
for wealthy White planters for many generations reinforcing an occu-
pation that keeps Native Hawaiians landless and poor, lacking access
to decent health care or education, institutionalized in the military,
and disproportionately imprisoned.1 45 From this perspective, the sta-
tus of Asians in Hawai'i should be defined solely in terms of "their
relationship to Indigenous peoples in a settler state."1 4 6
The same, of course, could and should be said about all other
non-Indigenous peoples living in settler societies. Those of us who are
not Indigenous to this land would not be here but for settler occupation
and appropriation, and our primary relationship to the structures of
power and privilege must be understood in that context. Our very pres-
ence as non-Indigenous peoples can serve to legitimize settler society
and its occupation of Indigenous lands; struggles to remediate dispari-
ties between the settler class and non-Indigenous Others run the risk
of rendering settler colonial institutions invisible while simultaneously
reinforcing them.1 47 This is one of the pitfalls of portraying the United
States as a "nation of immigrants." As Veracini puts it, "the colonising
145. Haunani-Kay Trask, Settlers of Color and 'Immigrant' Hegemony, in ASIAN SET-
TLER COLONIALISM: FROM LOCAL GOVERNANCE TO THE HABITS OF EVERYDAY LIFE IN HAWAI'I
45, 46-47 (Candace Fujikane & Jonathan Y. Okamura eds., 2008). For more detail on Native
Hawaiian conditions of life, see Healani Sonoda, A Nation Incarcerated, in ASIAN SETTLER
COLONIALISM 99-115; David Stannard, The Hawaiians: Health, Justice, Sovereignty, in
ASIAN SETTLER COLONIALISM 161-69.
146. Candace Fujikane, Introduction: Asian Settler Colonialism in the U.S. Colony of
Hawai'i, in ASIAN SETTLER COLONIALISM: FROM LOCAL GOVERNANCE TO THE HABITS OF EVE-
RYDAY LIFE IN HAWAI'I 1, 12 (Candace Fujikane & Jonathan Y. Okamura eds., 2008); see also
Eiko Kosasa, Ideological Images, in ASIAN SETTLER COLONIALISM 209, 227 (arguing that
"[a] s Japanese settlers, we have ascended from being collaborators in a colonial system to
being enforcers and keepers of that system and have an obligation to support-but not pre-
sume to direct-Native Hawaiian self-determination"). See generally Dean Itsuji Saranillio,
Why Asian Settler Colonialism Matters: A Thought Piece on Critiques, Debates, and Indige-
nous Difference, 3 SETTLER COLONIAL STUD. 280, 280-94 (SPECIAL ISSUE) (2013), available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2013.810697.
147. VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 33-34 (noting that "exogenous
Others, unlike their indigenous counterparts, do not challenge with their very presence the
legitimacy of the settler entity" and that "the sustained presence of exogenous Others con-
firms the indigenisation of the settler collective").
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settler can disappear behind the subaltern migrant" and settler states
"can then be recoded as postcolonial migrant societies."'148
This danger must not be ignored or minimized. I do not believe,
however, that it needs to preclude development of accurate analyses of
structural racism in the United States through particularized inquiries
that address how the settler class (defined as those who came with or
have adopted the presumption that this is their society) has facilitated
the migration-voluntary or involuntary-of persons it never intended
to fully incorporate into American society and how it has developed a
panoply of social institutions to ensure that non-settler migrants re-
main subordinated within the settler state. Such analyses can help us
understand the significance of the differences between the treatment of
Indigenous peoples and non-Indigenous Others, and how these distinc-
tions are rooted in the diverse purposes served by various segments of
the population over whom the settler class asserts hegemonic control.
Clarifying these relationships can, in turn, help us better un-
derstand the persistence of race-based injustices and disparities, the
ways in which the subordination of so-called racial minorities is rooted
in the displacement of Indigenous peoples, and the need to give pri-
macy to Indigenous struggles for self-determination.14 9 Structural
analyses are rooted in the narratives through which we define our-
selves and our actions. Some of the ways in which these narratives can
either reinforce or begin to deconstruct the racialized structures of set-
tler hegemony are addressed in the following Part.
III. RECASTING THE NARRATIVE
The silent spaces of history raise the most profound questions.
-Howard Berman'5 0
Narratives of origin, identity, and purpose structure social rela-
tions, identifying who belongs, their status with respect to others, and
how decisions for the collective will be made and enforced. They tell us
who we are, where we have come from and where we are going, what
148. Id. at 108.
149. In other words, a failure to align oneself with the colonized places one in the posi-
tion of functioning as a colonizer. As Albert Memmi said, "[T]he facts of colonial life are not
simply ideas, but the general effect of actual conditions. To refuse means either withdraw-
ing physically from those conditions or remaining to fight and change them." ALBERT
MEMMI, THE COLONIZER AND THE COLONIZED 19 (1965).
150. Howard R. Berman, Perspectives on American Indian Sovereignty and Inter-
national Law, 1600 to 1776, in EXILED IN THE LAND OF THE FREE: DEMOCRACY, INDIAN
NATIONS, AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 125, 126 (Oren R. Lyons & John C. Mohawk eds.,
1992).
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we should fear, what we should want, and how we should try to get
it.' 5 ' Our stories also shape what will be recognized as substantive jus-
tice or injustice, and define remedial options in terms of both means
and ends, for, as the late Robert Cover observed, "[n]o set of legal insti-
tutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it
and give it meaning."1 5 2 To understand the limitations of the legal
remedies available within the constraints of constitutional rights as in-
terpreted by the Supreme Court, and to expand our vision to include
more liberatory alternatives, it is helpful to consider the narratives
within which we understand our histories and our futures.
A. Settler Origin Stories
Settler origin stories typically begin with their own arrival, ren-
dering invisible the societies being replaced, or recasting them as part
of the wilderness tamed by the colonists' "civilizing mission." 53 The
American history most of us were taught is such a story, generally
starting with a reference to Christopher Columbus and quickly skip-
ping to the Pilgrims and Puritans, and the "pioneers" who settled the
West.1 54 The dominant narrative of U.S. history portrays the American
"founding fathers" as making a decisive break with British colonialism,
thus banishing colonial relations to the distant past and leaving no
room for assessing the extent to which they may account for institu-
tionalized structures of privilege and subordination.15 5 The founders'
desire for democratic governance and religious freedom is emphasized,
and the selectivity with which various groups were encouraged-or
not-to migrate is obfuscated by the mantra that this is a "nation of
immigrants ."156
151. See Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narra-
tive, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2435-41 (1988). See generally Charles Lawrence III, Listening
for Stories in All the Right Places: Narrative and Racial Formation Theory, 47 LAW & Soc'Y
REV. 247 (2012).
152. Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4, 4-5 (1983).
153. See ANGHIE, supra note 113 and accompanying text.
154. See JAMES W. LOEWEN, LIES My TEACHER TOLD ME: EVERYTHING YOUR AMERICAN
HISTORY TEXTBOOK GOT WRONG 31-134 (2007).
155. See Lorenzo Veracini, Telling the End of the Settler Colonial Story, in STUDIES IN
SETTLER COLONIALISM: POLITICS, IDENTITY AND CULTURE 204, 211-12 (Fiona Bateman & Li-
onel Pilkington eds., 2011) (explaining how the "national" replaces what is indigenous and
the colonizer is depicted as a colonized subject) [hereinafter Veracini, Telling the End].
156. See, e.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294 (1978) ("As a nation we exhibit ex-
traordinary hospitality to those who come to our country, which is not surprising for we
have often been described as 'a nation of immigrants."'); Juanita Sales Lee, We Are a Nation
of Immigrants, 56 FED. LAW. MONTHLY 3, 3-4 (2009) (Message from the President of the
Federal Bar Association).
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The American origin story provides a highly sanitized version of
the violence employed against, and the exploitation of, Indigenous peo-
ples, persons of African descent, and occasionally some immigrant
groups, but relegates these actions to a past for which no one is today
responsible. Such injustices are described as unfortunate rather than
willfully cruel, as the inevitable growing pains of an emergent democ-
racy or, at a minimum, as mitigated by the assertion that those in
power were acting for a higher purpose and in accordance with the
standards of their time. 5 7 The latter perspective is aptly summarized
by Israeli historian Benny Morris' observation that "[e]ven the great
American democracy could not have been created without the annihila-
tion of the Indians. There are cases in which the overall, final good
justifies harsh and cruel acts in the course of history." 58
The "final good" is represented in the characterization of the
United States as not only "the most prosperous, powerful nation on
Earth," but also a beacon of freedom and democracy for the rest of the
world.' 59 It is the culmination of Western civilization, we are told, the
product of a genealogy that, as historian Eric Wolf puts it, takes us
from ancient Greece and Rome to Christian Europe, from the Renais-
sance and the Enlightenment to political democracy and the industrial
revolution. 60 "Industry, crossed with democracy, in turn yielded the
United States, embodying the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness."11 6 Historic exclusions from political processes, as well as
legalized apartheid, are noted as passing phases in the gradual exten-
sion of democratic rights to White women and people of color.1 62
157. See generally WARD CHURCHILL, 'To Judge Them by the Standards of Their Time":
America's Indian Fighters, the Laws of War and the Question of International Order, in
PERVERSIONS OF JUSTICE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLE & ANGLOAMERICAN LAW 303, 303-403 (2003).
158. See Ari Shavit, Survival of the Fittest?: An Interview with Benny Morris, COUNTER-
PUNCH (Jan. 16-18, 2004), http://www.counterpunch.org/2004/01/16/an-interview-with-
benny-morris/ (reproducing Morris' interview originally published in Ha'aretz).
159. President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009), available at http://
www.inaugural.senate.gov/swearing-in/address/address-by-barack-obama-2009; see also
President Ronald Reagan, Farewell Address (Jan. 11, 1989) available at http://www.ameri-
canrhetoric.com/speeches/ronaldreaganfarewelladdress.html (stating that America is "still
a beacon, still a magnet for all who must have freedom"); President George W. Bush, Ad-
dress to the Nation (Sept. 11, 2001) available at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/
gwbush9lladdresstothenation.htm ("America was targeted for attack because we're the
brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world.").
160. ERIC R. WOLF, EUROPE AND THE PEOPLE WITHOUT HISTORY 5 (1982). On this line-
age, and its fallacies, see generally JOHN C. MOHAWK, UTOPIAN LEGACIES: A HISTORY OF
CONQUEST AND OPPRESSION IN THE WESTERN WORLD (2000).
161. WOLF, supra note 160, at 5.
162. See LOEWEN, supra note 154, at 204-18, 280-300.
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In this history, colonialism is referenced only with respect to the
settlers' insistence on independence from Britain; the founders were
the victims, not the perpetrators, of colonial exploitation and violence,
and any violence they engaged in was in self-defense. 63 This is a com-
forting narrative for those who benefit from-or believe, or want to
believe, they benefit from-the status quo. However, there are many
for whom the hegemonic American narrative rings hollow. Its "silent
spaces" are filled with alternate histories and grim realities that do not
comport with the storyline of ever-expanding human wellbeing in the
United States and the world more generally. Developing the capacity
to envision liberatory alternatives requires narratives capable of ac-
counting for the experiences of all peoples in this society in structural
terms, without dismissing their hardships as anomalies or resorting to
exceptionalism and its "greater good" justifications.
B. The Stories of Others
In A Way of Being Free, Nigerian author Ben Okri says, "In a
fractured age, when cynicism is god, here is a possible heresy: we live
by stories, we also live in them . . . . We live stories that either give our
lives meaning or negate it with meaninglessness."1 64 If the liberal dem-
ocratic narrative of the United States as a "nation of immigrants"
moving inexorably toward equal rights and opportunities for all of its
citizens is structurally unattainable because it conflicts with the fun-
damental realities and purposes of settler colonialism, what we
perceive as apathy about struggles for equality may be a perfectly rea-
sonable response to a story that negates meaning in our lives. But we
need not be limited by the narratives that purport to define us for, as
Okri also notes, "[i]f we change the stories we live by, quite possibly we
change our lives. "165
1. Indigenous Perspectives
If we acknowledge this to be a colonial settler state, we cannot
ignore the fact that its land base and natural resources-its very exis-
tence, as well as its wealth and power-derive from the elimination of
Indigenous peoples and the appropriation of their lands. Any narrative
that ignores or glosses over this foundational reality serves to reinforce
163. See VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 79-81.
164. THOMAS KING, THE TRUTH ABOUT STORIES: A NATIVE NARRATIVE 153 (2003) (quot-
ing BEN OKRI, A WAY OF BEING FREE 46 (1997)).
165. Id.
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settler hegemony by entrenching the myth that this was, or might as
well have been, unoccupied land.' 66 Histories that begin from that pre-
mise, implicitly or explicitly, cannot accurately reflect the origins of
this country, explain its subsequent history, or account for current
structural realities. This is much more than a theoretical problem be-
cause strategies to empower our communities or redress structural
inequities cannot be effective within the constraints of such narratives.
Getting beyond these constraints involves some appreciation of
what settler society has sought to erase and replace, i.e., the hundreds
of nations of diverse peoples who trace their origins to this continent. It
is estimated that, prior to European contact, some fifteen million peo-
ple lived in what is now identified as the continental United States.16 7
They had highly developed cosmologies and cultures; 68 extensive agri-
cultural production;1 69 complex languages and systems of governance,
including not only internal but also international law;1 70 and extensive
networks of trade and communication across the continent.' 7 ' Indige-
nous sovereignty over their lands and territories was a given. As an
Onondaga diplomat pointed out to the British governor of New York in
166. See Milner S. Ball, Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2280, 2296-97 (1989) (describing the eradication or caricaturization of American Indi-
ans within standard versions of the U.S. origin story). On the development of and
controversy over the Columbus story, see generally TIMOTHY KUBAL, CULTURAL MOVEMENTS
AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY: CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS AND THE REWRITING OF THE NATIONAL
ORIGIN MYTH (2008).
167. See KIRKPATRICK SALE, THE CONQUEST OF PARADISE: CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS AND
THE COLUMBIAN LEGACY 316 (1990); see also Lenore A. Stiffarm with Phil Lane, Jr., The
Demography of Native North America: A Question of American Indian Survival, in THE
STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA: GENOCIDE, COLONIZATION, AND RESISTANCE 23, 26-28 (M. An-
nette Jaimes ed., 1992).
168. See MOHAWK, supra note 160, at 15-28. See generally Rennard Strickland, Imple-
menting the National Policy of Understanding, Preserving, and Safeguarding the Heritage of
Indian Peoples and Native Hawaiians: Human Rights, Sacred Objects, and Cultural Patri-
mony, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 175 (1992).
169. See Oren R. Lyons, The American Indian in the Past, in EXILED IN THE LAND OF THE
FREE: DEMOCRACY, INDIAN NATIONS, AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 13, 31 (Oren R. Lyons &
John C. Mohawk eds., 1992); see also JACK WEATHERFORD, INDIAN GIVERS: HOW THE INDIANS
OF THE AMERICAS TRANSFORMED THE WORLD 63 (1988) (noting that some 60% of contem-
porary agricultural products originated in the Americas).
170. See John C. Mohawk & Oren R. Lyons, Introduction in EXILED IN THE LAND OF THE
FREE: DEMOCRACY, INDIAN NATIONS, AND THE U.S. CONSTIToTION 1, 3 (Oren R. Lyons & John
C. Mohawk eds., 1992). See generally Rennard Strickland, Wolf Warriors and Turtle Kings:
Native American Law Before the Blue Coats, 72 WASH. L. REV. 103 (1997); Robert A. Wil-
liams, Jr., Linking Arms Together: Multicultural Constitutionalism in a North American
Indigenous Vision of Law and Peace, 82 CAL. L. REV. 981 (1994).
171. See Robert J. Miller, Economic Development in Indian Country: Will Capitalism or
Socialism Succeed?, 80 OR. L. REV. 757, 786-98 (2001).
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1684, "We being a Free People ... may give our Lands, and be joyn'd to
the Sachem we like best."17 2
Against this backdrop, the Anglo-American colonists' "notion of
a pre-emptive right to the continent," embodied in their colonial char-
ters that "designated the Pacific Ocean . . . as the western boundary of
the several colonies," 73 and their presumption of sovereignty over ter-
ritory that they had never seen,1 74 explains much about the means
they employed and the ideology they invoked to support their endeav-
ors. As charitably put by historian Walter LaFeber, "[t] he genius of the
Founding Fathers" lay in their perception that a "reciprocal relation-
ship" could be developed between "landed and maritime expansion"
and the new American empire's "ideals of justice, political representa-
tion, and opportunity."175
We can see that the settlers' racialized depictions of American
Indians as lawless, godless, warlike and wandering "savages" were not
merely the result of ignorance or prejudice-their own documentation
refutes this-but provided the rationale for their seemingly contradic-
tory claims that the lands occupied were both "vacant" and legitimately
obtained by conquest.176 Because the settlers had no incentive to dis-
tinguish civilians from combatants in their quest for land, they waged
"total war on a local scale."' 77 By 1890, when the federal government
172. Quoted in Berman, supra note 150, at 159.
173. RICHARD W. VAN ALSTYNE, THE RISING AMERICAN EMPIRE 8 (1974); see also WOOD,
supra note 126.
174. See WARD CHURCHILL, Perversions of Justice: Examining the Doctrine of U.S.
Rights to Occupancy in North America, in PERVERSIONS OF JUSTICE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLE &
ANGLOAMERICAN LAW 1, 8-9 (2003) (noting that Justice Marshall extended his char-
acterization of American Indians as "domestic dependent nations" even to those nations
that had not yet encountered the United States "in any appreciable way") [hereinafter
CHURCHILL, Perversions of Justice]. See generally Aziz RANA, THE Two FACES OF AMERICAN
FREEDOM (2010) (noting the attitudes of the early settlers); Joshua Simon, Review Essay:
The United States as Settler Empire, 2 SETTLER COLONIAL STUD. 253-67 (2012), available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2012.10648835.
175. Walter LaFeber, Foreign Policies of a New Nation: Franklin, Madison, and the
'Dream of a New Land to Fulfill with People in Self-Control,' 1750-1804, in FRom COLONY TO
EMPIRE: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 9, 10-11 (William A. Wil-
liams ed., 1972).
176. See WILLIAMS, AMERICAN INDIAN, supra note 132, at 208-12.
177. A. Dirk Moses, Empire, Colony, Genocide: Keywords and the Philosophy of History,
in EMPIRE, COLONY, GENOCIDE: CONQUEST, OCCUPATION, AND SUBALTERN RESISTANCE IN
WORLD HISTORY 3, 26 (A. Dirk Moses ed., 2008) (distinguishing colonial wars from wars
between European powers, which tended to have limited aims) [hereinafter Moses, Empire];
see also DAVID STANNARD, AMERICAN HOLOCAUST: COLUMBUS AND THE CONQUEST OF THE
NEW WORLD 15, 104-06 (1993) [hereinafter STANNARD, AMERICAN HOLOCAUST]; FRANCIS JEN-
NINGS, THE INVASION OF AMERICA: INDIANS, COLONIALISM, AND THE CANT OF CONQUEST 206-
27 (1976); RICHARD DRINNON, FACING WEST: THE METAPHYSICS OF INDIAN-HATING AND Em-
PIRE-BUILDING 35-57 (1980).
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officially declared the "frontier" closed, it estimated that fewer than
250,000 Indians remained, residing on less than 3% of their original
land base.' 78 This had been accomplished directly by military force; by
purportedly "rogue" settlers who were, in fact, encouraged to occupy
Indian lands; and by individuals motivated by the scalp bounties of-
fered by local governments and "civic" organizations throughout the
country.17 9 Most of the remaining Indigenous peoples had been forcibly
removed from their homelands, interned en masse in unlivable condi-
tions, and confined to alien and inhospitable reservations-processes
that predictably resulted in the deaths of 40 to 50% of those removed or
interned.18 0
Some of these realities are acknowledged in mainstream his-
tory, albeit in highly sanitized fashion, because they contribute to the
perception that American Indians can safely be relegated to the past,
notwithstanding their consistent resistance and lived assertion of their
right to self-determination. This focus on the "vanishing Indian"' 8 ' has
preempted acknowledgement of the equally genocidal measures imple-
mented by the federal government following consolidation of its
territorial base. Often framed as assimilative measures and imple-
mented without consultation or consent through a series of "head-
snapping changes in federal policy," to quote Gerald Torres,18 2 these
have included the individualized allotment of reservation lands; 8 3 the
imposition of identity through "blood quantum" requirements;18 4 the
banning of Indigenous cultural and spiritual practices; 8 5 and the
forced relocation of about half of all Native children, for some five gen-
178. See CHURCHILL, Perversions of Justice, supra note 174, at 12.
179. See WARD CHURCHILL, Nits Make Lice": The Extermination of North American In-
dians, 1607-1996, in A LITTLE MATTER OF GENOCIDE: HOLOCAUST AND DENIAL IN THE
AMERICAS, 1492 TO THE PRESENT 129-288 (1997).
180. See SIDNEY L. HARRING, CRow DOG'S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL
LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 204-06 (1994); RUSSELL THORN-
TON, THE CHEROKEES: A POPULATION HISTORY 75-77 (1990); see generally also GRANT
FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL: THE IMMIGRATION OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES (1953).
181. For background on this pervasive characterization, see generally DAVID R.M. BECK,
THE MYTH OF THE VANISHING RACE (2001); BRIAN W. DIPPIE, THE VANISHING AMERICAN:
WHITE ATTITUDES AND U.S. INDIAN POLICY (1991).
182. Torres, supra note 96, at 1037.
183. See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1, 7-16 (1995).
184. See generally Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood Quantum in Federal Indian
Law to 1935, 70 MICH. L. REV. 955 (1972).
185. See generally GEORGE E. TINKER, MISSIONARY CONQUEST: THE GOSPEL AND NATIVE
AMERICAN CULTURAL GENOCIDE (1993).
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erations, to boarding schools whose stated mission was to "kill the
Indian, save the man" in each student.'s6
The unconstrained power of the federal government to dictate
all aspects of American Indian life was affirmed in a 1903 case, Lone
Wolf v. Hitchcock, in which the Supreme Court asserted that "plenary
authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by
Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a
political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of
the government."s7 While historically inaccurate, this was an entirely
apt summary of the settler state's presumed prerogative. It was a pre-
rogative exercised in 1924 to unilaterally declare Indians to be U.S.
citizens,"' and in 1934 to "reorganize" and "recognize" so-called tribal
governments under terms dictated by the United States, facilitating
the continued appropriation of the natural resources such as oil, coal,
and uranium being discovered on Indian lands.8 9 After World War II,
the federal government began "terminating" federally recognized
tribes and once again moved to relocate American Indians, this time
from reservation lands to urban areas. 90 In the 1970s, under intensi-
fying domestic pressure and international scrutiny, Congress passed
legislation claiming to recognize Indigenous "self-determination."1 9
This, however, has been consistently belied by the state's continued
(and oxymoronic) insistence that American Indians are sovereign only
to the extent acceptable to the federal government.1 92
186. See generally CHURCHILL, KILL THE INDIAN, supra note 95; DAVID WALLACE ADAMS,
EDUCATION FOR EXTINCTION: AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE BOARDING SCHOOL EXPERIENCE,
1875-1928 (1995).
187. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903); see also BLUE CLARK, LONE WOLF
v. HITCHCOCK: TREATY RIGHTS AND INDIAN LAW AT THE END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 2
(1994).
188. See Porter, Demise, supra note 30, at 123-28.
189. See Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Government Re-
form: What Are the Issues?, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 72, 83-85 (1997); Rebecca L. Robbins,
Self-Determination and Subordination: The Past, Present, and Future of American Indian
Governance, in THE STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA: GENOCIDE, COLONIZATION, AND RESISTANCE
87, 94-98 (M. Annette Jaimes ed., 1992).
190. See id. at 98-100.
191. See id. at 100-04; see also Vine Deloria, Jr., "Congress in Its Wisdom": The Course of
Indian Legislation, in THE AGGRESSIONS OF CIVILIZATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY SINCE THE
1880s 105, 112 (1984) (explaining that the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assis-
tance Act "provided for more extensive subcontracting of certain federal services" but did
not "bolster the political status of tribes").
192. See Mark Trahant, Elections 2012: My Sovereign Debate, Recalling George W.
Bush's Sovereignty Speech, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Oct. 2, 2012), available at http://indi-
ancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2012/10/02/elections-2012-my-sovereign-debate-
recalling-george-w-bushs-sovereignty-speech-137303 (recounting President George W.
Bush's 2004 pronouncement that "tribal sovereignty" means "you've been given sover-
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The judiciary continues to allow this exercise of unfettered state
power. Courts routinely invoke the plenary power doctrine and Chief
Justice Marshall's 1831 characterization in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
of Indians as "domestic dependent nations ."'19 This conclusion, in turn,
rests on the explicitly colonial "doctrine of discovery" and its attendant
depiction of American Indians as savage or uncivilized.1 9 4 Acknowledg-
ing the logical and legal problems with this construction, in the 1823
case of Johnson v. McIntosh, 9 5 Justice Marshall aptly summarized the
rationale of settler colonial occupation: "Conquest gives a title which
the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private and
speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the original jus-
tice of the claim which has been successfully asserted."19 6
At this point, American Indians have been forced off some 97%
of their homelands.' 9 7 Even so, taking into account only those lands
and resources the federal government acknowledges as Indian-owned,
American Indians should be, per capita, the richest demographic group
in the U.S., but they are, instead, the poorest. 98 The U.S government
has consistently asserted a right to control Indigenous lives, lands, and
resources, claiming to be acting as the "guardian" of its Indian
"wards." 99 Among other consequences, in 2005, American Indians liv-
ing on or near reservations had a 49% unemployment rate, and 29% of
those with jobs earned wages below poverty level. 2 0 0 On many reserva-
eignty," apparently by the federal government); see also Robert B. Porter, The Meaning of
Indigenous Nation Sovereignty, 34 ARIz. ST. L.J. 75, 91-94 (2002).
193. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). On the Court's continued reliance
on the plenary power doctrine, see CLARK, supra note 187, at 106-11; see also ROBERT A.
WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE
LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 89-95 (2005) (commenting on the Marshall Cases)
[hereinafter WILLIAMS, LOADED WEAPON].
194. On the inconsistencies underlying the doctrine of discovery, see Ward Churchill,
The Law Stood Squarely on its Head: U.S. Legal Doctrine, Indigenous Self-Determination
and the Question of World Order, 81 OR. L. REV. 663, 673-80 (2002) [hereinafter Churchill,
The Law Stood Squarely]. On the continued effect of this doctrine and its racialized pre-
sumptions, see generally WILLIAMS, LOADED WEAPON, supra note 193.
195. See generally Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
196. Id. at 588. See generally Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the
Conqueror, 41 Am. U. L. REV. 753 (1992).
197. See Churchill, The Law Stood Squarely, supra note 194, at 679.
198. See RENNARD STRICKLAND, TONTo's REVENGE: REFLECTIONS ON AMERICAN INDIAN
CULTURE AND POLICY 52-54 (1998) [hereinafter STRICKLAND, TONTo's REVENGE].
199. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17; see also Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over
Indians: Its Sources and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 207 (1984) [hereinafter
Newton, Federal Power over Indians].
200. U.S. DEP'T INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, 2005 AMERICAN INDIAN POPULA-
TION AND LABOR REPORT, 1, available at http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/
idc-001719.pdf.
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tions, especially on the Northern Plains, unemployment rates over 80%
or even 90% are common.201 American Indian households are five
times more likely than the average American household to lack com-
plete plumbing, over three times as likely to be without complete
kitchens, and more than twice as likely to be overcrowded. 2 0 2 Among
other predictable results, Indigenous peoples have the lowest life ex-
pectancies, highest infant mortality rates, highest suicide rates, and
highest rates of death from exposure and communicable diseases in the
United States.203
After overseeing almost a decade of litigation over the federal
government's mismanagement of individual Indian trust accounts,
Federal District Judge Royce Lamberth concluded,
For those harboring hope that the stories of murder, dispossession,
forced marches, assimilationist policy programs, and other inci-
dents of cultural genocide against the Indians are merely the
echoes of a horrible, bigoted government-past that has been sani-
tized by the good deeds of more recent history, this case serves as
an appalling reminder of the evils that result when large numbers
of the politically powerless are placed at the mercy of institutions
engendered and controlled by a politically powerful few. 20 4
This summary simply skims the surface of what has been done, and
continues to be done, to sustain the territorial base of the U.S. settler
state. Once we are clear about the foundations on which American soci-
ety rests now, not just in some distant past for which we are not
responsible, we can begin to flesh out narratives capable of accounting
for and, potentially, decolonizing structures of racialized domination
and subordination affecting both Indigenous peoples and non-Indige-
nous peoples of color within American society. Policies and practices
that seem aberrational, contradictory, or simply mean-spirited begin to
make sense structurally, when viewed in light of the tensions gener-
ated by the settler imperative. This imperative encompassed the
settlers' perceived need to maintain total control of the land, to develop
201. See Vincent Schilling, Getting Jobbed: 15 Tribes with Unemployment Rates Over 80
Percent, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Aug. 29, 2013), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork
.com/20 13/08/29/danger-zone- 15-tribes-unemployment-rates-over-80-percent- 151078.
202. See U.S. DEP'T Hous. & URBAN DEV., CONTINUITY AND CHANGE: DEMOGRAPHIC, So-
CIOECONOMIC, AND HOUSING CONDITIONS OF AMERICAN INDIANS AND ALASKA NATIVES, XV
(2014), available at http://www.huduser.org/portal//publications/pdf/housing conditions.pdf
(using data from 2006-2010).
203. See STRICKLAND, TONTO'S REVENGE, supra note 198, at 53.
204. Cobell v. Norton, 229 F.R.D. 5, 7 (D.D.C. 2005). Citing this and other portions of
the opinion, the court of appeals removed Judge Lamberth from the case in July 2006. See
Cobell v. Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 317, 326-35 (D.C. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1317
(2007).
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a labor force capable of maximizing the wealth generated from that
land, to restrict the benefits of economic growth, to grant political par-
ticipation to those envisioned as members of the settler class and,
simultaneously, to justify these ends and the means used to achieve
them in terms of the "greater good" being achieved for "all of
humanity."205
2. Non-Indigenous Others
Standing outside the triumphalist narrative of American his-
tory allows us to grasp the significance of the African slave trade and
the institution of chattel slavery in terms of the material and cultural
losses systematically inflicted upon those who were, through these
processes, both externally and internally colonized. It also allows us to
examine the extent to which enslaved labor provided the agricultural
and industrial base for settler consolidation and expansion. According
to historian Howard Zinn, the early Anglo-American colonists were dis-
inclined to agricultural labor, unable to enslave a sufficient number of
Indians, and did not have enough indentured servants to meet their
perceived needs.206 The African slave trade appeared to provide the so-
lution, for by 1619, when John Rolfe purchased twenty African workers
in Jamestown, about one million enslaved Africans had already been
brought to European colonies in the Western Hemisphere. 2 0 7 By 1800,
this total had reached ten to fifteen million, the result of a process of
warfare, captivity, and transportation that robbed the African conti-
nent of perhaps fifty million people. 208
Africans, of course, came to the Americas with rich histories of
their own; they were from hundreds of different Indigenous societies,
each with a distinctive culture and religious, political, and legal tradi-
205. See supra notes 126, 132-34, 140-41, 158-62 and accompanying text.
206. HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492-PRESENT 25-26
(2003). On the enslavement of American Indians, see Gregory Ablavsky, Making Indians
"White": The Judicial Abolition of Native Slavery in Revolutionary Virginia and Its Racial
Legacy, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1457, 1466 (2011) (noting the enslavement of some 30,000 to
50,000 Indians in the British colonies in North America).
207. See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. Moss, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A
HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS 53 (1988); ZINN, supra note 206, at 25-26.
208. See MARCUS REDIKER ET AL., Introduction in MANY MIDDLE PASSAGES: FORCED MI-
GRATION AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 8 (Rediker et al. eds., 2007); ZINN, supra
note 206, at 29; see also WALTER RODNEY, How EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA, 96-97
(rev. ed., 1982). See generally THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE: EFFECTS ON ECONOMIES, SOCIE-
TIES, AND PEOPLES IN AFRICA, THE AMERICAS, AND EUROPE (Joseph E. Inikori & Stanley L.
Engerman eds., 1992).
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tions established over millennia. 209 From the settler perspective, the
creation of a labor force suitable to rendering occupied lands produc-
tive entailed eliminating these identities and cultures. As Vincent
Harding observed, "besides setting up legal barriers against the entry
of black people as self-determining participants into the developing
American society, the laws struck another cruel blow of a different
kind" by proscribing African cultural and religious practices, as well as
languages. 210 "Thus, [slaveholding society] attempted to shut black
people out from both cultures, to make them wholly dependent
neuters." 211
Beginning in the mid-1600s, laws were promulgated in the colo-
nies that not only instituted perpetual, hereditary slavery, but also
denied all basic political rights to persons of African descent, forbade
their ownership of property, prohibited their education, limited their
freedom of movement, and proscribed any means of self-defense. 212 In
contrast to the master narrative's refrain of constant, if gradual, pro-
gress toward full equality, the patterns that emerge from the
subsequent history of Afrodescendant peoples in the United States evi-
dence rhetorical and legal shifts toward formal equality consistently
accompanied by measures intended to maintain settler domination.
Thus, following the formal abolition of slavery in 1866,213 slave
codes were replaced by "Black codes" intended to accomplish much of
the same purposes. 2 1 4 These new laws had the added benefit, from the
settlers' perspective, of criminalizing much of the Black population for
activities such as idleness, vagrancy, or "disrespect" of White people,
209. See generally JOHN G. JACKSON, INTRODUCTION To AFRICAN CIVILIZATIONS (2001
[1970]).
210. VINCENT HARDING, THERE IS A RIVER: THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM IN
AMERICA 27 (1981).
211. Id.; see also IRA BERLIN, MANY THOUSANDS GONE: THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES OF
SLAVERY IN NORTH AMERICA 112, 123-24, 149-50 (1998).
212. See Carlton Waterhouse, Avoiding Another Step in a Series of Unfortunate Legal
Events: A Consideration of Black Life Under American Law from 1619 to 1972 and a Chal-
lenge to Prevailing Notions of Legally Based Reparations, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 207,
230-46 (2006); WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE NEGRO: 1550-1812 109-10 (1968). On the subordination of Black people in Northern
states, see generally LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES:
1790-1860 (1961).
213. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII § 1 ("[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States").
214. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 70-71 (noting that Black codes had been
passed so that "the condition of the slave race would ... be almost as bad as it was before");
see also A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMP-
TIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 84-87 (1996).
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while fueling a system of convict labor that served essentially the same
purposes as chattel slavery, often at a lower cost to the settlers.215 Fol-
lowing the Fourteenth Amendment's granting (or imposition,
depending on one's perspective) of citizenship to African Americans
and its guarantee of due process and equal protection under law ,216
racial segregation was legally mandated in many states and upheld by
the Supreme Court in the 1896 case of Plessy v. Ferguson.2 1 7 And of
course, in the wake of the Court's overturning of Plessy and Congress'
passage of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts of the mid-1960s,
we have again seen that while formal structures of law have changed,
the grim realities of life in many Black communities have not. 2 18
Viewing settler policy in terms of the shift from an initial drive
to create an ever-expanding slave labor force to the perception of Black
people as a "surplus" population to be contained and controlled lends
consistency and coherence to a history that moves from slavery to con-
vict labor to our present carceral state.2 1 9 It can explain how Jim Crow
laws-apartheid-functioned to exclude African Americans from the
settler class, why a "colorblind" legal regime is incapable of remedying
racial disparities, why integrationist visions are never realized, and
why separatist movements and small-scale efforts for community em-
powerment are treated as threats. 220
Each community has its own narratives, of course, only a few of
which can be mentioned here. Historian Rodolfo Acuixa's characteriza-
tion of Chicanos as internally colonized 221 and the contemporary
215. See LERONE BENNETT, JR., BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER: A HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICA
273 (6th ed. 1987) ("[C]hain gangs were integral parts of the system ... leased to private
individuals and companies, which made large fortunes on their miseries."). See generally
ALEx LICHTENSTEIN, TWICE THE WORK OF FREE LABOR: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONVICT
LABOR IN THE NEW SOUTH (1996); MATTHEW J. MANCINI, ONE DIES, GET ANOTHER: CONVICT
LEASING IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH, 1866-1928 (1996); DAVID M. OSHINSKY, "WORSE THAN
SLAVERY": PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE (1996).
216. After declaring "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof' to be citizens, the 14th Amendment says that no state shall "de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
217. See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE
STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1966).
218. See supra notes 55-57, 59-66 and accompanying text.
219. See PARENTI, supra note 84, at 238.
220. On the legal and ideological history of the construct of colorblindness, see generally
Ian F. Haney L6pez, "A Nation of Minorities": Race, Ethnicity and Reactionary Colorblind-
ness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985 (2007) [hereinafter Haney L6pez, "A Nation of Minorities"]. For
White perspectives on Black nationalism, see Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 758, 835-44 (1990).
221. See ACUlA, supra note 45, at 3.
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realities of life in Mexican American communities are difficult to com-
prehend without a rudimentary understanding of the Anglo-American
settler occupation of Texas that preceded its annexation and the 1848
war of aggression that, together, resulted in the expropriation of the
northern half of Mexico. 2 2 2 These lands were "cleared" for settler occu-
pation by vigilante action and by requiring Mexican residents to
affirmatively prove their title claims in U.S. courts with documenta-
tion that generally did not exist in the Mexican legal system.2 2 3
Continuous attempts have since been made to convert Mexican com-
munities on both sides of the border into a pool of readily available and
easily disposable labor, resulting in the ongoing cycles of reliance upon
and rejection of undocumented workers. 2 2 4 The inability of the settler
society to reconcile these realities with its self-perception is reflected in
the recent efforts to ban Mexican American history in Arizona high
schools on the premise that such courses "promote racial
resentment."225
Similarly, the incorporation of Alaska and Hawai'i are glossed
over in a narrative that, apparently, needs no explanation beyond
"more natural resources and militarily strategic territory must be a
good thing."226 In a series of events paralleling the establishment of the
"Republic of Texas" by White settlers and its subsequent absorption by
the United States, 2 2 7 Anglo-American settlers, with the backing of U.S.
military forces, overthrew the Kingdom of Hawai'i in 1893 and per-
suaded the federal government to annex the territory shortly
222. See Juan F. Perea, A Brief History of Race and the U.S.-Mexican Border: Tracing
the Trajectories of Conquest, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 283, 287-91 (2003).
223. See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval, 167 U.S. 278, 298 (1897) (rejecting communal
land rights). See generally Guadalupe T. Luna, Chicana/Chicano Land Tenure in the Agra-
rian Domain: On the Edge of a "Naked Knife," 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 39 (1998).
224. See Perea, supra note 222, at 303-10.
225. See Roque Planas, Arizona's Law Banning Mexican-American Studies Curriculum
is Constitutional, Judge Rules, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.huffington
post.com/2013/03/11/arizona-mexican-american-studies-curriculum-constitutional n 28510
34.html.
226. See WALTER NUGENT, HABITS OF EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN EXPANSION 237-
51, 256-65 (2008). For judicial accounts of these acquisitions see Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S.
495, 501-05 (2000) (describing the "cession" of all Crown and public lands to the United
States); and United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 F. Supp. 1009, 1014-15 (D. Ala.
1977), affd 612 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 888 (1980) (describing provi-
sions of law allowing Alaska Natives to "use" their traditional lands but reserving mineral
rights to the government). For a Native Hawaiian perspective, see generally TRASK, FROM A
NATIVE DAUGHTER, supra note 98.
227. See ACUlA, supra note 45, at 10-24.
2014 43
FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW
thereafter. 2 28 In 1993, Congress formally acknowledged that these ac-
tions were illegal and a violation of Native Hawaiians' right to self-
determination, but the U.S. government nonetheless steadfastly re-
jects assertions of Native Hawaiian sovereignty. 229 Alaska is
referenced as having been "purchased" from Russia in 1867, with no
reference to the rights or preferences of the Alaska Natives who have
been organized into "corporations" that do not even have the very lim-
ited autonomy "granted" to those American Indian nations the federal
government chooses to recognize, but are capable of relinquishing their
lands and natural resources. 230
Another glaring narrative gap erases the fact that the United
States continues to exercise jurisdiction over some four million people
in the unincorporated territories-i.e., external colonies-of Puerto
Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands. 2 3 1 None of these territories is recognized as an indepen-
dent country or a state of the union, and all are subject to the absolute
and unconstrained-"plenary"-power of the U.S. government. 232 Af-
ter the United States took "possession" of Puerto Rico in 1898,
following the so-called Spanish-American War, the Court struggled
with the question of whether constitutional rights applied to such un-
incorporated territories. Concluding that it did not, Justice Brown, who
just five years earlier had authored the majority opinion in Plessy v.
Ferguson,233 assured us that we need not fear that despotism would
result, for "[t]here are certain principles of natural justice inherent in
the Anglo-Saxon character, which need no expression in constitutions
or statutes to give them effect or to secure dependencies against legis-
228. See WARD CHURCHILL, Stolen Kingdom: The Right of Hawai'i to Decolonization, in
PERVERSIONS OF JUSTICE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLE & ANGLOAMERICAN LAW 73, 74-84 (2003).
229. Apology Resolution of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (acknowledging
that "the illegal overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii ... resulted in the suppression of the
inherent sovereignty of the Native Hawaiian people"). On the United States' ongoing obliga-
tion to remediate this illegal action, see generally Jennifer M.L. Chock, One Hundred Years
of Illegitimacy: International Legal Analysis of the Illegal Overthrow of the Hawaiian Mon-
archy, Hawai'i's Annexation, and Possible Reparations, 17 U. HAW. L. REV. 463 (1995).
230. See Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall, Between the Foreign and the Do-
mestic: The Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, Invented and Reinvented, in FOREIGN IN A
DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO Rico, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 1 (Christina
Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001).
231. See NATSU TAYLOR SAITO, FROM CHINESE EXCLUSION TO GUANTANAMO BAY: PLE-
NARY POWER AND THE PREROGATIVE STATE 32-34 (2006) [hereinafter SAITO, FROM CHINESE
EXCLUSION].
232. See infra notes 354-55, 364-67.
233. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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lation manifestly hostile to their real interests." 2 3 4 This is still the law
that governs American settler state relations with externally colonized
peoples. 235
Finally, it is difficult to make sense of the complex and often
contradictory dynamics affecting migrant communities of color without
deconstructing the mantra of America as a "nation of immigrants."2 3 6
It is a myth that not only erases Indigenous peoples, but obscures the
ways in which immigration and naturalization policy has been used to
provide low-cost labor while simultaneously limiting popular imagery
of "real" Americans to persons of exclusively European-preferably
northern and western European-descent. Until the late nineteenth
century, immigration was not perceived as a threat to settler goals be-
cause "the free global movement of labor was essential to economic
development in the New World," 2 3 7 and all people of color were pre-
cluded from U.S. citizenship. Naturalized citizenship had been limited
to "free white person[s]" since 1790-a racial prerequisite that re-
mained in place, in some form, until 195223 8-and non-Indigenous
people of color did not become citizens by virtue of birth in the territory
until 1868.239
When the Chinese labor that had serviced settler society on the
West Coast and built the transcontinental railroad became superflu-
ous, the federal government implemented its first immigration
234. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 280 (1901); see also Efr6n Rivera Ramos, The
Legal Construction of American Colonialism: The Insular Cases (1901-1922), 65 REV. JUR.
U.P.R. 225, 246-47 (1996).
235. See generally FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO Rico, AMERICAN EXPANSION,
AND THE CONSTITUTION (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001).
236. See, e.g., Connelie, 435 U.S. at 294 (noting that "we have often been described as 'a
nation of immigrants"' while upholding a New York statute requiring police officers to be
U.S. citizens); White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President in Ad-
dress to the Nation on Immigration, Nov. 20, 2014 (President Barack Obama concluding his
statement on immigration policy with: "My fellow Americans, we are and always will be a
nation of immigrants."), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/
remarks-president-address-nation-immigration.
237. MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
AMERICA 17 (2004) (adding that "[t]his was the case even if many of the laborers themselves
were not free but, rather, were enslaved or indentured").
238. Naturalization Act of 1790, 1 1st Cong., 1 Stat. 103 (1790) (repealed by the Act of
January 19, 1795, which re-enacted most of its provisions, including its racial restrictions).
Following passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, this provision was modified to allow the
naturalization of "persons of African descent." See Act of July 14, 1870, 41st Cong. § 7, 16
Stat. 254 (1870). The racial restriction was removed by the Immigration and Nationality
(McCarran-Walter) Act, 82nd Cong. Ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
239. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the state wherein they reside").
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restrictions. 2 4 0 As the Supreme Court explained in the Chinese Exclu-
sion cases, the settlers' sovereign prerogative gave them absolute
authority to control who would be allowed to enter or remain within
their claimed territorial boundaries, regardless of otherwise applicable
constitutional constraints. 2 4 1 By the 1920s, an upsurge in immigration
from southern and eastern Europe had triggered a "nativist"242 back-
lash that converged with a shift toward reliance on technology rather
than continued expansion of the manufacturing workforce.243 In re-
sponse, Congress enacted its first comprehensive restrictions on
immigration in 1924, imposing an annual limit on the total number of
immigrants from outside the Western Hemisphere and allocating that
total according to national origin quotas. 2 4 4 These quotas, which re-
mained in effect until 1965, excluded virtually all peoples of color and
limited European immigration in proportion to the countries of origin
of the White population as of 1910.245
Narratives incorporating the exclusion or exploitation of those
deemed Other illustrate not only how the dynamic of difference has
been maintained, but also how the settler class began to see itself as
White and, as Cheryl Harris has documented, converted Whiteness
into a form of property. 246 This Part is not intended to provide any-
thing resembling a comprehensive overview of alternative narratives
of American history, but simply to point out some of the salient histori-
cal realities that tend to be omitted or glossed over in the master
narrative. As we begin to apply racial realism to our histories, we can
begin to see patterns emerge, and these patterns facilitate the con-
240. See ROGER DANIELS, GUARDING THE GOLDEN DOOR: AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY
AND IMMIGRANTS SINCE 1882 16-20 (2004).
241. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (upholding the exclusion
of all Chinese workers despite apparent conflicts with the 1868 Burlingame Treaty and the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893) (allowing the deportation of three permanent residents because they had no White
witnesses to attest to their residency).
242. The appropriation of the term "nativist" by settlers opposed to subsequent immi-
gration reflects an intent to reinforce the notion that they-not Indigenous peoples-are
"native" to this land. Veracini describes this need to "perform their indigenization" as "a
typically settler colonial inversion." VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 79.
243. See NGAI, supra note 237, at 19-20; DANIELS, supra note 240, at 27-58.
244. NGAI, supra note 237, at 21-55.
245. Id. at 26 (quoting Johnson-Reed Act, 43 Stat. 153, § 11(d) (1924)).
246. See generally Harris, Whiteness, supra note 22; LIPSITz, supra note 22. For a case
study, see generally NOEL IGNATIEv, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (2008). On ways in
which the insights developed in Harris' Whiteness as Property can contribute to settler colo-
nial theory, see generally Natsu Taylor Saito, Race and Decolonization: Whiteness as
Property in the American Settler Colonial Project, 31 HARv. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. (forth-
coming Spring 2015).
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struction of theoretical frameworks capable of explaining historical
consistencies and disparities in structural, rather than exceptional,
terms. With, again, no pretense of developing a comprehensive frame-
work, the following Part IV illustrates how some of the strategies
employed by the settler state can be gleaned from this history.
IV. STRATEGIES OF COLONIZATION
What colonization has done, then, is to ... induce a state of affairs
in which it actually has become necessary to advocate that survival
should be chosen over extinction.
-Robert B. Porter2 4 7
Developing narratives-the stories we live by-outside the lin-
ear, universalizing and triumphalist discourse of settler ideology helps
us to recognize how we all, including those who identify as White, have
been assigned racialized identities and to recognize ways in which
these identities shape our relationship to the social, economic, and po-
litical status quo and, therefore, to each other. Narrative shifts may
thus be a necessary first step in understanding the dynamics of racial-
ized injustice, but they do not provide strategies for change. In order to
envision effective remedial measures, we need to understand not only
that harm has been and continues to be done, but also how it is being
done, for this is what allows us to make structural change. Theoretical
analyses of settler colonialism are beginning to identify strategies uti-
lized to bring to fruition the settlers' goals of effectively occupying land,
controlling natural resources, and rendering their claimed territory
"productive."248 Understanding how specific strategies have been used
to institutionalize colonial relations lays the groundwork, I believe, for
envisioning strategies of decolonization.
Relying on, and loosely following Lorenzo Veracini's identifica-
tion of "transfer strategies" used by settler societies to remove
Indigenous peoples, literally and conceptually, from settler spaces,249
this Part provides examples of what I have chosen to call (a) strategies
of elimination, primarily targeting Indigenous peoples; (b) strategies of
subjugation directed at peoples of African descent; and (c) strategies of
subordination and manipulation utilized with respect to peoples of
color generally understood to be voluntary migrants. It is an attempt to
247. Robert B. Porter, Pursuing the Path of Indigenization in the Era of Emergent Inter-
national Law Governing the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 5 YALE Hum. RTS. & DEV. L.J.
123, 132 (2002) [hereinafter Porter, Pursuing the Path].
248. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
249. See VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 35-50.
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begin applying a settler colonial analysis not only to Indigenous peo-
ples, but also to other peoples of color in the United States.
I realize, of course, that speaking at this level of generality nec-
essarily omits large sectors of the population, as well as enormously
significant distinctions in our histories and our contemporary realities.
I have not attempted to address the combinations of strategies utilized
against Chicana/os, for example, who are in large measure peoples in-
digenous to this continent, initially subjected to a different colonizing
power, 25 0 or the situation of Puerto Ricans, whose homeland remains
an external U.S. colony, but more than half of whom now live in the
continental United States. 2 5 1 1 also believe that what might be termed
strategies of control or regimentation have long been employed to en-
sure that those identified as White in this society act in a manner that
reinforces, rather than undermines, settler privilege. 2 52 An assessment
of those strategies, however, is well beyond the scope of this prelimi-
nary exploration. My intent is not to provide a comprehensive analysis,
but simply to illustrate that injustices we often attribute to personal
prejudice or view as holdovers of a bygone era may retain considerable
power because they serve systemic purposes. Without understanding
those purposes, I do not believe we can fashion effective remedial
measures.
A. Strategies of Elimination: Indigenous Peoples
I begin with some of the strategies used to obtain and maintain
territorial control, as they were, and remain, integral to the mainte-
nance of the American settler state. As Patrick Wolfe notes, land "is
not merely a component of settler society but its basic precondition."2 53
The "logic of elimination" central to settler societies "requires the elim-
ination of the owners of that territory, but not in any particular
way." 2 5 4 Veracini identifies twenty-six practices, which he terms
250. See generally ACUlA, supra note 45.
251. See Juan R. Torruella, Ruling America's Colonies: The Insular Cases, 32 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 57, 87 (2013).
252. For a few examples, see DRINNON, supra note 177, at 9-13 (describing the Puritan's
1627 persecution of Thomas Morton for "going native"); LILLIAN SMITH, KILLERS OF THE
DREAM 13 (photo. reprint 1994) (1949) (explaining that, as a White person, she "had to find
out what life in a segregated culture had done to me"). Use of the term "race traitor" to
describe Euroamericans who resist racial hierarchy demonstrates that being "White" re-
quires complicity, as well as pedigree. See generally RACE TRAITOR (Noel Ignatiev & John
Garvey eds., 1996); MAB SEGREST, MEMOIR OF A RACE TRAITOR (1994).
253. Wolfe, Structure and Event, supra note 126, at 103.
254. Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native, supra note 133, at
402.
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"transfer strategies." 2 5 5 Initially, Anglo-American colonists relied pri-
marily on two of these strategies: direct killing and conceptual
displacement. The concept of direct killing encompasses the deliberate
introduction of disease, i.e., biological warfare; organized military
force; and localized violence by the civilian settler population, includ-
ing that resulting from scalp bounties. 2 5 6 Later, less direct methods
were utilized, such as the involuntary sterilization of over 40% of Na-
tive women, and the requirement that Indian children attend boarding
schools with 50% mortality rates.2 5 7
Conceptual displacement refers to the characterization of Indig-
enous peoples as "pathologically mobile and 'nomadic,"' i.e., coming
from somewhere else and/or nowhere in particular.258 This is illus-
trated by Justice Johnson's concurring opinion in Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, describing Indian "tribes" as "nothing more than wandering
hordes, held together only by ties of blood and habit." 2 5 9 A related
strategy is one Veracini terms "perception transfer," in which Indige-
nous peoples do not really exist, except as part of the natural
landscape.260 Thus, for example, in recruiting settlers for the territory
that would, in 1620, become the Plymouth Colony, John Smith de-
scribed it as "so planted with Gardens and Corne fields" and "well
inhabited with a goodly, strong and well proportioned people" that it
constituted his favorite "of all the [ I] parts of the world that [he had]
yet seene not inhabited." 2 6 1 A variation of this strategy can be seen in
George Washington's pronouncement that "the gradual extension of
our settlements will as certainly cause the savage, as the wolf, to re-
tire; both being beasts of prey, tho' they differ in shape." 2 6 2
As the American Indian population base and, therefore, its abil-
ity to resist, was reduced to the point where complete physical
elimination no longer made economic or military sense, the most desir-
255. See VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 35-50.
256. See generally CHURCHILL, "Nits Make Lice," supra note 179; on scalp bounties, see
id. at 178-88. See generally STANNARD, AMERICAN HOLOCAUST, supra note 177.
257. On sterilization, see ANDREA SMITH, CONQUEST: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND AMERICAN
INDIAN GENOCIDE 80-88 (2005). On boarding schools, see supra note 186.
258. VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 36.
259. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 27-28 (Johnson, J., concurring).
260. VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 37.
261. NEAL SALISBURY, MANITOU AND PROVIDENCE: INDIANS, EUROPEANS, AND THE MAK-
ING OF NEw ENGLAND, 1500-1643 98 (1982) (quoting TRAVELS AND WORKS OF CAPTAIN JOHN
SMITH).
262. Quoted in DRINNON, supra note 177, at 65. In fact, Washington engaged in a pro-
longed and brutal war to wrest territorial control from the well-organized Iroquois League.
See generally BARBARA ALICE MANN, GEORGE WASHINGTON'S WAR ON NATIVE AMERICA
(2009).
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able lands were "cleared," and the remaining population interned and
removed to what were perceived to be the least desirable lands. 2 6 3 Ver-
acini calls this "ethnic transfer," noting that one of its effects is to
transform those who survive into refugees of a sort, because they have
been torn from the traditional lands that have defined their identities
and cultures and relocated to lands to which they are not truly
indigenous .264
Measures that go beyond direct killing or physical removal il-
lustrate some of the less obvious ways in which settler state policies
and popular culture have rendered Native peoples invisible, eviscer-
ated their cultures, and portrayed their "disappearance" as inevitable.
Thus, for example, historical and purportedly scientific narratives are
deployed to deny that Indigenous peoples come from any given location
so that "when really existing Indigenous people enter the field of set-
tler perception, they are deemed to have entered the settler space and
can therefore be considered exogenous." 2 6 5 This version of conceptual
displacement supports settler claims that everyone in the United
States has descended from immigrants and, as a result, has an "equal"
right to land. It can also be combined with a "narrative transfer" that
acknowledges Indigenous peoples only in the past tense. In addition to
rendering American Indians invisible in the present, conceptual dis-
placement facilitates the repression of resistance, for when Indigenous
peoples' "defeat is irretrievably located in the past, their activism in
the present is [rendered] illegitimate."2 6 6
Settler society also uses its self-appointed prerogative to con-
struct "authentic" indigeneity "as a frozen precontact essence" whose
"primary effect is to provide a formula for disqualification." 267 In-
digeneity is also erased by racialization, which collapses innumerable
distinct polities, cultures, and relational networks into a vacuous iden-
tity based on arbitrarily assigned phenotypical and cultural
characteristics, and redefines multiple nations as a single "minority
group" within the settler body politic. 2 68 This lays the groundwork for
263. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
264. VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 35-37.
265. Id. at 36-37.
266. Id. at 41.
267. WOLFE, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 25, at 204; see also VERACINI, SETTLER
COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 40.
268. See VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM supra note 23, at 43 (describing "multicultural
transfer" as "when indigenous autonomy is collapsed with exogenous alterity"); id. at 48
(characterizing Indigenous incorporation into a racial binary as "transfer by racialization").
On the relationship between racialization and the subversion of Indigenous sovereignty in
the United States, see generally Torres, supra note 96.
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"resolving" the underlying problem of illegitimate occupation through a
"reconciliation" process intended to result in "relegitimation and set-
tler self-supersession." 2 6 9
The federal government's unilaterally imposed definitions of
who is an "Indian," including its use of "blood quantum" rules to re-
strict access to various "benefits" like individual land allotments, have
predictably shrunk the officially recognized American Indian popula-
tion base,270 a process Veracini terms "transfer by accounting." 271 This
strategy is also illustrated by the selective federal-and state-recog-
nition of American Indian "tribes," a process that, by definition, also
gives these governments the right to un-recognize or "terminate"
them.272 Federal authorities "allow" tribal governments some discre-
tion with respect to membership while allocating "benefits" in lump-
sum fashion, a process that predictably results in the internalization of
transfer by accounting, as tribal authorities pare down their member-
ship rolls to maximize benefits for remaining members. 2 7 3
Since the late 1800s, when the Indigenous population had been
reduced to a small fraction of the overall polity, American policy has
emphasized assimilation. 2 7 4 Ultimately, assimilation is futile, because
its success is "never dependent on indigenous performance" but, in-
stead, requires absorption by settler society. 275 This does not happen,
except in isolated instances, because the maintenance of settler privi-
lege requires unassimilable difference. In the meantime, however, it
"allows Indigenous people to be envisaged as only temporarily ex-
cluded" and supports settler claims to be "ultimately representing all
269. VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 50.
270. See John Rockwell Snowden et al., American Indian Sovereignty and Natural-
ization: It's a Race Thing, 80 NEB. L. REV. 171, 216-18 (2001); Ward Churchill, The Crucible
of American Indian Identity: Native Tradition Versus Colonial Imposition in Postconquest
North America, in CONTEMPORARY NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURAL ISSUES 39, 50 (Duane Cham-
pagne ed., 1999).
271. VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 39.
272. See Rennard Strickland, The Genocidal Premise in Native American Law and Pol-
icy: Exorcising Aboriginal Ghosts, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 325, 330-31 (1998).
273. See generally James D. Diamond, Who Controls Tribal Membership? The Legal
Background of Disenrollment and Tribal Membership Litigation, in BEST PRACTICES FOR
DEFENDING TRIBAL MEMBERSHIP CASES 37-54 (2013); Margo S. Brownell, Who's an Indian?
Searching for an Answer to the Question at the Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 275 (2000-2001).
274. See Michael G. Lacy, The United States and American Indians: Political Relations,
in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 83-101 (Vine Deloria, Jr., ed., 1985)
(discussing assimilationist programs as "cooptation" of the threat posed by American Indi-
ans to the legitimacy of the American political system).
275. VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 38.
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residents." 2 7 6 It also provides the rationale for extinguishing Indige-
nous culture and identity, an ultimately genocidal aim aptly captured
by the stated objective of the boarding schools to "kill the Indian, save
the man."277 Assimilationist ideology paves the way for vilifying and
criminalizing those Indigenous peoples who are either structurally pre-
vented from assimilating or do not wish to do so. The dysfunction that
is found in all impoverished, colonized, and traumatized communities
is, in this case, attributed to Indians being "drunk," "lazy," "violent," or
"incompetent," and is used to justify high rates of incarceration. 2 78 The
removal of Indian children from their communities is also justified by
depicting their parents in these terms .279 Such forms of criminalization
are, as Veracini observes, "crucial to the disavowal of the inherently
political character of indigenous demands." 28 0
Articulating these-and many other-strategies of elimination
allows us to deconstruct and therefore resist the processes-sometimes
hidden or denied, sometimes valorized-by which the American settler
state has appropriated and legitimized control of its territorial base. In
attempting to better understand the dynamics that have shaped, and
continue to define, the status of other peoples of color in this country-
those who are neither indigenous to this land nor intended to become
part of the settler population-we see a distinct but overlapping set of
strategies employed to recruit and control a labor force adequate to
276. Id. at 39 (emphasis in original).
277. CHURCHILL, KILL THE INDIAN, supra note 95, at 14 (quoting an 1895 speech by the
architect of the boarding school system, U.S. Army Captain Richard Henry Pratt); see also
Patrick Wolfe, Recuperating Binarism: A Heretical Introduction, in 3 SETTLER COLONIALISM
AND INDIGENOUS ALTERNATIVES IN GLOBAL CONTEXT (2): RECUPERATING BINARISM 257, 263
(2013), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2013.830587 (noting that "Native
assimilation is not primarily a recruitment into Whiteness" but "an elimination of In-
digeneity") [hereinafter Wolfe, Recuperating Binarism].
278. See Richard Braunstein & Steve Feimer, South Dakota Criminal Justice: A Study
of Racial Disparities, 48 S.D. L. REV. 171, 172 (2002-2003) (noting disparities in the
criminalization and victimization of American Indians as well as pervasive "negative and
degrading stereotypes").
279. See Tanya Asim Cooper, Racial Bias in American Foster Care: The National De-
bate, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 215, 238 (2013) ("Stereotypes of Native Americans as alcoholics, drug
addicts, and gamblers underlie current agency decisions to remove Native American chil-
dren from their homes."); Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32-
33 (1989) (noting that by the early 1970s 25-35% of all American Indian children were in
adoptive homes, foster care, or institutions; that they were placed for adoption at eight
times the rate of non-Indian children; and that 90% of these placements were in non-Indian
homes).
280. VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 45. In fact, the political status of
American Indians results in their being subject to federal criminal jurisdiction for offenses
usually prosecuted by states and, as a result, they often receive significantly harsher
sentences. See generally Timothy J. Droske, Correcting Native American Sentencing Dispar-
ity Post-Booker, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 723 (2008).
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meeting perceived settler needs. As noted above, this is a dimension of
historical and theoretical analysis that is not well developed. The fol-
lowing sections offer some examples that are neither definitive nor
comprehensive, in the hopes of stimulating thinking about the coloni-
zation of peoples of color within the United States.
B. Strategies of Subjugation: Afrodescendant Peoples
As settler societies employed strategies of elimination to claim
and occupy lands, the predictable result was that the occupied lands
could only be made "productive" by importing a large labor force. 2 81
While it was foreseen that some of these workers would join the settler
class, the bulk of this workforce had to be subordinated if the settler
class was to maintain its political and economic hegemony. 28 2 Thus, we
begin considering the role of "non-Indigenous Others" from the pre-
mise, articulated by Patrick Wolfe, that "two distinct colonial
relationships of inequality are involved here: one (the dispossession of
Natives) centring on land and the other (the exploitation of immi-
grants) centring on labour."28 3 In other words, "the two societies, Red
and Black, were of antithetical but complementary value to White
society." 28 4
In considering U.S. history, the relationship "centring on la-
bour" is multidimensional and historically contingent in many
respects. The situation of African Americans requires distinct analysis,
I believe, because enslaved Africans cannot appropriately be described
as "immigrants," with the connotations that term carries of at least
minimal volition. Of course, all people racialized as Black in this coun-
try are not the descendants of slaves, and many of the strategies of
subordination used against other migrant groups are directly applica-
ble to recent African immigrants. Nonetheless, the Black identity
attributed to such immigrants often blurs distinctions that are other-
wise very significant within African American communities. 28 5 Thus,
for example, the unarmed Amadou Diallo was most probably shot
forty-one times by New York City police officers in 1999 because he
281. See WOLFE, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 25, at 1-2.
282. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 405 (1857) (observing that persons of
African descent, "whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to [the] authority" of
"citizens of the United States").
283. Wolfe, Recuperating Binarism, supra note 277, at 264.
284. Wolfe, Race and the Trace, supra note 29, at 275.
285. See generally Maurice R. Dyson, Racial Free-Riding on the Coattails of a Dream
Deferred: Can I Borrow Your Social Capital?, 13 Wm. & IVIARY BILL RTS. J. 967 (2005).
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was a Black man pulling a wallet out of his jacket, not because he was
a recent immigrant.28 6
The strategies employed by Anglo-American settler society to
subordinate enslaved Africans and their descendants-or perceived de-
scendants-have shifted over time, as labor needs have changed and
overtly supremacist ideology and law have become incompatible with
the image of American democracy that the settler class relies on for its
legitimacy, both domestically and internationally. An analysis of this
history yields parallels to the strategies utilized to erase Indigenous
identity, if not physical presence; to promote assimilation while simul-
taneously perpetuating the dynamic of difference; and more generally,
to foster a narrative justifying settler colonization in terms of the
larger trajectory of human progress. Historically, strategies of subjuga-
tion have played a larger role than strategies of elimination with
respect to Afrodescendants, but as Black people have come to be per-
ceived as "surplus" population we see certain strategies of elimination
being prioritized.
The African slave trade was, of course, a direct consequence of
external European colonization, and the millions of Africans brought to
this continent were Indigenous peoples forcibly removed from their
traditional lands and cultures. 28 7 The trans-Atlantic slave trade re-
sulted in dramatic population decimation within African societies, but
its primary purpose was to generate profit for the colonizers, not to
eliminate African peoples directly. While it did not further colonial in-
terests to declare enslaved persons non-existent, a variant of
perception transfer can be seen in the characterization of enslaved per-
sons as property, and in their depiction-like that of other Indigenous
peoples-as part of "nature," wild animals or subhuman "savages."28 8
Thus, for example, South Carolina's initial slave code was modeled on
that of Barbados, which declared enslaved Africans to be "of barbarous,
wild, savage natures, [ ] such as renders them wholly unqualified to be
governed by the laws, customs and practices" of the colonizers. 28 9
The slave trade may be history's largest example of involuntary
ethnic transfer, forcing Indigenous peoples off of their traditional lands
and onto alien terrain. 290 Indigenous African identities-cultural and
spiritual practices, languages, histories, family ties, even names-were
286. See William B. Moffitt, Racial Discrimination in America, CHAMPION MAGAZINE,
May 2000 at 9 ("[H]is only crime was the color of his skin.").
287. See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
289. JORDAN, supra note 212, at 109-10.
290. See VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 35.
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erased to the best of settler ability in order to facilitate control over
enslaved workers, to justify their classification as property, and to en-
hance the credibility of settler claims to be uplifting the
"uncivilized." 291 This involved what Veracini terms "transfer by co-
erced lifestyle change," 2 9 2 as well as conceptual displacement, the
portrayal of Afrodescendant peoples as simultaneously from "some-
where else" and "nowhere in particular." 2 9 3
Legally, persons of African descent have been "disappeared"
from settler society by denying them legal personhood, excluding them
from citizenship, and limiting their agency by minutely regulating all
aspects of their lives. 2 9 4 Their intended exclusion from settler society
was clearly articulated by Chief Justice Taney in his 1856 Dred Scott
opinion, which bluntly concluded that "a negro whose ancestors were
imported into this country, and sold as slaves" was most definitely not
"a member of the political community formed and brought into exis-
tence by the Constitution of the United States."2 9 5 In fact, Taney went
on, even "free negroes" were not part of "this people" and, as far as the
founders were concerned, a person of African descent "had no rights
which the White man was bound to respect." 296
The most obvious difference in the treatment of American In-
dian and Afrodescendant populations arises from the settlers' desire to
encourage the reproduction of enslaved persons. 2 9 7 Thus, in the case of
the Black population, we see an inverse form of transfer by accounting.
Instead of employing exclusionary blood quantum rules to diminish the
population over time, settlers instituted increasingly inclusive racial
classification schemes resulting, ultimately, in the "one-drop" rule.2 98
Rather than expanding the settler class or allowing for its "dilution,"
the offspring of Afrodescendant persons were always to be subordi-
nated, if not directly enslaved. In the meantime, of course, the settler
class came to identify itself as White, and to define Whiteness with as
291. See supra notes 118-20, 152 and accompanying text.
292. VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 44.
293. Id. at 35-36.
294. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
295. Scott, 60 U.S. at 403.
296. Id. at 407
297. See HENRY WIENCEK, MASTER OF THE MOUNTAIN: THOMAS JEFFERSON AND His
SLAVES 259 (2012) (explaining that Jefferson, who paid particular attention to the "breed-
ing" of enslaved persons, stated that "a child raised every 2 years is of more profit than the
crop of the best laboring man").
298. See generally Daniel J. Sharfstein, Crossing the Color Line: Racial Migration and
the One-Drop Rule, 1600-1860, 91 MINN. L. REV. 592 (2007) (discussing the evolution of
these classifications).
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much exclusivity as possible. The illogical system by which persons
continue to be assigned Black or White identities in American society
can thus be traced directly to settler interests.
Faced with the prospect of the abolition of slavery, American
political leaders seriously considered the viability of wholesale ethnic
transfer "back to Africa." 299 When that proved impracticable, other
means of constricting rights and maintaining social control were devel-
oped to undermine the impact of the abolition of slavery, as well as the
Fourteenth Amendment's recognition of birthright citizenship and its
guarantees of equal protection and due process of law.3 0 0 One solution
was criminalization, and the control it offered over Black lives.3 0 '
Thus, for example, the convict labor system effectively ensured that an
ample supply of Black workers would be available, frequently to their
former "owners," and often at a cost less than that of sustaining en-
slaved labor.3 0 2 Such formal policies of subjugation were supple-
mented, consistently, by the tolerance and even encouragement of vigi-
lante violence by the settler population at large.3 0 3
Black labor-both enslaved and nominally free-sustained the
earliest Anglo-American settler colonies, provided the agricultural
base that supported settler expansion, and generated the material
base of American industrialization. 3 0 4 Over the past several decades,
however, manufacturing jobs have been replaced by technology and/or
the outsourcing of production, making African American labor increas-
ingly superfluous to settler goals.3 0 5 One result is that strategies of
subjugation have shifted from those which increase the settlers' ability
to extract wealth from Black labor to those of containment and control.
299. See Michael Daly Hawkins, John Quincy Adams and the Antebellum Maritime
Slave Trade: The Politics of Slavery and the Slavery of Politics, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1,
10 (2000) (noting that Congress in 1819 "declare[d] it the official policy of the United States
to return free Blacks-both kidnapped Africans and emancipated former slaves-to
Africa").
300. See supra notes 213, 216.
301. See generally THE AGE OF JIM CROW: SEGREGATION FROM THE END OF RECONST-
RUCTION TO THE GREAT DEPRESSION (Paul Finkelman ed., 1992); see also VERACINI, SETTLER
COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 45 (discussing criminalization as a settler colonial strategy).
302. See supra note 215.
303. See generally HERBERT SHAPIRO, WHITE VIOLENCE AND BLACK RESPONSE: FROM RE-
CONSTRUCTION TO MONTGOMERY (1988).
304. See generally GAVIN WRIGHT, SLAVERY AND AMERICAN ECONomic DEVELOPMENT
(2006).
305. See Tibbs, supra note 2, at 55 (noting that 50% of Black men employed in manufac-
turing jobs in five Midwestern states lost their jobs to deindustrialization between 1979 and
1980 and that Black youth unemployment quadrupled and Black family income fell 50%
between 1965 and 1980).
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Criminalization, of course, has again been employed to accomplish
these purposes.3 0 6
Having erased-to the fullest extent possible-the awareness of
the African cultures, histories, and communities that would allow
Black people in the United States to understand themselves indepen-
dently of settler culture, American society has attempted to replace
self-definition with assimilation. 3 0 7 In other words, like colonized peo-
ples throughout the world, Afrodescendants in North America were to
be "'uplifted' out of existence."308 Assimilation, however, was an illu-
sory goal because it requires not only the willingness of those deemed
Other to conform to mainstream standards, values, and cultural
norms, but their acceptance by settler society.309 This, however, occurs
only on a sporadic basis because maintenance of settler sovereign pre-
rogative and the "value" associated with Whiteness requires the
perpetuation of some form of unassimilable difference.310 Thus, the
conflation of "Black" with crime, drugs, and dependency discussed
above serves to ensure the dynamic of difference that characterizes co-
lonial relations.3 1 '
As I hope this illustrates, viewing racial discrimination in terms
of the imperatives of settler colonialism helps explain how racial hier-
archy has been maintained in this society even as the mechanisms
have shifted from enslavement to legalized apartheid and exclusion
and, most recently, to "colorblind" or "postracial" means of subjugation.
This framework also sheds light on why many people of color persist in
pursuing assimilative goals, for if there is no perception of a past to
reconstruct and no viable alternatives for the future, engaging in an
306. See PARENTI, supra note 84, at 238. See generally Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Mass
Incarceration ofAfrican-American Males: A Return to Institutionalized Slavery, Oppression,
and Disenfranchisement of Constitutional Rights, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 599 (2007). On
social containment, see generally CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, STOP AND FRISK:
THE HUMAN IMPACT (2012), available at http://stopandfrisk.org/the-human-impact-report
.pdf; Donald F. Tibbs & Tyron P. Woods, The Jena Six and Black Punishment: Law and
Raw Life in the Domain of Nonexistence, 7 SEATTLE J. FOR Soc. JUST. 235 (2008).
307. See MEMMI, supra note 149, at 89 (noting that for the colonizers' "legitimacy to be
complete, it is not enough for the colonized to be a slave, he must also accept his role"). On
the problematic nature of assimilation, see infra notes 427-434 and accompanying text.
308. VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 37.
309. See id. at 38 (noting that assimilation requires "absorption" by the settler body
politic).
310. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 84, 91 and accompanying text.
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apparently Sisyphean struggle is understandably preferable to
despair. 312
C. Strategies of Subordination and Manipulation:
"Voluntary" Immigrants
Peoples of color in contemporary American society who are
neither indigenous to this land nor the descendants of enslaved Afri-
cans migrated to this continent for reasons that encompass the entire
spectrum of volition. Given the United States' remarkably successful
campaign to depict this as a "land of opportunity" for all, many un-
doubtedly came voluntarily, believing-accurately or not-in their
ability to share in the benefits accrued by the settler class.3 13 Many
others, however, have migrated under very different circumstances,
from Chinese laborers literally kidnapped and forced to migrate; 314 to
Filipinos, Puerto Ricans and Pacific Islanders driven from their home-
lands by U.S. colonial occupation and its economic consequences;315 to
Central American refugees, themselves Indigenous peoples, forced off
their lands by U.S.-backed military governments;316 to those, like Mex-
ican subsistence farmers, no longer able to feed their families as a
312. HOMER, ODYSSEY 175-76 (Stanley Lombardo, trans., Hackett Publishing Co. Inc.
2000) (describing Sisyphus' condemnation to forever rolling a large boulder up a hill, only to
have it always roll back down); see also Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 555 (9th Cir.
2005) (explaining the term).
313. See, e.g., Jim Lockwood, Land of Opportunity Attracts Immigrants, CITIZENSVOICE
(May 26, 2013), http://citizensvoice.com/news/1and-of-opportunity-attracts-immigrants-1.14
92463.
314. See Renee C. Redman, From Importation of Slaves to Migration of Laborers: The
Struggle to Outlaw American Participation in the Chinese Coolie Trade and the Seeds of
United States Immigration Law, 3 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 1, 2-5 (2010).
315. See John Enriquez Andres, The Raiding of the Pearl: The Effects of Trade Liberali-
zation on Philippine Labor Migration, and the Filipino Migrant Worker's Experience, 10
RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 523, 530-31 (2009) (documenting the pressure to migrate resulting
from poverty in the Philippines); Torruella, supra note 251, at 82-87 (demonstrating the
nexus between colonization, economic exploitation and migration in Puerto Rico); Ediberto
Roman & Theron Simmons, Membership Denied: Subordination and Subjugation Under
United States Expansionism, 39 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 437, 488-519 (2002) (explaining the
ongoing effects of U.S. colonialism in the Pacific Islands).
316. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Romig, Salvadoran Illegal Aliens: A Struggle to Obtain Refuge
in the United States, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 295, 317-18 (1985) (explaining the relationship
between Salvadoran migrants and U.S. foreign policy).
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result of global economic agreements;317 to refugees generated by U.S.
wars, from Southeast Asia to Iraq and Afghanistan.3 18
Some of these peoples have been subjected to the push-pull dy-
namics of perceived labor needs. In these cases, governmental policies
have facilitated the importation of labor from, for example, China and
Mexico, when otherwise available labor was inadequate to settler terri-
torial or economic expansion, and implemented exclusionary policies in
response to economic downturns.3 19 In other cases, such as the influx
of refugees generated by U.S. wars, the diversification of the popula-
tion seems less intentional, accepted, often grudgingly, as the
collateral damage of the policies and actions perceived as necessary to
achieve or maintain global hegemony. 320 Regardless of the motivations
impelling people of color to the United States, certain commonalities,
or patterns, can be seen in terms of their subordination, i.e., how they
have been racially identified and incorporated into settler hierarchies
of power and privilege, and what I have termed their manipulation,
i.e., how their status as migrants who are neither Black nor White has
been used to further the subjugation of peoples of African descent and
reinforce the perceived legitimacy of the settler state and its elimina-
tion of Indigenous peoples.
Some of the strategies employed against more-and-less volun-
tary migrants of color overlap with those used to subordinate
Afrodescendant and Indigenous peoples in this country. Assimilation
is probably the most obvious. While it has tended to be less coercively
enforced with respect to migrant Others, the pressure to abandon lan-
guages, cultures, and histories has been consistent. 321 This results in a
317. See Marc Belanger, Immigration, Race, and Economic Globalization on the U.S.-
Mexico Border: Tangled Histories and Contemporary Realities, 10 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
1, 2-3, 13-16 (2006).
318. See Thomas Hedges, U.S. Breaks Promises to Iraqi and Afghan Refugees, TRUTHDIG
(Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/us breaks-promises-to-iraqi-and af
ghan-refugees_20130327 (noting that about 80,000 of 1.5 million refugees fleeing Iraq have
been resettled in the U.S.). See generally Gary Kar-Chuen Chow, Exiled Once Again: Conse-
quences of the Congressional Expansion of Deportable Offenses on the Southeast Asian
Refugee Community, 12 ASIAN Am. L.J. 103, 106-11 (2005) (providing background on
Vietnamese, Cambodian, Laotian, and Hmong refugees).
319. See generally Gerald P. L6pez, Don't We Like Them Illegal?, 45 U.C. DAVIs L. REV.
1711 (2012).
320. See, e.g., A.O. Scott, Witnesses to the Collapse: "Last Days in Vietnam" Looks at Fall
of Saigon, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/movies/ast-
days-in-vietnam-looks-at-fall-of-saigon.html (reviewing a movie addressing the evacuation
of "[t]housands of Vietnamese who had loyally served the American cause").
321. See Enid Trucios-Gaynes, The Legacy ofRacially Restrictive Immigration Laws and
Policies and the Construction of the American National Identity, 76 OR. L. REV. 369, 378-89
(1997). See generally Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Deconstructing Homo[geneous] Americanus:
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form of conceptual displacement because those whose past has been
erased come from "nowhere" and only what is "here" matters. Thus, the
fact that a refugee may be a medical doctor becomes irrelevant, invisi-
ble, to those who only see a taxi driver.322 Ethnic transfer has also been
employed, as illustrated by the mass deportations of Mexicans and
Mexican Americans in the 1930s, 3 2 3 and the mass internment of Japa-
nese Americans, both "aliens" and U.S. citizens, during WWII.3 2 4 In
both cases, much of the political pressure for these enforced removals
came from "nativists," i.e. White settlers who viewed this as their coun-
try and resented not only the competition of cheap labor but also the
occupation and cultivation of their agricultural lands in Western
states .325
The racialization of migrant Others is a strategy that has been
used to subordinate peoples of color in a way that erases their particu-
lar histories and identities, replacing them with artificially constructed
identities that are then used to reinforce a multi-layered racial hierar-
chy. Just as Indigenous peoples from hundreds of nations in North
America or Africa have been categorized, officially and in public per-
ception, as simply "American Indian" or "Black,"326 those of Chinese,
Vietnamese, Korean or Filipino ancestry are all "Asians,"327 while
those from origins as diverse as Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Argentina
The White Ethnic Immigrant Narrative and Its Exclusionary Effect, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1493
(1998).
322. See Paul McDaniel, Licensing Barriers Leave Immigrant Doctors Driving Cabs In-
stead of Practicing Medicine, Am. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Dec. 17, 2013), http://immi-
grationimpact.com/2013/12/17/icensing-barriers-leave-immigrant-doctors-driving-cabs-in-
stead-of-practicing-medicine/.
323. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Forgotten "Repatriation" of Persons of Mexican Ancestry
and Lessons for the "War on Terror," 26 PACE L. REV. 1, 4-9 (2005) (discussing the removal of
an estimated one million Mexicans and Mexican Americans during the Depression and not-
ing that it would today be considered a form of "ethnic cleansing") [hereinafter Johnson,
Forgotten Repatriation].
324. See Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J.
489, 489, 508 (1945) (noting that a majority of those interned were U.S. citizens, and that
German and Italian aliens were not interned en masse).
325. See Sumi Cho, Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren,
Brown and a Theory of Racial Redemption, 40 B.C. L. REV. 73, 115-18 (1998) (discussing the
role of the Native Sons of the Golden West in the Japanese American internment). See gen-
erally Johnson, Forgotten Repatriation, supra note 323.
326. See Kevin Brown, Should Black Immigrants Be Favored Over Black Hispanics and
Black Multiracials in the Admissions Processes of Selective Higher Education Programs?, 54
How. L.J. 255, 256 (2011) (noting a shift in admissions practices away from a unified
"Black" category).
327. See Robert S. Chang, The Invention ofAsian Americans, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 947,
952-56 (2013). On the shifting racialization of South Asians, see Vinay Harpalani, Desi Crit:
Theorizing the Racial Ambiguity of South Asian Americans, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. Am. L.
77, 104-09 (2013).
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are "Hispanic."3 28 In recent decades, the classification system has be-
come somewhat more complex but no more accurate. 3 2 9
One result of this process is that characteristics attributed to
one subgroup may be applied, at will, to those with whom they have
been racially conflated. From this emerges the logic, if one can use that
term, that allowed a jury in Detroit to acquit White workers, allegedly
upset by layoffs at a Japanese-owned auto plant, for beating Vincent
Chin, a fifth generation Chinese American, to death with a baseball
bat while disparaging him as a "gook."3 3 0 In a related phenomenon, we
have seen Arab Americans and persons from a wide range of countries
in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia, collapsed into a
racialized identity whose predominant feature might be described as
"presumed terrorist."3 3
Regardless of the vagaries of the taxonomy, the first and proba-
bly most important point is that all of these categories are Not-
White. 332 Functionally, this means that persons so classified are
presumed not to be eligible for inclusion in the settler class. Simultane-
ously, however, such migrant Others are deemed Not-Black, giving
them an incentive to collaborate in the maintenance of racial hierar-
chy.333 The possibility of assimilation, i.e., "honorary" settler status,3 3 4
is held out as an incentive to conform, to undermine coalition building
with Black communities as well as other migrant groups and Indige-
328. See Francisco Valdes, Race, Ethnicity, and Hispanismo in a Triangular Perspective:
The "Essential Latinalo" and Latcrit Theory, 48 UCLA L. REV. 305, 313-17 (2000).
329. On the shifting definitions used in the U.S. Census, see Alaina R. Walker, Choos-
ing to Be Multiracial in America: The Sociopolitical Implications of the "Check All That
Apply" Approach to Race Adopted in the 2000 U.S. Census, 21 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 61,
64-67 (2011).
330. See SUCHENG CHAN, ASIAN AMERICANS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY 176-78 (1991).
331. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and
the "Racing" of Arab Americans as "Terrorists," 8 ASIAN L.J. 1, 11-15 (2001). For a more
nuanced discussion of this phenomenon, see generally Ming H. Chen, Alienated: A Rework-
ing of the Racialization Thesis After September 11, 18 Am. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 411
(2010).
332. On the legal construction of the White/non-White distinction, see generally IAN F.
HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE By LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (2006) [hereinafter HA-
NEY LOPEZ, WHITE By LAW].
333. See Mari Matsuda, We Will Not Be Used, 1 ASIAN Am. PAC. Is. L.J. 79, 79 (1993)
(noting that the "racial middle" can "reinforce white supremacy if the middle deludes itself
into thinking that it can be just like white if it tries hard enough") [hereinafter Matsuda, We
Will Not Be Used].
334. This phrase echoes the apartheid-era South African policy of classifying Japanese
as "honorary whites" because of the importance of Japanese trade and investment. See Seiro
Kawasaki, The Policy of Apartheid and the Japanese in the Republic of South Africa, 5 To-
KYO KASEIGAKUIN TSUKUBA WOMEN'S UNIVERSITY BULLETIN 53, 54 (2001), available at http://
www.tsukuba-g.ac.jp/library/kiyou/2001/4.KAWASAKI.pdf
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nous peoples, and as evidence of the settler myth that it is not
structural racism but some variant of cultural dysfunction that keeps
people of African descent and American Indians at the lowest rungs of
social and economic wellbeing.335
This is perhaps best illustrated by the depiction of Asian Ameri-
cans as the "model minority."336 The label itself reflects its intent to
both subordinate and manipulate. Asians are a "minority"-i.e., not
settlers-and thus to be relegated to a subordinate status within set-
tler society. Simultaneously, however, we are the "model," presumably
for other "minorities."3 3 7 This phrase evokes the imagery of Asians as
hardworking, economically successful, and anxious to assimilate. It
masks the distinct problems faced by particular subgroups, as when
refugees from Laos or Cambodia are assumed to have the resources
accumulated by Chinese or Japanese American communities over
many generations. 33  It sends the not-so-subtle message to Asian
Americans that we should be "grateful" not to be at the bottom of set-
tler racial hierarchy, reinforcing settler hegemony by creating barriers
to our ability to see common patterns of subordination.3 3 9
The benefits that migrant Others purportedly gain from assimi-
lation are consistently undermined by another strategy that may be
termed the construction of "perpetual foreignness," or excludability. 340
As noted above, until after the Civil War, birthright citizenship was
presumed to extend only to White settlers and their offspring (assum-
ing those children were also White), 341 and naturalized citizenship was
explicitly limited to persons who were, among other things, "free white
person[s]."342 This racial prerequisite to naturalized citizenship was
not completely eliminated until 1952,343 and in the interim "ineligibil-
335. See Matsuda, We Will Not Be Used, supra note 333, at 80-81.
336. See RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN
AMERICANS 474-84 (rev'd ed. 1998).
337. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Model Minority, Yellow Peril: Functions of "Foreignness" in
the Construction of Asian American Legal Identity, 4 ASIAN L.J. 71, 71-73 (1997).
338. See Kia Xiong, Missing the Hmong: A Need for More from Asian American Legal
Studies, 18 ASIAN PAC. Am. L.J. 119, 123-24 (2012-2013).
339. See generally Matsuda, We Will Not Be Used, supra note 333.
340. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, "Foreignness," and
Racial Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REv. 261, 295-325 (1997); Keith Aoki, "For-
eign-ness" & Asian American Identities: Yellowface, World War II Propaganda, and
Bifurcated Racial Stereotypes, 4 ASIAN PAC. Am. L.J. 1, 3 (1996) (noting that Asian Ameri-
cans are "race-ed" not only as "non-Whites" but also as "foreign").
341. See supra notes 213, 216, 295-96 and accompanying text.
342. See supra note 238. See generally HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAw, supra note 332
(discussing cases that interpreted this racial prerequisite to naturalization).
343. See supra note 238 and accompanying text; see also HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW,
supra note 332, at 43-44.
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ity to citizenship," code for "non-White," was used to restrict the rights
and privileges available to immigrants of color.344 This strategy was
deployed effectively to prevent "aliens ineligible to citizenship" from
owning land in many Western states, thus ensuring that they would
not, in U.S. Senator James Phelan's terms, "destroy[ ] the area for
White settlement and the desirable element." 3 4 5
The federal government's plenary authority over immigration
has been used to shape the immigrant population on the basis of race
and national origin, to impose ideological and political restrictions on
immigrants, and to deport them or imprison them indefinitely without
due process or otherwise applicable constitutional protections. 346 The
government's ability to retroactively change the terms under which
even long-term permanent residents may remain renders these groups
even more vulnerable to settler control and manipulation.3 4 7
As a result of policies restricting "legal" immigration to num-
bers far below the perceived labor needs of the agricultural and service
sectors, as well as the economic pressures generated by international
free trade agreements, there are large communities of undocumented
migrants in the United States. 3 4 8 This facilitates a strategy of subordi-
nation that may be termed "presumption of illegal presence," as the
conflated racialization of Mexicans and Central Americans, for exam-
ple, colors them all as "illegal aliens." 3 4 9 The result is not only the
sociocultural subordination that attends stereotyping, but also a par-
ticular form of criminalization that encourages racial profiling and
normalizes the idea that immigrants of color may be disappeared by
governmental authorities at any time.3 5 0
344. See HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE By LAw, supra note 332, at 90-91.
345. Quoted in NGAI, supra note 237, at 39; see also Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633,
650-63 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring) (finding California's alien land law unconstitutional
and explaining the racism underlying its reliance on ineligibility to citizenship). See gener-
ally Keith Aoki, No Right to Own? The Early Twentieth Century "Alien Land Laws" as a
Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 37 (1998).
346. See generally Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary
Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545
(1990).
347. See L6pez, supra note 319, at 1718 (arguing that "[t]he U.S. has built its prosperity,
while Mexico has managed its distress" with undocumented Mexican migration).
348. See AVIVA CHOMSKY, UNDOCUMENTED: How IMMIGRATION BECAME ILLEGAL 63
(2014).
349. See id. at 14-20. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, "Aliens" and the U.S. Immigration
Laws: The Social and Legal Construction ofNonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-Am. L. REV. 263
(1997).
350. NGAI, supra note 237, at 2 ("[T]he presence of large illegal populations in Asian and
Latino communities has historically contributed to the construction of those communities as
illegitimate, criminal, and unassimilable.").
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Racialization, harsh immigration laws, and the historic use of
race-based restrictions on birthright and naturalized citizenship have
thus combined to produce perpetual foreignness. As Ngai notes,
the association of these minority groups as unassimilable foreigners
has led to the creation of "alien citizens"-persons who are Ameri-
can citizens by virtue of their birth in the United States but who are
presumed to be foreign by the mainstream of American culture and,
at times, by the state.3 5 '
One result is the often unspoken assumption that White people may
have roots in other countries, but are from here. It is grudgingly ac-
cepted that persons of African descent cannot, generally, be sent back
to Africa, but they are to be excluded from settler space where possible.
Everyone else is from somewhere else, and must constantly prove the
legitimacy of their presence. The pervasiveness of this presumption of
foreignness, and therefore illegitimate presence, was most starkly
bought home to me in a sadly ironic incident shortly after September
11, 2001, when a young Creek woman in Oklahoma was run over and
killed by young White men who assaulted a group of Native youth
while shouting "Go back to your own country!"352
The point of developing analytical tools that explain the dynam-
ics of racial, economic, and political domination and subordination is
not simply to better understand what is, and how we got here, but to
enable us to envision and implement more effective strategies of resis-
tance and transformation. In this process, law is tremendously
influential because it is offered and generally accepted as a path to
racial justice, and because it often implements strategies of elimina-
tion and subordination that we need to recognize. Law will not liberate
us, but may, at times, serve as a tool of decolonization. The following
Parts V and VI address the inadequacies of legal remedies for racial
justice within the limitations of U.S. constitutional law, and the poten-
tial-as well as limitations-of emerging frameworks of international
law.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION AND THE DYNAmVc OF DIFFERENCE
[Tihe power to acquire territory . . . implies, not only the power to
govern such territory, but to prescribe upon what terms the United
351. Id. at 2.
352. See MICHAEL NEWTON, HATE CRIME IN AMERICA, 1968-2013: A CHRONOLOGY OF OF-
FENSES, LEGISLATION AND RELATED EVENTS (2014) (entry dated Sept. 15, 2001).
64 Vol. 10:1:1
TALES OF COLOR AND COLONIALISM
States will receive its inhabitants, and what their status shall be in
what Chief Justice Marshall termed the "American empire."
-Downes v. Bidwell3 5 3
In contemporary U.S. culture, it is almost axiomatic that full
incorporation of the population under U.S. jurisdiction into the settler
state is the intended result of constitutionally recognized civil and po-
litical rights, as well as the aspirational goal of people of color living in
the United States or its claimed territories. It is presumed that any
vestiges of discriminatory treatment are best addressed through legal
enforcement of the Constitution's guarantees of due process and equal
protection, and that assimilation will overcome any remaining limita-
tions imposed as a result of perceived difference. However, if one
accepts that the United States is-still-a colonial settler state, it fol-
lows that the primary purpose of this state's legal system would be to
sustain the territorial claims and the relationships of privilege and
subordination that ensure control of political, economic, and social in-
stitutions by the settler class. Simultaneously, however, the legal
system must shore up the ideological justifications of settler society,
framed in terms of extending the "American values" of freedom, democ-
racy, and human rights to the world at large.
Thus, the dynamic of difference characterizes not only racial at-
titudes and social relations, but the legal system as well. The tensions
and contradictions between the law's stated purposes and its lived re-
alities limit its utility while simultaneously providing opportunities to
use this dissonance to extend the reach of formally recognized rights.
This Part addresses why struggles to implement formal guarantees of
equal protection have failed to ensure racial justice. First, it notes that
large sectors of the population are explicitly excluded from constitu-
tional protection by virtue of the plenary power doctrine. Second, even
when constitutional protections are available, they have been inter-
preted in formalistic ways that facilitate the dynamic of difference by
both requiring and precluding assimilation. It concludes by observing
that even if assimilation were not precluded, it is a problematic goal
because it would come at the cost of eliminating Indigenous identity
and rights, as well as the right of all other peoples to self-determina-
tion. At best, it would ensure the domestic consolidation of settler
society, without dismantling its colonial foundations or limiting the
global reach of its economic, political, or military ambitions.
353. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 279 (1901).
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A. Plenary Power
The first thing to note about constitutional protections is that
the Supreme Court has simply decreed that they do not apply to very
broad and significant sectors of the population over whom the United
States asserts jurisdiction. 3 5 4 Instead, power that is explicitly colonial
may be exercised over American Indian nations, immigrants, and re-
sidents of unincorporated territories by the political branches of
government, i.e., Congress and the Executive. This is known as the ple-
nary power doctrine, under which the Court has said the federal
government can exercise plenary-full or complete, and therefore un-
challengeable-authority over these peoples .5
Early Anglo-American settlers understood that their ability to
establish an independent state was contingent upon acknowledging
the sovereignty of American Indian nations and negotiating treaties
with these nations. 35 6 Their intent, however, was always to exercise
their presumed prerogative to control not only the lands at issue but
also the structures of institutional power. By the 1830s, the Supreme
Court had unilaterally declared Indigenous peoples to be "domestic de-
pendent nations" whose relationship to the United States was that of a
"ward" to a "guardian."3 5 7 The doctrine was more formally articulated
in 1903, with the Supreme Court's clearly counterfactual statement
that "[p]lenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has
been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has al-
ways been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the
judicial department of the government." 5 8
Using this rationale, the Court upheld the 1887 Allotment Act,
which converted collectively held Indian lands into individual allot-
ments and allowed "surplus" land to be transferred to White settlers,
354. See generally SAITO, FROM CHINESE EXCLUSION, supra note 231; THOMAS ALEXAN-
DER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2002) [hereinafter ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY]; Sa-
rah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the
Nineteenth-Century Origins of Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002).
355. See SAITO, FROM CHINESE EXCLUSION, supra note 231, at 13-49.
356. See Siegfried Wiessner, American Indian Treaties and Modern International Law,
7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 567, 591 (1995) (noting that the U.S. initially "enter[ed] into treaties
of friendship and alliance on a perfectly level playing field with the Indian nations ...
extending to them the same courtesies as to other nations of the then overwhelmingly Euro-
pean international legal order").
357. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17. See generally Helen W. Winston, "An Anomaly Un-
known:" Supreme Court Application of International Law Norms on Indigenous Rights in
the Cherokee Cases (1831-32), 1 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 339 (1994).
358. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565. See generally CLARK, supra note 187.
66 Vol. 10:1:1
TALES OF COLOR AND COLONIALISM
despite the fact that the law violated both the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment and the explicit terms of an 1867 treaty.35 9 This ju-
dicial doctrine of plenary power has since been invoked to allow
Congress and the Executive to engage in otherwise unconstitutional
actions against American Indian nations with no semblance of judicial
restraint,3 6 0 resulting, for example, in generations of American Indian
children being forced into abusive "boarding schools,"3 6 ' and the gov-
ernment's recent failure to account for more than one hundred billion
dollars it confiscated and held "in trust" for individual American Indi-
ans. 362 As Philip Frickey notes, the "practical effect [of federal Indian
law] has been to legitimate the colonization of this continent-the dis-
placement of its native peoples-by the descendants of Europeans."3 63
Similarly, the United States has, since 1898, exercised jurisdic-
tion over "unincorporated territories" without extending constitutional
protections to their inhabitants. From 1898 to 1946, the U.S. consid-
ered Filipinos "wards" of the United States, "nationals" who owed
allegiance to the U.S. but were not entitled to the full benefits of citi-
zenship. 364 In 1901, Justice White declared in Downes v. Bidwell that
the colony of Puerto Rico "was foreign to the United States in a domes-
tic sense."365 This description is still accurate after a century of U.S.
rule, as Puerto Ricans still have no representation in Congress, only
qualified citizenship, and no right to determine their own political sta-
tus.3 6 6 Similarly, the Northern Mariana Islands, the U.S. Virgin
Islands, and American Samoa are not recognized as independent states
359. Natsu Taylor Saito, Asserting Plenary Power Over the "Other": Indians, Immi-
grants, Colonial Subjects, and Why U.S. Jurisprudence Needs to Incorporate International
Law, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 427, 441 (2002).
360. See generally Newton, Federal Power over Indians, supra note 199.
361. See generally CHURCHILL, KILL THE INDIAN, supra note 95.
362. See Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128, 1133-35 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (ruling in class action
suit filed in 1996 for unaccounted-for individual American Indian trust monies); see also
Jennifer Talhelm, Inside Washington: Cowboy Judge in Indian Case Holds Little Back, AP
ALERT, Nov. 28, 2005 (noting claims that the Interior Department mishandled more than
$100 billion in royalties); Diana Marrero, Tribal Members Place Renewed Urgency on
Resolving Landmark Lawsuit, MUSKOGEE DAILY PHOENIX & TIMES DEMOCRAT, Nov. 18,
2005, at 1 (noting charges of governmental "squandering" of $137 billion).
363. Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in
Federal Indian Law, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1754, 1754 (1997).
364. See Avelino J. Halagao, Jr., Citizens Denied: A Critical Examination of the Rabang
Decision Rejecting United States Citizenship Claims by Persons Born in the Philippines Dur-
ing the Territorial Period, 5 ASIAN PAC. Am. L.J. 77, 77-78 (1998).
365. Downes, 182 U.S. at 341 (1901) (White, J., concurring).
366. See Burnett & Marshall, supra note 230, at 12. See generally EFRN RIVERA RAMOS,
THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY: THE JUDICIAL AND SOCIAL LEGACY OF AMERICAN
COLONIALISM IN PUERTO Rico (2001).
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or as states of the union, and their residents remain subject to the ple-
nary authority of the U.S. government.3 6 7
Since the 1880s, the plenary power doctrine has been relied
upon to protect the settlers' assumption of control over who could enter
or reside within their claimed territorial boundaries. In 1889, a Chi-
nese permanent resident challenged a statute that was passed while
he was abroad and prevented the reentry of Chinese persons into the
United States.368 The Supreme Court refused to apply the provisions of
a treaty with China or the Fifth Amendment's due process clause on
the grounds that Congress' "determination is conclusive upon the judi-
ciary."3 6 9 This rationale was extended during the Cold War to the
indefinite detention of those whom the government wished to deport,
but had nowhere to go.37 0 The plenary power doctrine continues to be
the foundational principle of U.S. immigration law.3 7 ' It has been in-
voked to justify intercepting Haitians and asylum seekers on the high
seas, or detaining them off-shore, 3 7 2 because persons not admitted to
the territory "have no constitutional rights with regard to their appli-
cations, and must be content to accept whatever statutory rights and
privileges they are granted by Congress." 373 This assertion of power
permits the indefinite detention of undocumented migrants, as well as
the increasingly harsh immigration measures referenced above. 374 In
367. See Burnett & Marshall, supra note 230, at 1-2.
368. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 600 (noting that "the last expression of the sovereign
will must control").
369. Id. at 606; see also Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730-34 (1893) (extending plenary
authority from exclusion to deportation and refusing to characterize deportation as punish-
ment that would trigger constitutional scrutiny).
370. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 208 (1953) (allowing
a returning permanent resident to be held indefinitely on Ellis Island, without a hearing, on
the Attorney General's assertion that his entry would be "prejudicial to the public interest").
371. See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary
Congressional Power, 1984 Sup. CT. REV. 255; Motomura, supra note 346; ALEINIKOFF, SEM-
BLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 354.
372. See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (holding that neither
the Refugee Convention nor U.S. immigration statutes would be applied to actions on the
high seas). See generally Bill Frelick, Haitian Boat Interdiction and Return: First Asylum
and First Principles of Refugee Protection, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 675 (1993).
373. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 968 (11th Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court ruled that
the Eleventh Circuit should not have reached the constitutional question and declined to
revisit the Cold War plenary power cases. Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854-55 (1985). The
following year the Court refused to grant certiorari in Garcia-Mir v. Meese, in which the
Eleventh Circuit noted specifically that international human rights law was inapplicable to
the indefinitely detained Mariel Cubans. 788 F.2d 1446, 1453-55 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986).
374. In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Court found detained migrants to
have some due process rights, but this has not eliminated indefinite detention or limited the
plenary power doctrine. See generally Michelle Carey, "You Don't Know If They'll Let You
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combination with the state's claim to plenary authority over unincorpo-
rated territories, it has also been used to justify the United States'
failure to provide detainees at Guantanamo Bay with otherwise appli-
cable legal or constitutional protections.3 75
This judicial doctrine puts us on notice that although contempo-
rary legal decisions may employ more sanitized language, and layers of
precedent may be invoked to mask the underlying reasoning, only the
"principles of natural justice inherent in the Anglo-Saxon character"
stand between those deemed Other and "manifestly hostile" state ac-
tion.3 7 6 The government may choose to extend certain rights or
privileges to the peoples at issue, but only as an exercise of its own
prerogative, not because it recognizes an obligation to do so.37 What
this means is that, while constitutional protections may be utilized to
alleviate injustice or enhance equal treatment amongst those who,
from a settler perspective, have no identity outside the settler polity,
the lines have been clearly drawn. The judiciary will not interpret the
Constitution to limit, to any significant degree, the settler prerogative
to occupy lands and appropriate resources, to erase Indigenous sover-
eignty, or to determine who may enter or remain on those lands.
Regardless of how reasonably, equitably, or effectively constitutional
principles may be applied to some sectors of the citizenry, underlying
colonial structures will remain intact.
B. Equal Protection and Due Process
The plenary power doctrine thus exempts certain sectors of the
population from constitutional protection. For those to whom the Con-
stitution does apply, it is generally presumed that the guarantees of
due process and equal protection provided by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments can be used to dismantle racial hierarchy.378 This pro-
Out in One Day, One Year, or Ten Years . . ." Indefinite Detention of Immigrants after
Zadvydas v. Davis, 24 CHICANO-LATINo L. REV. 12 (2003); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Det-
aining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIG. L.J.
365 (2002).
375. See generally Ernesto Hernindez-L6pez, Kiyemba, Guantdnamo, and Immigration
Law: An Extraterritorial Constitution in a Plenary Power World, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 193
(2012); Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 Loy. L. REV. 1 (2004).
376. Downes, 182 U.S. at 280-81.
377. This is, itself, a strategy of both elimination and subordination that parallels the
imposition of dual legal systems in classic colonial societies. See Jeffrey R. Dudas, Law at
the American Frontier, 29 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 859, 869 (2004) (discussing dual legal systems
in colonial contexts).
378. For an overview of the developments addressed in this section, see generally Ian
Haney-L6pez, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779 (2012) (explaining how equal
2014 69
FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW
position, however, warrants scrutiny. The triumphalist narrative of
American legal history generally moves from the Constitution as origi-
nally framed, with its articulation of a broad range of rights for a
limited sector of the population and its protection of the institution of
slavery, to the Reconstruction Amendments that abolished slavery, in-
stituted birthright citizenship, guaranteed equal protection under law,
and prohibited racial discrimination in voting rights. It portrays the
subsequent century of legalized apartheid as a transitional phase to
the current implementation of these rights through judicial decisions
and legislation passed during the civil rights era.3 7 9 From this perspec-
tive, the law may have once been, but is no longer a tool of racialized
subordination, and any disparities in its enforcement, or in access to
social resources more generally, are attributable either to vestigial
prejudice or the failure of racial "minorities" to take advantage of the
opportunities available to all.
The problem with this narrative-like that of the Anglo-Ameri-
can origin story more generally-is that it fails to account for the
persistent patterns of exclusion, elimination, and subordination
throughout U.S. history, and the reality that racial disparities in
wealth, income, housing, education, employment, access to healthcare,
and incarceration rates have not diminished significantly since legal-
ized apartheid was abolished.38 0 A brief review of key legal decisions
implementing constitutional rights and legislation purporting to pro-
tect civil rights illustrates how structural inequality has been
maintained.
In the Civil Rights Cases of 1883, the Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional portions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 prohibiting
private owners of public accommodations from discriminating on the
basis of race. 3 8 ' In the Court's opinion, it was time for former slaves to
"cease [ I] to be the special favorite of the laws." 38 2 As observed by Mario
Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky, and Trina Jones, "Just eighteen years af-
ter the end of slavery ... the Supreme Court was ready to declare that
protection jurisprudence has come to protect the racial status quo) [hereinafter Haney-
L6pez, Intentional Blindness]; Charles Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Re-
flections on the Impact and Origins of "The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection," 40 CONN. L.
REV. 931 (2008) (addressing the shortcomings of equal protection theory).
379. For a critique of the standard narrative, see LOEWEN, supra note 154, at 131-163,
223-31.
380. See supra notes 54-66.
381. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-15 (1883) (finding these prohibitions to violate
the Tenth Amendment's protection of state powers, and holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection extended only to state action).
382. Id. at 25.
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U.S. society was ostensibly post-racial."38 3 Shortly thereafter, in Plessy
v. Ferguson, it found "separate but equal" accommodations (meaning
legally mandated apartheid) to comport with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's guarantee of equal protection.38 4 As succinctly summarized by
Justice Powell in the Bakke case, for all practical purposes the equal
protection clause had been "strangled in infancy. "385
Confronted with the constitutionality of interning U.S. citizens
of Japanese descent during World War II, the Supreme Court declared
laws restricting civil rights on the basis of race to be "immediately sus-
pect,"3 8 6 thus introducing the notion of "strict scrutiny" into American
jurisprudence. Despite its claim to be rigidly scrutinizing mass incar-
ceration on the basis of race, the Court upheld the internment,
accepting at face value the government's assertion that it was neces-
sary for national security.38 7 A decade later, in Brown v. Board of
Education, the Supreme Court expanded the reach of Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection, using evidence of the effects of segrega-
tion on Black school children to overturn Plessy and declare segregated
schools to be inherently unequal.38 8 But the Justices did not actually
address the history of racism in this country. Instead, they character-
ized legalized apartheid as aberrational, noting in a companion case to
Brown that "[c]lassifications based solely upon race must be scruti-
nized with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and
hence constitutionally suspect."3 8 9 Since then, the Court has employed
strict scrutiny not only to strike down overtly discriminatory laws,
such as those prohibiting miscegenation,3 9 0 but also laws or policies
intended to remedy historic racial inequities through some variant of
383. Barnes et al., supra note 9, at 973.
384. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550-51.
385. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (internal cita-
tion omitted). Justice Powell notes that, by contrast, "the Due Process Clause flourished as a
cornerstone in the Court's defense of property and liberty of contract." Id.
386. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
387. Id. at 217-19. See generally Rostow, supra note 324 (debunking the government's
claim of military necessity).
388. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
389. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (finding racial segregation in District of
Columbia schools to be unconstitutional under the due process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment) (emphasis added).
390. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1967).
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what is commonly termed "affirmative action." 3 9 ' The presumption in
this line of equal protection cases is that race should not matter.39 2
As a result, the principle that law should not be used to exclude
or disadvantage people on the basis of race or ethnicity has been trans-
formed into an ahistorical proposition that does not allow for the
recognition of any privilege that White people, collectively, have ac-
crued over several centuries of institutionalized racism.3 9 3 This is
reflected in Justice Powell's assertion in Bakke that "'societal discrimi-
nation' does not justify . .. impos[ing] disadvantages upon persons ...
who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the
special admissions program are thought to have suffered." 3 9 4 Those
who have historically benefitted from White privilege are, individually,
"innocent."3 95 As Cheryl Harris explained, they have accrued a prop-
erty interest in Whiteness, and any attempt to dispossess them of its
advantages becomes a taking.3 9 6 Dissenting in the Wards Cove case in
1989, Justice Blackmun "wonder[ed] whether the majority still
believes that race discrimination-or more accurately, race discrim-
391. See Haney-L6pez, Intentional Blindness, supra note 378, at 1826-28; see also Dar-
ren Lenard Hutchinson, "Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race": The Inversion of
Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615,
637 (2003) (noting that laws burdening historically privileged groups have been most fre-
quently struck down). The Court may be slowly shifting back toward the incorporation of
context to strict scrutiny analyses. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003)
("[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-based governmental action"); see also Eric K. Ya-
mamoto et al., Contextual Strict Scrutiny, 49 How. L.J. 214, 248-56 (2006) (pointing out the
Court's acknowledgment of context in a range of cases).
392. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that a
general history of past racial discrimination did not justify the use of racial quotas in public
works contracts); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Fullilove v. Klutz-
nick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265 (precluding consideration of race in
medical school admissions, except as part of a broader process of enhancing diversity).
393. On institutionalized racism, see generally john a. powell, Structural Racism: Build-
ing Upon the Insights of John Calmore, 86 N.C. L. REV. 791 (2008) [hereinafter powell,
Structural Racism]. On the failure to meaningfully implement civil rights legislation, see
generally John 0. Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1067 (1998) (criticizing the implementation of fair housing laws).
394. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310; see Haney L6pez, "A Nation of Minorities," supra note 219,
at 1035-37 (noting Justice Powell's transformation of Whites from the majority to a collec-
tion of ethnic "minorities"); see also Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and
Difference in Twentieth-Century Race Law, 88 CAL. L. REv.1923, 1993-97 (2000); Peter H.
Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL. REV. 1, 46-49
(2001). See generally Charles R. Lawrence, III, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the
Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUMBIA L. REV. 928 (2001).
395. See, e.g., Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 (eschewing "discriminatory legal remedies that
work against innocent people") (emphasis in original).
396. See generally Harris, Whiteness, supra note 22.
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ination against nonwhites-is a problem in our society, or even
remembers that it ever was."3 9 7
The Supreme Court's erasure of this country's history of state-
sanctioned racism has freed the settler class from any collective legal
responsibility for its consequences, and allowed the judiciary to limit
redress to cases in which individuals of any "race" can demonstrate
that they have been denied equal treatment as the direct result of ra-
cial animus.398 Judicial remedies for wrongs resulting from the most
ingrained-i.e., unconscious-racial biases continue to be constricted,
even in the face of overwhelming evidence of racial disparities.3 9 9 Since
its 1976 ruling in Washington v. Davis, the Court has insisted that
equal protection claims based on disparate impact without proof of dis-
criminatory intent will be subject only to rational basis review, not
strict scrutiny. 400 Increasingly, even claimants under Titles VI and VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1965, which allow consideration of disparate
impact, are being required to offer proof of causation in addition to evi-
dence of racialized disparity.401 According to john powell, "From a
structural perspective, causation is understood as cumulative within
and across domains." 402 However, from the decontextualized perspec-
tive of American jurisprudence, evidence of causation is constrained to
a narrow range of discrete, individualized decisions or actions. Only by
erasing historical realities could Justice Powell assert in Bakke that
397. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 662 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
398. See, e.g., R.A. Lenhardt, Localities as Equality Innovators, 7 STANFORD J. C. RTS. &
Civ. LIBERTIES 265, 266 (2011) (discussing the Court's refusal to afford deference to munici-
pal policies and programs intended to address racial disparities).
399. Barnes et al., supra note 9, at 993-97 (noting that the increasingly "postracial" or
"colorblind" approach of the Supreme Court is not new, but harkens back to its jurispru-
dence of the pre-Brown v. Board of Education era); see also Andr6 Douglas Pond Cummings,
The Associated Dangers of 'Brilliant Disguises,' Color-Blind Constitutionalism, and Pos-
tracial Rhetoric, 85 INDIANA L.J. 1277, 1277-91 (2010).
400. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
401. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (holding that there is no pri-
vate right of action under Title VI to challenge the disparate impact of regulations
permitting drivers license examinations to be offered only in English); Olatunde C.A. John-
son, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUMBIA L. REV. 374, 390-401 (2007); see also Ricci v. DeStefano,
129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677 (2009) (finding that New Haven's refusal to certify the results of
firefighters' promotional examinations on the basis of racial disparity violated Title VII's
prohibition of disparate treatment); Girardeau A. Spann, Postracial Discrimination, 5 MOD-
ERN Am. 26, 34 (2009) (concluding that the Ricci majority "constructed a previously
undetected tension between the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of Ti-
tle VII, and then resolved that tension in a way that strained against [Title VII's] overall
antidiscrimination objective").
402. powell, Structural Racism, supra note 393, at 796.
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"[t]here is no principled basis for deciding which groups would merit
'heightened judicial solicitude' and which would not." 4 0 3
Challenges to the stark racial disparities evident in the crimi-
nal justice system face similar hurdles. Thus, for example, in
McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme Court concluded that statistical evi-
dence of racial disparity in the imposition of death sentences did not
establish that the Constitution's guarantee of due process had been vi-
olated.404 It reasoned, "Our analysis begins with the basic principle
that a defendant who alleges an equal protection violation has the bur-
den of proving 'the existence of purposeful discrimination."' 4 0 5 Going
further, it required the defendant to "prove that the purposeful dis-
crimination 'had a discriminatory effect' on him."4 0 6 Over the next
twenty years, there were no instances in which Black defendants suc-
cessfully challenged the imposition of the death penalty in cases where
the victims were White. 4 0 7
While the Supreme Court insists on interpreting the constitu-
tional protections afforded criminal defendants in a purportedly
"colorblind" or "postracial" manner, it continues to allow race to play a
significant role in law enforcement. Thus, through the mid-1960s, the
Supreme Court had consistently interpreted the Fourth Amendment to
require that stops and searches by police be justified by probable cause
that a crime had been or was about to be committed. 408 However, in
Terry v. Ohio-a case that arose in the wake of the urban rebellions of
that era, most of which had been triggered by abusive police prac-
tices409-the Court authorized police to stop and frisk individuals
based on "reasonable suspicion" alone. 4 10 While the Terry opinion
barely mentions race, the officer's suspicions of John Terry arose from
the fact that he was a Black man who walked back and forth in front of
a store window and then stopped to talk to a White man. 411
403. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 296 (1978).
404. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 296-97 (1987).
405. Id. at 292 (internal citations omitted).
406. Id. (internal citations omitted).
407. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Litigating for Racial Fairness After McCleskey v. Kemp,
39 COLUM. Hum. RTS. L. REV. 178, 179-80 (2007) (discussing State v. Kelly, 502 S.E.2d 99
(S.C. 1998), the only successful McCleskey challenge, and one involving a Black defendant
and Black victims).
408. See Renee McDonald Hutchins, Stop Terry: Reasonable Suspicion, Race, and a Pro-
posal to Limit Terry Stops, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 883, 884 (2013).
409. See id. at 887-88.
410. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
411. See Paul Butler, The White Fourth Amendment, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 245, 248
(2010).
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Since then, the Court has found that, while race alone is not
sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion, race plus any number of
otherwise innocent factors may suffice-factors so varied as to be
meaningless. 4 1 2 The "totality of the circumstances" may be consid-
ered,413 resulting, as Donald Tibbs puts it, in a standard under which
"0 + 0 + 0 + 0 = reasonable suspicion." 4 1 4 The results are highlighted in
a study by the Center for Constitutional Rights, which found that, in
2012, the New York Police Department engaged in some 700,000 stops
and frisks, with Black and Latina/o persons targeted in nearly 85% of
all stops. 4 1 5 In 90% of the cases, the stops did not result in arrests or
summons, but they often involved the use of force by the police. 416 As a
very predictable consequence, residents of targeted communities feel
themselves to be living "under siege," literally trapped in their apart-
ments because "simply being in the hallways, stairwells, or elevators of
their apartment buildings, in front of their buildings, or anywhere
outside including: walking on the street, on the subway, in a park, at
the corner store, or while driving" renders them vulnerable to humilia-
tion and abuse.417
As noted above, a plaintiff alleging race-based violations of
equal protection in a civil action must establish discriminatory intent.
However, in the criminal law context, the Court has deemed police of-
ficers' "[s]ubjective intentions"-i.e., their discriminatory intent-to be
irrelevant. 418 As a result, policing may be conducted in an entirely
racialized manner, as long as some-any-facially race-neutral ratio-
nale can be provided. There is no legal remedy for the glaring
disparities in the rates of stops, searches, arrests, convictions, and in-
carceration that result from this license. 4 1 9 As Paul Butler observes,
412. See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 269-72 (2002) (finding "suspicious"
both the driver's failure to wave at a border patrol agent and his children's waving at the
agent); see also United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(criticizing airport stops relying on a "profile" that included, among other factors, acting
nervously, acting too calmly, traveling alone, traveling with a companion, being the first to
deplane, being the last to deplane, and deplaning in the middle).
413. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983) (announcing the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" test for establishing probable cause).
414. See Tibbs, supra note 2, at 65.
415. CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 306, at 3.
416. Id. at 5-6.
417. Id. at 17.
418. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) ("Subjective intentions play
no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.").
419. See generally THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO
THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE REGARDING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE
UNITED STATES CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2013), available at http://sentencingproject.org/
doc/publications/rdICCPR%20Race%20and%20Justice%20Shadow%20Report.pdf
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the Fourth Amendment does not function so much as a guarantee of
individual rights but as "a project . . . to expand the power of the police
against people of color," "construct [ing] the criminal as colored, and the
White as innocent," and facilitating the "racial policing of space." 4 2 0 Po-
lice officers, as well as prosecutors and judges, have almost unlimited
discretion to use criminal law to keep people of color in "their place,"
quite literally.4 2 1
In the meantime, the state's prerogative to maintain structures
of racial privilege and subordination by almost any means it deems
appropriate is protected by the extension of qualified and/or absolute
immunity to an expanding range of actors. The federal and state gov-
ernments are immune from legal accountability except to the extent
they consent to being sued.4 2 2 Judges, prosecutors, police officers,
prison guards (even in private prisons), and a wide range of elected or
appointed government officials are also given immunity, absolute or
qualified, from personal liability. 423 The bottom line is that "[s]over-
eign immunity allows the government to violate the Constitution or
laws of the United States without accountability . . . [and]
[c]onstitutional and statutory rights can be violated, but individuals
are left with no remedies."424
C. Assimilationism
The cases discussed in the previous sections reveal how the le-
gal doctrines that continue to define relationships within this society-
not simply the discriminatory laws of previous eras-function as strat-
egies of subordination, regardless of whether they are consciously
intended as such. A significant dimension of what keeps us locked into
pursuing remedies within a system whose rules preclude racial justice
420. Butler, supra note 411, at 246-47.
421. On prosecutorial discretion, see generally Angela J. Davis, Racial Fairness in the
Criminal Justice System: The Role of the Prosecutor, 39 COLUM. Hum. RTS. L. REV. 202
(2007). For an example of the reach of judicial discretion, see Paige Williams, Double Jeop-
ardy, NEW YORKER (Nov. 17, 2014), available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/
11/17/double-jeopardy-3 ("In Alabama, a judge can override a jury that spares a murderer
from the death penalty.").
422. See generally Denise Gilman, Calling the United States' Bluff- How Sovereign Im-
munity Undermines the United States' Claim to an Effective Domestic Human Rights
System, 95 GEO. L.J. 591 (2007); Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53
STAN. L. REV. 1201 (2001).
423. On the injustices arising from such immunities, see generally Timothy M. Stengel,
Absolute Judicial Immunity Makes Absolutely No Sense: An Argument for an Exception to
Judicial Immunity, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 1071 (2012); Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Abso-
lute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L. REV. 53 (2005).
424. Chemerinsky, supra note 422, at 1213.
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is, I believe, the presumption that assimilation into settler society is
and should be the ultimate solution for racialized injustice. There are
competing visions of what this means, as illustrated by the so-called
culture wars, along a spectrum that ranges from explicit Anglo-Saxon
hegemony to "multiculturalism," but they are all visions of what this
settler state should look like. 4 2 5 Within this paradigm, it becomes en-
tirely reasonable to recognize legal rights and implement remedial
measures only to the extent they further the assimilationist goals prof-
fered by settler society. 4 2 6
Assimilationist ideology presumes that the dominant culture is
both normative and superior to all other cultures, offering to share the
benefits of White privilege with persons of color willing to abandon
whatever may be distinctive about their cultures and histories.427 As
Jerome Culp observed, "What is the ultimate aim of eliminating dis-
crimination? The courts have consistently answered this question by
assuming that assimilation and cultural degradation were the only two
courses available." 4 28 Thus, in Brown v. Board of Education, the Court
justified its intervention on the grounds that education "is the very
foundation of good citizenship ... a principal instrument in awakening
the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment." 4 2 9
On its face, this appears to be a neutral observation, but the cultural
values being referenced, and the environment to which children should
"adjust normally," are exposed in the Court's assertion that
"'[s]egregation of white and colored children in public schools has a
detrimental effect upon the colored children," "retard[ing]" their devel-
opment and depriving them of "benefits they would receive in a
racial[ly] integrated school system."4 3 0
As Neil Gotanda points out, this construction conflates the "re-
ified systemic subordination" of people of color with their cultures,
425. See generally COURTS AND THE CULTURE WARS (Bradley C. S. Watson ed., 2002).
426. See Delgado, Centennial Reflections, supra note 20, at 436-37 (explaining that par-
adigms of racial thought determine what is relevant and constrain disagreements to a
narrow range of options).
427. See Barbara J. Flagg, "And Grace Will Lead Me Home": The Case for Judicial Race
Activism, 4 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 103, 107-08 (2013) (describing Whiteness as the norma-
tive cultural baseline). This process also affects European immigrants, of course. See
generally Dagmar Rita Myslinska, Contemporary First-Generation European Americans:
The Unbearable "Whiteness" of Being, 88 TUL. L. REV. 559 (2014).
428. See Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Black People in White Face: Assimilation, Culture, and the
Brown Case, 36 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 665, 678 (1995).
429. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
430. Id. at 494.
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communities, and consciousness. 4 3 1 It reflects the perception, fostered
by assimilationist ideology, that any non-settler culture, community, or
consciousness is devoid of social value. This is a presumption that, of
course, entrenches racial hierarchy. In addition to thus harming all
peoples of color, assimilation into the "mainstream"-i.e., settler soci-
ety-requires acceptance of the legitimacy and superiority of that
society. This, in turn, further legitimates the ongoing occupation of In-
digenous lands and concomitant efforts to eliminate Indigenous
peoples. As Chickasaw scholar Jodi Byrd observes, "When the remedia-
tion of the colonization of American Indians is framed through
discourses of racialization that can be redressed by further inclusion
into the nation-state, there is a significant failure to grapple with the
fact that such discourses further reinscribe the original colonial
injury."4 3 2
According to Byrd, one result of this assimilationist framing is
that other "minorities" within settler society are given the "impossible
choice" of "articulat[ing] freedom at the expense of another." 4 3 3 This is,
indeed, the choice presented to us by the dominant narrative, but it,
too, is illusory. Assimilation offers non-Indigenous Others the possibil-
ity of gaining limited access to some of the privileges of the settler class
at the expense of other peoples, but this does not equate to freedom.
We are not free to define ourselves or to maintain our cultures except
in the most superficial of ways, and we certainly are not free to restruc-
ture the core institutions of settler society in ways that might truly
benefit our communities. 434
431. See Neil Gotanda,A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV.
1, 56 (1991); see also John 0. Calmore, Spatial Equality and the Kerner Commission Report:
A Back-to-the-Future Essay, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1487, 1498 (1993) (discussing the difference
between integration and "nonsegregation"); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk, and
United States v. Fordice: Why Integrationism Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CALIF. L.
REV. 1401, 1469 (1993) (criticizing the Court's failure to allow public funding of historically
Black colleges and universities on the basis of "'neutral' assimilationist principles" both be-
cause of Black students' continued exclusion from White institutions and because such
defunding "acts to sever the tie between African-American students and their own
community").
432. BYRD, supra note 124, at xxiii.
433. Id. at xxiv.
434. See MALCOLM X, By ANY MEANS NECESSARY: SPEECHES, INTERVIEWS AND A LETTER
17 (George Brietman ed., 1970) (noting that the real message of those advocating the inte-
gration of public schools "is that the whites are so much superior that just their presence in
a black classroom balances it out"); see also George A. Martinez, Latinos, Assimilation and
the Law: A Philosophical Perspective, 20 CHICANO-LATINo L. REV. 1, 6 (1999) (noting that
the Brown opinion captures three key requirements of assimilationist ideology: compliance
with dominant norms, rejection of race consciousness, and "repudiat[ion of] the equal value
of cultures").
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Thus viewed through the lens of racial realism, the limitations
of domestic legal remedies for racialized injustice become apparent.
There are large sectors of the population-notably the most directly
colonized-to whom constitutional protections simply do not apply.4 3 5
For those formally entitled to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments'
guarantees of equal protection, legal remedies are constrained to mea-
sures that promote assimilationism while ensuring that structures
protecting the status quo will remain intact. These remedies are not
insignificant, for they can provide some degree of relief from egregious
wrongs, but they will not allow for the sort of institutional change that
substantive justice requires, and the relief provided often comes at the
cost of reinforcing underlying structures of domination and
subordination. 4 3 6
Derrick Bell challenged us to deploy racial realism in a manner
that "frees us to imagine and implement racial strategies that can
bring fulfillment and even triumph." 4 3 7 If our goal is to eliminate racial
injustice and the racialized privilege that perpetuates it, and if racial
hierarchy is a structural phenomenon necessary to the maintenance of
a settler colonial state, it seems that we need to imagine and imple-
ment strategies capable of deconstructing colonial relations. I have
argued here that, as a general rule, domestic law cannot be relied upon
to decolonize the social, economic, or political institutions that main-
tain the status quo. Does international law provide more liberatory
options? This question is considered in the following Part.
VI. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Whenever you are in a civil-rights struggle, whether you know it or
not, you are confining yourself to the jurisdiction of Uncle Sam....
Civil rights means you're asking Uncle Sam to treat you right.
Human rights are something you were born with.
-Malcolm X4 38
Since the founding of the United States, international law has
been invoked by peoples within its borders to support their claims to
basic human rights. The Declaration of Independence, if read carefully,
reveals itself to be a listing of the British Crown's violations of interna-
435. See supra notes 354-77 and accompanying text.
436. See Margaret Raymond, The Problem with Innocence, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 449, 451
(2001) (noting the tendency to interpret the overturning of wrongful convictions as evidence
that "the system works").
437. Bell, supra note 2, at 374.
438. Malcolm X, The Ballot or the Bullet, supra note 49, at 34-35.
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tional law, proffered as evidence for the settler colonists' right to
establish and be recognized as an independent state. 4 3 9 The settlers
relied upon treaties with Indigenous nations not only to justify their
claims to territory but as evidence of their own sovereignty, and Ameri-
can Indians have consistently attempted to enforce their rights under
these treaties and under international law more generally. 4 4 0
Other peoples whose territories have been claimed by the
United States-including Chicana/os, Native Hawaiians, Alaska Na-
tives, Puerto Ricans, and various Pacific Islanders-have contested,
and continue to contest, the occupation of their lands under interna-
tional law. 4 4 1 Throughout U.S. history, international law has been
invoked consistently by persons of African descent to challenge slavery,
legalized apartheid, and continuing manifestations of racialized subor-
dination. 442 And from the Chinese Exclusion cases of the 1880s to the
present, immigrants have relied upon treaties and customary interna-
tional law to challenge U.S. immigration law and the manner in which
it is enforced. 4 4 3
For the most part, these efforts have met with very limited suc-
cess. This is due, in part, to the nature of the international legal
system and, in part, to the United States' history of selectively exempt-
ing itself from compliance with international law. Contemporary
international law is explicitly Euroderivative in origin and many of its
foundational principles emerged from the attempts of colonial powers
to regulate relations among themselves as they expropriated the land,
labor, and natural resources of peoples they characterized as "uncivi-
lized."444 The substance of the law derives, for the most part, from the
practice of states and the agreements made between them. Legal state-
hood depends, in turn, on recognition by other states and, until well
439. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 3-28 (U.S. 1776).
440. See CHURCHILL, Perversions of Justice, supra note 174, at 5-6. See generally Kirke
Kickingbird, What's Past Is Prologue: The Status and Contemporary Relevance ofAmerican
Indian Treaties, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 603 (1995).
441. See, e.g., Mililani B. Trask, Historical and Contemporary Hawaiian Self-Determi-
nation: A Native Hawaiian Perspective, 8 ARIz. J. INT'L &COMP. L. 77, 91-94 (1991);
Jacqueline N. Font-Guzmdn & Yanira Alemdn, Human Rights Violations in Puerto Rico:
Agency From the Margins, 12 J. L. & Soc. CHALLENGES 107, 149 (2010); Marie Rios-Marti-
nez, Congressional Colonialism in the Pacific: The Case of the Northern Mariana Islands
and Its Covenant with the United States, 3 SCHOLAR 41, 48-52 (2000).
442. See Gay J. McDougall, Toward a Meaningful International Regime: The Domestic
Relevance of International Efforts to Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 40 How.
L.J. 571, 571-75 (1997); see also RICHARDSON, supra note 47.
443. See supra note 241 and accompanying text. See generally Joan Fitzpatrick & Wil-
liam Mckay Bennett, A Lion in the Path? The Influence of International Law on the
Immigration Policy of the United States, 70 WASH. L. REv. 589 (1995).
444. See generally ANGHIE, supra note 113.
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into the twentieth century, such recognition was contingent upon a de-
termination that the entity wishing to be recognized was sufficiently
"civilized" by European standards. 445 Nonetheless, since the founding
of the United Nations and, more significantly, the movements for inde-
pendence that swept the globe in the aftermath of World War II, the
number of recognized states has grown dramatically and this, in turn,
has led to substantive changes in international law. 4 4 6
The transformation of external colonial territories into at least
nominally independent states has fueled the expansion of a body of in-
ternational human rights law that affirms the right of all peoples to
self-determination, acknowledges Indigenous rights, and prohibits ra-
cial discrimination. 4 4 7 Much of this law is directly relevant to the
issues of racialized hierarchy we confront in the United States today.
While the international legal system is not, for the most part, capable
of providing effective remedies for the dispossession and subjugation of
peoples within settler states, international law can serve at least two
important functions.
The first is that, despite being constrained by state power, in-
ternational law articulates rights and remedies that go beyond those
recognized within our constitutional framework.448 As explained in
more detail below, discrimination, particularly on the basis of race, has
been universally proscribed and the need for remedies that address
structural racism has been explicitly stated. Indigenous peoples'
rights, not only to survival, but also to control over their traditional
lands, resources, cultures, and identities are acknowledged. Attempts
to eliminate group identity have been condemned as genocide. These
developments provide opportunities for contesting U.S. policies and
practices in international forums, and encourage us to envision legal
remedies that transcend the strictures of constitutional rights, as they
have been interpreted and implemented by U.S. courts.
More significantly, international law confirms the legitimacy of
struggles that go beyond asking, or pressuring, the state for more
445. See id. at 98-100; DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 52-57 (3d
ed. 2010).
446. The number of United Nations member states has grown from 51 to nearly 200. See
Member States, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml (last visited
Apr. 2, 2015). See generally ROLAND BURKE, DECOLONIZATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF INTER-
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (2010) (discussing the impact of newly independent states on the
expansion of international human rights law).
447. See infra notes 451-83, 511-46 and accompanying text.
448. See generally Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment: A New
Form of Guarantee, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 231 (1975) (explaining why the Constitution should
be interpreted to encompass internationally recognized human rights).
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rights, or better enforcement of existing rights, to a more liberatory
paradigm. It affirms human dignity as the foundational principle of all
other human rights. This empowers us to challenge any regime of
rights that strips individuals or communities of their dignity, re-
minding us, as Malcolm X emphasized, that as human beings we have
inherent rights-and responsibilities-regardless of what we are told
by those in power. 4 4 9 Perhaps most fundamentally, international law
acknowledges the right of all peoples to self-determination. This foun-
dation enables us to begin envisioning what it would mean for all
peoples within the United States to "freely determine [our] political
status and freely pursue [our] economic, social and cultural develop-
ment." 4 5 0
A. Racial Discrimination and "Minority" Rights
A large body of international law deals with the rights of "mi-
norities," a term that encompasses national minorities as well as
racial, ethnic and religious groups. 4 5 1 I have argued throughout this
article that the institutionalized racism of settler colonial society can-
not be effectively redressed by assimilationist measures designed to
more effectively incorporate "minorities." Nonetheless, struggles for ra-
cial justice are a necessary part of maintaining human dignity within
settler society and enabling communities of color to move past the most
basic struggles for survival to envisioning and implementing structural
change. In this effort, international human rights law can help us see
that the principle of non-discrimination need not be limited by the con-
straints we encounter within the U.S. legal system.
The prohibition on racial discrimination is articulated in the
United Nations Charter and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), as well as the two major human rights treaties, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR). 452 It is regarded by many to be not only customary interna-
tional law-and therefore binding on all states-but also a jus cogens
449. See supra note 438 and accompanying text.
450. See infra note 515 and accompanying text.
451. See, e.g., Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious or Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp.
No. 49 (Vol. I), U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (Vol. 1) (Dec. 18, 1992).
452. See U.N. Charter, art. 1, para. 3; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), arts. 2, 7 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 2(1), 26, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPRI; International Covenant on Economic, Social
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or preemptory legal norm. 4 5 3 The Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), a treaty with 177 states par-
ties, defines racial discrimination as
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race,
colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose
or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or ex-
ercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other
field of public life. 4 5 4
This body of law prohibiting racial discrimination moves significantly
beyond the United States' formal commitment to equal protection in
several important ways.
First, it recognizes the right of ethnic, religious or linguistic mi-
norities, "in community with the other members of their group," to
maintain their own identity and culture. 45 5 Assimilation must be truly
voluntary, and equal treatment may not be conditioned on assimila-
tion. Thus, for example, in 2007, the Committee charged with monitor-
ing compliance with the CERD observed that "policies of forced assimi-
lation amount to racial discrimination and constitute grave violations
of the convention." 4 5 6
Second, as illustrated by the "purpose or effect" language of the
CERD's definition, the prohibition is not limited to discriminatory in-
tent but encompasses disparate impact as well. 4 5 7 In 2014, the CERD
Committee noted its concern that U.S. law does not comport with the
Convention, "which requires States parties to prohibit and eliminate
racial discrimination in all its forms, including practices and legisla-
tion that may not be discriminatory in purpose, but are discriminatory
in effect." 4 58 Illustrating its recognition of the need to address struc-
and Cultural Rights, art. 2(2), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinaf-
ter ICESCR].
453. See McDougall, supra note 442, at 577-78.
454. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
art. 1, para. 1, opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD]. For
status of parties, see Treaty Collection, UNITED NATIONS, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg no=IV-2&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Apr. 2,
2015).
455. See ICCPR, supra note 452, at art. 27; see also Convention on the Rights of the
Child, art. 30, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
456. Concluding Observations, Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
67th Sess., Aug. 2-19, 2005, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/TKM/CO/5, para. 12 (Mar. 27, 2007); see also
Council Directive 2000/43, art. 11, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22, 25 (EC) (rejecting forced
assimilation).
457. See supra note 454 and accompanying text.
458. Concluding Observations on the Combined Seventh and Ninth Periodic Reports of
the United States of America, Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 85th
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tural racism, the Committee's 2014 report on U.S. compliance noted its
concerns with, among other problems, illegal government surveillance
and monitoring, the use of excessive force by law enforcement, the
"school-to-prison pipeline," and inadequate access to legal aid in both
civil and criminal contexts, and recommended that the United States
"adopt a National Action Plan to combat structural racial discrimi-
nation." 4 5 9
A third point of note is that international law acknowledges the
necessity of "special measures" (what we might broadly think of as af-
firmative action) to enable a minority group to achieve political,
economic, and social equality while, if it desires, maintaining its cul-
tural and ethnic identity.460 In contrast to current U.S. jurisprudence,
the CERD explicitly states that such special measures are not to be
considered a form of racism, 4 6 1 and the United States has been criti-
cized for placing "increasing restrictions on the use of special measures
as a tool to eliminate persistent disparities in the enjoyment of human
rights and fundamental freedoms based on race or ethnic origin."4 6 2
Thus, although international human rights law continues to be
criticized for inadequately addressing the structural underpinnings of
racial hierarchy, 463 its insistence that equal protection not be condi-
tioned on assimilation, its broad understanding of what is
encompassed within the construct of racial discrimination, and its pro-
mulgation of remedial measures that go beyond formal equality help us
to think critically about the constraints imposed on us by equal protec-
tion jurisprudence, as well as the plenary power doctrine. This broader
framing of rights can help us better analyze how U.S. legal doctrine
continues to be used to subordinate peoples of color, and provides op-
portunities to empower our communities by bringing claims to the
Sess., Aug. 11-29, 2014, U.N. Doe. CERD/C/USA/CO/7-9, para. 5 (Sep. 25, 2014) [hereinafter
Concluding Observations (2014)].
459. Id. at paras. 8, 17, 21, 23, 25.
460. See CERD, supra note 454, at art. 2, para. 2; McDougall, supra note 442, at 585.
461. See CERD, supra note 454, at art. 1, paras. 4, 2. See generally YUSSUF NAIM KLY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE BLACK MINORITY IN THE U.S. (3d. ed. 1985).
462. Concluding Observations (2014), supra note 458, at para. 7.
463. See, e.g., Celina Romany & Joon-Beom Chu, Affirmative Action in International
Human Rights Law: A Critical Perspective of Its Normative Assumptions, 36 CONN. L. REV.
831, 837 (2004) (noting that even in international law a "failure to acknowledge a contextual
identity brings about inadequate adjudicative and remedial frameworks that, within struc-
turally limited systems, perpetuate the false neutrality covering up systemic inequality and
discrimination").
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international bodies that will acknowledge the inadequacies of U.S.
remedies for racial injustice. 4 6 4
B. Rights of Indigenous Peoples
As noted above, many Indigenous peoples have resisted incorpo-
ration into settler societies. 4 6 5 This resistance is reflected in the fact
that they have long struggled for legal recognition as sovereign nations
rather than internal minorities. 466 Since 1977, Indigenous activists
have regularly gone to the United Nations in an attempt to have "our
rights to our territories, our lands, our resources, our treaties and our
right to self-determination to be recognized and accepted by the other
nations of the world as set out in the UN Charter." 467 Cree attorney
Sharon Venne notes that when they initiated these efforts, "[w]e could
not use international mechanisms then in existence to decolonize our-
selves, because the United States, Canada and other states refused to
allow Indigenous peoples to use the UN Committee on Decoloni-
zation." 4 68
After three decades of this work, the UN General Assembly
promulgated the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in
2007, addressing self-determination, land rights, and cultural and
spiritual rights, among many other topics. 4 6 9 The Declaration acknowl-
edges injustices resulting from Indigenous peoples' "colonization and
dispossession of their lands, territories and resources." 4 7 0 Recognizing
their right to maintain their cultures and identities, it prohibits their
464. See, e.g., Malcolm X Center for Self Determination, U.S. Called to Account for Im-
prisoned COINTELPRO and Civil Rights Era Activists at United Nations Convention to
End Racial Discrimination (CERD) Review (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.n2pp.info/print/
UNCERDReview_2014.pdf.
465. See, e.g., Porter, Pursuing the Path, supra note 247, at 170.
466. See Yousef T. Jabareen, Redefining Minority Rights: Successes and Shortcomings of
the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 18 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
119, 121-31 (2011) (explaining the distinction between minorities and Indigenous peoples).
467. Sharon H. Venne, The Road to the United Nations and Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples, 20(3) GRIFFITH L. REV. 557, 564 (2011) [hereinafter Venne, The Road]; see also Jose
Martinez Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations:
Final Report (Last Part) Submitted by the Special Rapporteur, E/CN4/Sub. 1/1983/21/Add 8
(Sept. 30, 1983), paras. 376-77 (noting the importance of respect for Indigenous culture,
language, and social and legal institutions). See generally John Clinebell & Jim Thomson,
Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Rights of Indigenous Peoples in International Law,
17 BUFF. L. REV. 669 (1978); Williams, Encounters, supra note 24.
468. Venne, The Road, supra note 467, at 564.
469. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295, (Sept. 13 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP].
470. Id. at Preamble.
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forced assimilation and forcible removal from their lands.4 7 1 This is of
significance with respect to ongoing struggles for land rights, to the
preservation of Indigenous cultural and religious traditions, and in ef-
forts to obtain redress for past takings. 4 7 2 The Declaration does not
directly acknowledge Indigenous sovereignty, but does require states
to "consult and cooperate in good faith" with Indigenous peoples to ob-
tain their "free, prior and informed consent before adopting legislative
or administrative measures that may affect them."4 7 3
The United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand
wielded their considerable international influence to ensure that early
drafts of the Declaration were substantially "watered down," 474 leaving
it open to criticism for "fail [ing] to enable or open up space for a dia-
logue on coexisting sovereignties" and allowing settler state "hegemony
and Indigenous subjugation" to "remain unchanged."4 7 5 Nonetheless,
global consciousness has been transformed by Indigenous utilization of
UN mechanisms, 476 and the fact that only the world's largest settler
states voted against the Declaration indicates that they perceive even
this rather benign articulation of Indigenous rights as threatening
their claimed prerogative to exercise unfettered control over Indige-
nous peoples. 4 7 7
Since 2001, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
and its Court of Human Rights have played vital roles in protecting
Indigenous rights to property and natural resources, recognizing that
"for Indigenous communities, relations to the land are not merely a
matter of possession and production but a material and spiritual ele-
ment which they must fully enjoy, even to preserve their cultural
471. Id. at arts. 5, 8-15.
472. See generally Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light
of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1141
(2008).
473. UNDRIP, supra note 469, at art. 19. See generally Akilah Jenga Kinnison, Indige-
nous Consent: Rethinking U.S. Consultation Policies in Light of the U.N. Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 53 ARiz. L. REV. 1301 (2011).
474. Irene Watson, The 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Indige-
nous Survival-Where to From Here? 20(3) GRIFFITH L. REV. 507, 507 (2011).
475. Id. at 508.
476. Venne, The Road, supra note 467, at 575-76. See generally Ward Churchill, A Trav-
esty of a Mockery of a Sham: Colonialism as "Self-Determination" in the UN Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 20(3) GRIFFITH L. REV. 526 (2011).
477. The Declaration was affirmed by 144 United Nations member states; 11 abstained
and Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States voted "no." Since 2007, these
four states have all stated that they support the Declaration while maintaining that it is not
legally binding. See Nicole Friederichs, A Reason to Revisit Maine's Indian Claims Settle-
ment Acts: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 35 Am. IND.
L. REV. 497, 499 (2010-2011).
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legacy and transmit it to future generations." 4 78 The Inter-American
Court's jurisprudence has evolved to recognize the enforceability of
traditional land claims, even when Indigenous peoples have been dis-
possessed, upon a showing of their unique relationship with those
lands. 4 7 9 While the United States is notorious for disregarding recom-
mendations from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
the Commission's findings have been instrumental in, for example, the
ability of Western Shoshone people to remain on their traditional lands
and to limit, to some extent, the devastation caused by mining
ventures. 48 0
Interestingly, the Inter-American Court has extended its recog-
nition of Indigenous land and resource rights to Afrodescendant
peoples who have maintained "a strong spiritual relationship" with the
lands they have long occupied. 481 The Court explicitly based its find-
ings on the similarities between Indigenous peoples and the
Afrodescendant communities at issue. 48 2 As a result, this body of juris-
prudence is not directly applicable to more dispersed or urbanized
Afrodescendant peoples, but it recognizes that the descendants of en-
slaved Africans in the Americas have a distinct place in settler
societies. It certainly supports the efforts of the Gullah/Geechee, for
example, to maintain an autonomous land base on the southeastern
478. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples'
Rights Over Their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources: Norms and Jurisprudence of the
Inter-American Human Rights System, 35 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 263, 266 (2010-2011) (citing
Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations,
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, para. 149 (Jan. 31, 2001); Case of
the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judg-
ment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, paras. 124, 131 (June 17, 2005); Case of the Plan
de Sanchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 116, para. 85 (Nov. 19, 2004)) [hereinafter Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples' Rights].
479. Id. (citing Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Repar-
ations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146 (Mar. 29, 2006)).
480. See generally Julie Ann Fishel, United States Called to Task on Indigenous Rights:
The Western Shoshone Struggle and Success at the International Level, 31 Am. INDIAN L.
REV. 619 (2006/2007).
481. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples'
Rights, supra note 478, at 266 (citing Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objec-
tions, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 174, para.
82 (Nov. 28, 2007)); see also Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 124 (2005) (recognizing the land rights of a Maroon Afrodescendant community).
482. See generally Ariel E. Dulitzky, When Afro-Descendants Became "Tribal Peoples":
The Inter-American Human Rights System and Rural Black Communities, 15 UCLA J. INT'L
L & FOREIGN AFF. 26 (2010) (arguing that adding consideration of racial discrimination to
the "strategy of culturalization of claims" would enhance the rights of Afrodescendant com-
munities in Latin America).
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coast of the United States. 48 3 More generally, it opens the door for re-
medial measures incorporating Afrodescendant peoples' cultural and
historical realities in international law, and also helps us envision
changes that could be made in domestic law.
C. Genocide
The prohibition of genocide is universally acknowledged to be a
jus cogens norm of international law, i.e., one from which there can be
no derogation. 48 4 In contesting the assimilationist framework of settler
colonial law, the condemnation of genocide plays a particularly signifi-
cant role. It is clear that the settler drive to eliminate and replace
Indigenous populations necessarily involves genocidal processes, al-
though the settler narrative contests this characterization. 48 5 It is less
well-understood why the treatment of African Americans has been
characterized as genocidal as, for example, in the 1951 petition entitled
"We Charge Genocide: The Crime of Government Against the Negro
People," delivered to the United Nations by Paul Robeson and William
Patterson in 1951.486 Much of the debate over whether American set-
tler society has, or is still, engaged in genocidal policies is rooted in a
failure to understand that the term genocide is not synonymous with
"mass murder" but encompasses the drive to eliminate "a national, eth-
nical, racial, or religious group, as such."48 7 In other words, it is the
erasure of "groupness" that is at issue.
The term "genocide" was coined by Raphael Lemkin, a Polish
Jewish attorney who wanted to clarify that it was criminal to "destroy,
483. See generally Marquetta L. Goodwine, Yeddi Wi: Gullah/Geechee Living Ways, in
IN PURSUIT OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION: COLLECTED PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS OF
THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION & THE
UNITED NATIONS, GENEVA 2000 107-13 (Y.N. Kly & D. My eds., 2001). See also Faith R.
Rivers, The Public Trust Debate: Implications for Heirs' Property Along the Gullah Coast, 15
SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 147 (2006).
484. See Johan D. van der Vyver, Prosecution and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 286, 287 (1999).
485. See generally Lindsay Glauner, The Need for Accountability and Reparation: 1830-
1976 the United States Government's Role in the Promotion, Implementation, and Execution
of the Crime of Genocide Against Native Americans, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 911 (2002); WARD
CHURCHILL, A LITTLE MATTER OF GENOCIDE: HOLOCAUST AND DENIAL IN THE AMERICAS, 1492
TO THE PRESENT (1997) (providing a detailed historical account).
486. See CIVIL RIGHTS CONGRESS, WE CHARGE GENOCIDE: THE HISTORIC PETITION TO THE
UNITED NATIONS FOR RELIEF FROM A CRIME OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AGAINST
THE NEGRO PEOPLE (William Patterson ed., New York: International Publishers 1970); see
also PERO GAGLO DAGBOVIE, AFRICAN AMERICAN HISTORY RECONSIDERED 158-72 (2010) (pro-
viding background information). See generally ANDERSON, supra note 47.
487. See infra note 489 and accompanying text.
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cripple, or degrade entire nations, racial and religious groups," thereby
destroying their cultures and erasing the contributions they had made
or might make to humanity. 48 8 Lemkin's initial draft of the UN Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
was substantially diluted, but his intent is reflected in the treaty's defi-
nition of genocide as
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a)
[k]illing members of the group; (b) [clausing serious bodily or
mental harm to members of the group; (c) [dieliberately inflicting
on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part; (d) [ilmposing measures intended to
prevent births within the group; (e) [florcibly transferring children
of the group to another group. 48 9
In his writings, Lemkin emphasized that genocidal processes
include physical debilitation, the limiting of reproductive capacity, the
eradication of self-government, the appropriation of economic re-
sources, the prohibition of peoples' language (especially in education),
attacks on intellectuals, suppression of religions, and the undermining
of "spiritual resistance" by means such as the promotion of alcohol and
"cheap" pleasures. 4 9 0 As historian and genocide scholar Dirk Moses ex-
plains, Lemkin "defined the concept as intrinsically colonial." 4 9 1 In his
seminal work, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, Lemkin explained:
Genocide has two phases: one, destruction of the national pattern of
the oppressed group; the other, the imposition of the national pat-
tern of the oppressor. This imposition . . . may be made upon the
oppressed population which is allowed to remain, or upon the terri-
tory alone, after the removal of the population and the colonization
of the area by the oppressor's own nationals. 4 92
488. See Moses, Empire, supra note 177, at 12 (quoting Memorandum from Raphael
Lemkin to R. Kempner, June 5, 1946).
489. International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, art. II, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (Dec. 9, 1948, entered into force Jan. 12, 1951)
at 280, [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. The Convention criminalizes actual and at-
tempted genocide, as well as "[d]irect and public incitement" of and complicity in genocide.
Id. at art. III.
490. RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AxIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 82-90 (1944); see also Moses,
Empire, supra note 177, at 13-14.
491. See Moses, Empire, supra note 177, at 9.
492. LEMKIN, supra note 490, at 79; see also Moses, Empire, supra note 177, at 9.
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This is, of course, the historical pattern characteristic of settler colonial
states .493
Lemkin described the enslavement of North American Indians
as "cultural genocide par excellence . . . the most effective and thorough
method of destroying a culture, and of de-socializing human beings."4 9 4
This description applies equally to the enslavement of African peoples,
of course. Moreover, the forced assimilation, impoverishment, and
mass incarceration of Afrodescendant peoples in the United States
since the abolition of slavery can be understood in these terms.495
While it is difficult and, to many, controversial to describe American
settler colonialism as genocidal, doing so clarifies that the problems we
face are not simply the result of "discrimination" that can be remedied
by legislating formal equality or by a gradual process of social
(re)education. Rather, they result from policies intended to "destroy,
in whole or in part," the group identity of subordinated peoples.496
Remediation entails an immediate halt to genocidal policies, and the
implementation of measures that support the reconstitution and con-
tinued vitality of "national, ethnic[], racial, or religious groups."4 9 7
With each passing generation, our histories and identities are further
obscured. International law reminds us that, to the extent genocidal
policies continue to affect our communities, we cannot afford to rely on
a system that has failed to bring about substantial change for more
than a half-century. As Jodo Costa Vargas puts it, "the urgency that
genocide generates . . . creates the imperatives of decolonization." 4 9 8
493. Wolfe, Structure and Event, supra note 126, at 121 (describing the "concrete empir-
ical relationships between spatial removal, mass killings, and biocultural assimilation" in
settler colonial regimes as "structural genocide").
494. John Docker, Are Settler-Colonies Inherently Genocidal? Re-reading Lemkin, in Em-
PIRE, COLONY, GENOCIDE: CONQUEST, OCCUPATION, AND SUBALTERN RESISTANCE IN WORLD
HISTORY 81, 94 (A. Dirk Moses ed., 2008).
495. See Charles Green, Genocide, Victimization, and America's Inner Cities, in GENO-
CIDE, WAR, AND HUMAN SURVIVAL 111-23 (Charles B. Strozier & Michael Flynn eds., 1996).
See generally Leavy Mathews, III, The Inoculations of the Eternal Spirit into International
Law: How the United States Must Save Itself and the World, 40 How. L.J. 709 (1997) (dis-
cussing U.S. concerns that ratification of the Genocide Convention would increase
international criticism of its treatment of Black Americans).
496. Genocide Convention, supra note 489, at art. II.
497. Id.
498. JoAo H. COSTA VARGAS, NEVER MEANT TO SURVIVE: GENOCIDE AND UTOPIAS IN
BLACK DIASPORA COMMUNITIES XXvii (2008).
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D. Human Dignity
As discussed above, well-established international law goes fur-
ther than U.S. law in its interpretation of the prohibition of racial
discrimination, its recognition of the unique status of Indigenous peo-
ples, and its acknowledgment of forced assimilation-among other
measures-as inherently genocidal. It also creates opportunities for In-
digenous peoples and other peoples of color in the United States to
have their grievances acknowledged-if not actually remedied-as le-
gal wrongs. While we will not be liberated by law, international law
does incorporate two precepts that are fundamental to liberatory
processes: it recognizes the centrality of human dignity to any rights
regime, and it acknowledges that all peoples have the right to self-
determination.
Dignity is a core value underlying all of the human rights
norms that have evolved in international law. 4 9 9 The preamble to the
UN Charter notes the member states' determination "to reaffirm faith
... in the dignity and worth of the human person,"500 and the UDHR
asserts that "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the founda-
tion of freedom, justice and peace in the world."50 ' The ICCPR and
ICESCR, the two overarching human rights treaties of the modern era,
emphasize that the rights they articulate "derive from the inherent
dignity of the human person." 5 0 2 Even when interpreting treaties that
do not explicitly reference the concept, international judicial bodies
such as the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights have incorporated human dignity into their
opinions .503
The dignity principle lays the foundation for a body of human
rights law with "a strong emphasis on the will and consent of the gov-
erned," according to legal scholar Oscar Schacter.504 In other words,
"the coercive rule of one or the few over the many is incompatible with
499. Oscar Schachter, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 Am. J. INT'L L. 848,
849 (1983) (noting that "[n]o other ideal seems so clearly accepted as a universal social
good").
500. U.N. Charter, supra note 452, at Preamble.
501. UDHR, supra note 452, at Preamble.
502. ICCPR, supra note 452, at Preamble; ICESCR, supra note 452, at Preamble.
503. See Luis Roberto Barroso, Here, There, and Everywhere: Human Dignity in Cont-
emporary Law and in the Transnational Discourse, 35 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 331, 341-
43 (2012).
504. Schachter, supra note 499, at 850.
2014 91
FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW
a due respect for the dignity of the person."5 0 5 Moreover, the concept is
rooted in a framework of respect for human life in the dynamic, organic
context of community, culture, history, and identity. Thus, Schacter
notes, "nothing is so clearly violative of the dignity of persons as treat-
ment that demeans or humiliates them. This includes not only attacks
on personal beliefs and ways of life but also attacks on the groups and
communities with which individuals are affiliated."5 0 6
Acknowledging the fundamental importance of human dignity
takes us beyond statistical disparities, or the progress purportedly re-
flected in the inclusion of "minorities" in mainstream institutions. It
gives us terms with which to articulate the underlying harm caused by,
for example, depicting American Indians as the caricatured mascots of
sports teams . 5 0 7 Similarly, it speaks to the underlying disrespect en-
tailed in allowing Michael Brown's body to lie in the street in
Ferguson, Missouri, for hours after he was shot by the police.5 08
Dignity also connotes respect for the ability of persons to make
and be responsible for their own actions.5 0 9 Recognition of the capacity
for acting responsibly, in turn, implies the right to do so. This is partic-
ularly significant because, in many cultures, human dignity is
manifested not by the defensive assertion of rights, but by the fulfilling
of responsibilities that extend to one's family, the broader community,
future generations, other forms of life, and the earth itself.5 10 We do
not need the law to tell us that we have an inherent right to live with
dignity. Nonetheless, those who struggle to protect their communities
and to create a better world for their children are often informed-by
the police, the courts, the education system, or the media-that they
have no "right" to do so. The fact that international law explicitly ac-
knowledges dignity as a foundational principle of all human rights can
help empower them by undergirding their legal claims and, perhaps
more importantly, by affirming the legitimacy of the work in which
they are engaged.
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. See WARD CHURCHILL, INDIANS ARE Us? CULTURE AND GENOCIDE IN NATIVE NORTH
AMERICA 62-87 (1994).
508. Julie Bosman & Joseph Goldstein, Timeline for a Body: 4 Hours in the Middle of a
Ferguson Street, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2014, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.con
2014/08/24/us/michael-brown-a-bodys-timeline-4-hours-on-a-ferguson-street.html?_r=0.
509. See Schachter, supra note 499, at 850.
510. See VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION 78-97 (2d ed.
1992). See generally GUSTAVO ESTEVA & MADHU SURI PRAKASH, GRASSROOTS POST-
MODERNISM: REMAKING THE SOIL OF CULTURES (1998).
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E. Self-Determination
The decolonization of settler society is not something that will
be imposed from above, but something that must be effectuated from
below. The right to self-determination articulated in international law
"is understood generally, at its core, as encompassing the idea that
human beings, individually and as groups, should be in control of their
own destiny, and that systems of government should be devised accord-
ingly, and not imposed upon them by alien domination."51 ' This is a
fundamental right that few directly contest, but it is also a principle
that, when taken seriously, has great potential for the decolonization of
settler societies. The consistent assertions of American Indian sover-
eignty and the calls for self-determination made by organizations such
as the Black Panther Party, Chicano Brown Berets, and Puerto Rican
Young Lords in the 1960s and 1970s were and are well-grounded in
international law.
The UN Charter identifies the development of "friendly rela-
tions among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples" as one of the United Nations' pri-
mary functions. 5 1 2 The General Assembly's 1960 Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Resolu-
tion 1514) "[s]olemnly proclaims the necessity of bringing to a speedy
and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifesta-
tions."513 It states forthrightly: "All peoples have the right to self-
determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their politi-
cal status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development." 5 1 4 This is repeated almost verbatim in Common Article
1 of the ICCPR and the ICESCR.515 According to the UN Human
511. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus's Legacy: Law as an Instrument of Racial Dis-
crimination Against Indigenous Peoples' Rights to Self-Determination, 8 ARIz. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 51, 51 (1991) (paraphrasing S. James Anaya's explanation).
512. U.N. Charter, supra note 452, at art. 1, para. 2; see also W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE
PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 104-13 (1977) (providing back-
ground on the intent of the drafters).
513. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doe. A/4684, at 66
(Dec. 14, 1960); see also OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 512, at 115-22 (discussing the back-
ground of the resolution).
514. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), supra note 513, at 66.
515. ICCPR, supra note 452, at art. 1; ICESCR, supra note 452, at art. 1; Howard J.
Vogel, Reframing Rights from the Ground Up: The Contribution of the New U.N. Law of
Self-Determination to Recovering the Principle of Sociability on the Way to a Relational The-
ory of International Human Rights, 20 TEMPLE INT'L &COMP. L.J. 443, 448-78 (2006)
(discussing the evolving concept of self-determination); see also Hurst Hannum, Rethinking
Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1993) (providing a more orthodox summary).
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Rights Committee, the right to self-determination was given primacy
in the ICCPR because "its realization is an essential condition for the
effective guarantee and observance of individual human rights and for
the promotion and strengthening of those rights."516 According to the
International Court of Justice, "the right of peoples to self-determina-
tion, as it evolved from the Charter and from United Nations practice,
has an erga omnes character"- in other words, it is binding on all.517
As with any legal principle, the real debate emerges in its appli-
cation.518 Richard Falk notes that much hinges on
whether the criteria relied upon to clarify the right to self-determi-
nation are to be determined in a top-down manner through the
mechanisms of statism and geopolitics or by a bottom-up approach
that exhibits the vitality and potency of emergent trends favoring
the extension of democratic practices and the deepening of human
rights.519
Three primary strategies characterize statist resistance to implement-
ing the right to self-determination. Because self-determination is
articulated as a right of "peoples," a state's first line of defense is often
to claim that a particular group is simply a "minority," or a subset of
the general population, not a distinct "people." 520 Building on this ar-
gument, states then invoke the international legal principle of "non-
516. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 12, art. 1, para. 1 (21st Sess., 1984),
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human
Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doe. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 12 (1994).
517. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 102, para. 29 (June 30) (citing Namibia
Opinion, infra note 530, as well as W. Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31-33,
paras. 54-59 (Oct. 16)); see also Edward A. Laing, The Norm of Self-Determination, 1941-
1991, 22 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 209 (1991) (identifying the norm as customary law, binding on
all states); Lee Seshagiri, Democratic Disobedience: Reconceiving Self-Determination and
Secession at International Law, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 553, 567 (2010) (noting that "the classi-
cal right of colonial self-determination has acquired jus cogens status").
518. Richard Falk, Preface to IN PURSUIT OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION: COL-
LECTED PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE RIGHT TO
SELF-DETERMINATION & THE UNITED NATIONS, GENEVA 2000 6, 6 (Y.N. My & D. My eds.,
2001) (noting that self-determination "bears directly on many of the bloodiest and persistent
struggles that presently beset every region of the planet, and bring intense suffering and
continuous frustration to millions of peoples").
519. Id.
520. See Erica-Irene A. Daes, An Overview of the History of Indigenous Peoples: Self-
Determination and the United Nations, 21 CAMBRIDGE REV. OF INT'L AFFAIRs 7, 12-13 (2008).
The United States and other settler states delayed finalization of the UN Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples by many years with their attempt to substitute the term
"populations" for "peoples." See Erica-Irene Daes, The UN Declaration on the Rights of In-
digenous Peoples: Background and Appraisal, in REFLECTIONS ON THE UN DECLARATION ON
THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 11, 18 (Stephen Allen & Alexandra Xanthaki eds.,
2011).
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interference in the internal affairs" of states. 5 2 1 Finally, settler states,
and other entities with internally colonized peoples, rely on what has
been termed the "salt water" or "blue water" doctrine, which attempts
to limit decolonization to territories that are "geographically separate"
as well as "distinct ethnically and/or culturally" from the "administer-
ing" state. 5 2 2
A different picture emerges when self-determination is viewed
from the bottom up. States do not have an exclusive right to determine
which groups within their population constitute peoples. Rather, as le-
gal scholar Howard Vogel observes, "the definition of the term 'peoples'
in a minority rights context must be left to the people themselves." 5 2 3
According to Erica-Irene Daes, a Special Rapporteur for the UN's Sub-
Commission on Human Rights and former chair of the UN's Working
Group on Indigenous Populations, 5 2 4 the "true test of self-determina-
tion . . . is whether Indigenous peoples themselves actually feel that
they have choices about their way of life." 5 2 5
Groups previously relegated to "minority" status are increas-
ingly recognized as having a right to self-determination. 5 2 6 In 1998, the
Canadian Supreme Court noted with respect to the status of Quebec
that "a people" may be a minority within a state,5 2 7 and that a "defina-
ble group" may have the right to determine its own political status
when consistently excluded from political, social, and cultural partici-
521. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), supra note 513, at para. 7; see also The 1970 Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) 25th
Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8082, at 121 (Oct. 24, 1970), UN Charter, supra note 452,
at art. 2(4) (prohibiting "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state").
522. See G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc A/4684, at
29 (Dec. 15, 1960); see also WATSON, ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, supra note 125, at 88.
523. Vogel, supra note 515, at 447.
524. The group was formally titled the "Working Group on Indigenous Populations." Be-
cause of the problematic nature of the term "populations," it was often referenced by
Indigenous experts as the "Working Group on Indigenous Peoples." See Venne, The Road,
supra note 467, at 560 n.12.
525. Erica-Irene A. Daes, Striving for Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples, in IN
PURSUIT OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION: COLLECTED PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION & THE UNITED
NATIONS, GENEVA 2000 50, 58 (Y.N. Kly & D. Kly eds., 2001) [hereinafter Daes, Striving for
Self-Determination].
526. See Vogel, supra note 515, at 448; see also KLY, supra note 461, at 124 (noting that
"the term 'peoples' which appears in the [UN] Charter and common article 1 of the two
[major human rights] Covenants, is becoming generally accepted to include minorities or
nationalities as it is being applied frequently in practice").
527. Reference re Secession of Quebec, 2 S.C.R. 217 (1998), at 70.
2014 95
FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW
pation in government. 5 28 A similar sentiment was expressed in the
1976 Universal Declaration on the Rights of Peoples ("Algiers Declara-
tion"), which states that "[e]very people has an imprescriptible and
unalienable right to self-determination . . ." including "the right to
break free from any colonial or foreign domination, whether direct or
indirect, and from any racist regime." 5 2 9
Peoplehood is often conceived in static or essentialist terms but
it can be actively constructed. In the Namibia case, the International
Court of Justice rejected South Africa's argument that "tribalism"
within Namibia prevented its population from constituting a people.5 3 0
Addressing "the Namibians' status of a people," International Court of
Justice Vice President Fouad Ammoun's separate opinion recognizes
the role of agency in this process by pointing out that "the Namibian
people . . . asserted its international personality by taking up the strug-
gle for freedom" and as a result, despite South Africa's objections, had
been recognized by UN General Assembly and Security Council resolu-
tions, as well as by the Court.5 3 '
Statist arguments to territorial integrity are undermined by ev-
idence that the viability of the state system itself is increasingly being
called into question and that state boundaries have always been, and
continue to be, in flux. 5 3 2 Settler states have no superior claim to colo-
nized territories simply because those lands have been incorporated
into their claimed boundaries. Colonialism is defined by structural re-
lations, not by the geographic distance separating the colonizer from
the colonized. Thus, in attempting to deflect criticism of its overtly co-
lonial policies, Belgium argued that the UN's trusteeship powers
should be applied as well to "those part of the 'metropolis inhabited by
528. Id. at 76. The International Court of Justice has concluded that groups in the West-
ern Sahara, East Timor, and Palestine constitute peoples with a right to self-determination.
See Wojciech Kornacki, When Minority Groups Become "People" Under International Law,
25 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 59, 79 (2012) (citing Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12,
68 (Oct. 16); Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 106 (June 30);
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 183 (July 9)).
529. See RICHARD A. Falk, HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, 185-94, 225-28
(1981).
530. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advi-
sory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Reports 16, 63 [hereinafter Namibia Opinion] (declaration of
President Muhammad Zafrulla Khan).
531. Id. at 69 (separate opinion of Vice-President Fouad Ammoun).
532. See RICHARD A. FALK, THE DECLINING WORLD ORDER: AMERICA'S IMPERIAL GEO-
POLITICS 9-11 (2004) (noting that "the state system [ ] at the core of the Westphalian
experience . . . [is] both a guiding and incoherent myth that does not now and never did
correspond with patterns of behavior in international politics").
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peoples whose degree of actual subordination to the rest of the state
community in the midst of which they lived placed them in a colonial
situation." 5 33 As summarized by Wolfe, "Nothing . . . about settler
colonialism requires there to be a spatial hiatus (or 'blue water') be-
tween metropole and colony. Settler colonization occurs and persists to
the extent that a population sets out to replace another one in
its habitation, regardless of where the colonizing population
originated." 5 3 4
Similarly, sustained occupation does not, per se, alter the na-
ture of the relationship. As Justice Ammoun observed with respect to
South African claims to Namibia (South West Africa), neither Ger-
many's colonization of Namibia nor South Africa's administrative
"mandate" erased Namibia's legal personality.5 35 "Sovereignty, which
is inherent in every people, just as liberty is inherent in every human
being, therefore did not cease to belong to the people subject to man-
date. It had simply, for a time, been rendered inarticulate and deprived
of freedom of expression."5 3 6
Finally, it is worth noting that the right to self-determination is
a "continuing right," meaning that the status of a people subject to the
jurisdiction of any state may always be reassessed.53 7 In the words of
international legal scholar Antonio Cassese, "The issue of whether the
government of a sovereign State is in compliance with [Common Arti-
cle 1 of the ICCPR and the ICESCR] is a legitimate question, with
reference to any State, at any point in time."5 3 8 It is not a static right.
As Daes emphasizes,
[Ilt is very important to think of self-determination as a process.
The process of achieving self-determination is endless. This is true of
all peoples-not only Indigenous peoples. Social and economic con-
533. Edward A. Laing, The Norm of Self-Determination, 1941-1991, 22 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 209, 245 (1992) (quoting A. RIGO SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETER-
MINATION 103 (1973)); see also JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (1979) (noting that "self-determination units" may encompass "en-
tities part of a metropolitan State but which have been governed in such a way as to make
them in effect non-self-governing territories").
534. Wolfe, Structure and Event, supra note 126, at 122.
535. Namibia Opinion, supra note 530, at 68 (separate opinion of Vice-President
Ammoun).
536. Id.; see also S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 107
(2004) (noting that "[d]ecolonization demonstrates that self-determination's remedial aspect
may trump or alter otherwise applicable legal doctrine," including claims to territorial
sovereignty).
537. See ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 54
(1995) (emphasis omitted).
538. Id. at 55. It should be noted, however, that Cassese does not see this right as apply-
ing to "internal minorities." Id. at 62.
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ditions are ever-changing in our complex world, as are the cultures
and aspirations of peoples. For different peoples to be able to live
together peacefully, without exploitation or domination-whether
it is within the same state or in two neighboring states-they must
continually renegotiate the terms of their relationships.5 3 9
The real question is what steps we will take to exercise our
right to self-determination. 54 0 As we consider our options, we must re-
main aware that in international law both substantive rights and
remedial measures are framed and limited by state actors, and states
have little incentive to empower internally subordinated groups or peo-
ples they have colonized. 54 1 Even when it can be demonstrated that
clearly articulated international law is being violated by state actors,
enforcement mechanisms tend to be cumbersome, slow, and relatively
easily subverted by governmental recalcitrance. 5 4 2 Non-compliant
states are usually induced to conform to international norms through
some combination of diplomatic, economic, and military pressure,
means that are likely to have the least impact on the most powerful
states. 543 As the world's dominant "superpower," the United States has
effectively exempted itself from the jurisdiction of most international
courts and often fails to participate in or comply with human rights
treaty regimes. 5 4 4
What all of this means is that we cannot expect international
law to step in and liberate us, any more than we can expect domestic
law to do so. Nonetheless, largely as a result of the widespread move-
ment for decolonization that resulted in formerly colonized territories
being recognized as independent states, international law has evolved
539. Daes, Striving for Self-Determination, supra note 525, at 57-58 (emphasis in origi-
nal); see also Vogel, supra note 515, at 478 ("The right to self-determination serves the well-
being of groups who define themselves as a people by addressing the conditions under which
they live and are governed through an on-going process of negotiation of the terms on which
they live with their neighbors.").
540. An important corollary is how we will defend others engaged in pursuit of their
right to self-determination. While this topic is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth
noting that domestic law may not be invoked to justify the violation of a state's interna-
tional obligations and that international law recognizes a special obligation to protect
human rights defenders. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 26-27, May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals,
Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, G.A. Res. 53/144, U.N. Doc. AIRES/53/144 (Mar. 8,
1999).
541. See ESTEVA & PRAKASH, supra note 510, at 10-11 (describing the universalization of
human rights as part of a process of "recolonization").
542. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference?,
111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002).
543. For a detailed analysis of compliance, see generally id.
544. See SAITO, MEETING THE ENEMY, supra note 136, at 205-17.
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to acknowledge fundamental rights that can play a key role in efforts
to deconstruct racial hierarchy and dismantle structures that perpetu-
ate colonial relations. While such rights are not likely to be fully
implemented by extant domestic, regional, or global legal institutions,
the fact that they are recognized as fundamental legal principles can
help us to imagine and implement liberatory options outside the con-
straints of a dominant narrative that depicts current settler colonial
realities as right, natural, or inevitable. 545
VII. IMAGINING DECOLONIZATION
Of course, the decolonization of settler colonialism needs to be
imagined before it is practised.
-Lorenzo Veracini546
Racial realism forces us to acknowledge that privilege and sub-
ordination are systemic and persistent in contemporary American
society. I have argued that assessing racial realities in terms of the
presumptions, perceived needs, and goals of those who benefit most
from settler colonialism can provide a framework that explains the his-
toric subordination of people of color and the apparent intractability of
institutionalized racism in a manner that is consistent and coherent
rather than riddled by contradiction. Material realities often require us
to work within settler colonial institutions, employing opportunities
provided by the ideological framework of formal equality and constitu-
tional rights to protect the most vulnerable where possible. However,
it is illogical to believe that we can rely on settler state law or legal
institutions to undo the very hierarchy they constructed and are in-
tended to protect.5 4 7 The question, then, becomes how we begin to
envision liberatory options.
As noted above, Kenyan author Ngtigi wa Thiong'o cautions
that the most powerful weapon utilized against oppressed peoples is a
"cultural bomb" intended to induce despair by eviscerating our belief in
our capacities and, "ultimately, [our]selves." 5 4 8 If racialized subordina-
tion in the United States is rooted in and perpetuates colonial
relationships, its remediation will require us to step outside the tri-
umphalist narrative of American settler culture and to consider what
545. On the importance of anti-colonial, international perspectives for critical race the-
ory, see generally John Hayakawa Tbrbk, Race Consciousness and the Work of De-
Colonization Today, 48 How. L.J. 351 (2004).
546. Veracini, Telling the End, supra note 155, at 211.
547. See Smith, The Moral Limits of the Law, supra note 17, at 70.
548. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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is entailed in the decolonization of the relationships between Indige-
nous peoples, those who see themselves as part of the settler class, and
those who are neither indigenous to this land nor intended to benefit
from settler privilege.
Imagining the decolonization of any settler state is a daunting
task, for we have no readily available models to consult. Decolonization
in the classic colonial context has generally meant that the colonizers
"go home" as formerly colonized territories are recognized as indepen-
dent states. As the strife that pervades many former colonies in Africa
and Asia illustrates, formal independence alone has not necessarily
been liberatory. Neocolonial exploitation has frequently ensured the
continued impoverishment of the formerly colonized and the mainte-
nance of colonially imposed territorial boundaries has precluded
peoples within those borders from exercising their right to self-deter-
mination. 5 4 9 In settler states, we are faced with different and even
more complicated circumstances because the territory at issue is con-
sidered "home" by both colonized and colonizer.550 What does it mean
for all peoples to be self-determining under these conditions?
There are no easy answers or formulaic solutions, for decolon-
ization is always context-specific. It cannot be legislated or decreed
from above. True decolonization entails the ability of the formerly colo-
nized to exercise their right to self-determination and, thus, is a
process that must be envisioned and implemented from the ground up.
Colonial powers may withdraw, or negotiate alternate arrangements
with the formerly colonized, but if they presume to dictate the terms of
decolonization, the end result is simply a different variant of colonial
domination. Patrick Wolfe's insight that settler colonial "invasion is a
structure not an event"5 5 ' tells us that decolonization, likewise, will
not be an event but a process of deconstruction and reconstruction. The
good news is that regardless of the policies maintained by those in
power, there are innumerable opportunities to assert human dignity,
to exercise the right to self-determination, and to set in motion
processes that are, themselves, liberatory.
549. See Ibrahim J. Gassama, Africa and the Politics of Destruction: A Critical Re-Ex-
amination of Neocolonialism and Its Consequences, 10 OR. REV. INT'L L. 327, 328-37 (2008)
(explaining the construct and the economic consequences of neocolonialism). On the process
and consequences of maintaining colonial boundaries, see generally Mutua, supra note 107.
550. Noting that the United States is "only a political entity," Cherokee artist/author
Jimmie Durham asks if at the end of American empire, "Would my country become free of
the US? If so, where is America? If not, do I really not come from any place?" JIMMIE DuR-
HAM, A CERTAIN LACK OF COHERENCE: WRITINGS ON ART AND CULTURAL POLITICS 175 (1993).
551. Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native, supra note 133, at
388.
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Indigenous scholars and activists in settler colonial states, in-
cluding the United States, are constantly furthering the theoretical
and practical work of decolonization. 552 I would not presume to engage
directly in that discussion, but I believe their work can be of tremen-
dous value to non-Indigenous peoples of color concerned about racial
justice in the United States. Drawing upon this work, and in the hope
of sparking further discussion, this concluding Part considers steps
that may help us move beyond despair and toward constructive
endeavors.
A. Changing the Stories We Live By
A first step in moving beyond colonial dynamics of power and
privilege is to "change the stories we live by."5 5 3 There are several
dimensions to this process. Perhaps most obviously, we can reclaim our
histories, refusing to concede to narratives that erase our identities,
our lived realities and, often, even our humanity.554 This can happen at
many levels, and can take many forms. We may need to re-value our
personal stories and ensure that our children understand their geneal-
ogies, contextualized within the histories of their communities. We can
appreciate the oral histories in which every person has a place, and in
which the "diversities of truth" are represented.5 55 The more formal
narration of collective memory can be encouraged by providing venues
designed to compile testimonies, as was done, for example, in the "peo-
ple's tribunals" where survivors of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita gave
testimony, or evidence of the dispossession of Native Hawaiians was
gathered.556
552. See, e.g., FOR INDIGENOUS MINDS ONLY: A DECOLONIZATION HANDBOOK (Waziyata-
win Angela Wilson & Michael Yellow Bird eds., 2012); FOR INDIGENOUS EYES ONLY: A
DECOLONIZATION HANDBOOK (Waziyatawin Angela Wilson & Michael Yellow Bird eds.,
2005); PORTER, SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 98; Churchill, The Indigenous Peoples, supra note
98. For an analysis from a "critical settler" perspective, see generally Ingrid Huygens, De-
veloping a Decolonisation Practice for Settler Colonisers: A Case Study from Aotearoa New
Zealand, 1 SETTLER COLONIAL STUD. 53 (2013), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
2201473X.2011.10648812.
553. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
554. See SMITH, DECOLONIZING, supra note 106, at 144-46.
555. See id. at 146.
556. On the Hurricane Katrina and Rita People's Tribunal, see Amy GOODMAN & DAVID
GOODMAN, STANDING UP TO THE MADNESS: ORDINARY HEROES IN ExTRAORDINARY TIMES 29
(2008); on the potential of international law to address issues identified at this tribunal, see
generally George E. Edwards, International Human Rights Law Violations Before, During,
and After Hurricane Katrina: An International Law Framework for Analysis, 31 T. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 353 (2006). For the record of the Hawai'i Tribunal, see generally ISLANDS IN
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Changing the stories by which we live keeps alive our histories
of survival, resistance, and contributions to humanity. But it also en-
tails acknowledging that contemporary American society is neither
postracial nor postcolonial, confronting harsh and unpleasant truths
that we may wish to deny.55 7 Racial realism does not allow us to re-
main in denial about the persistence of overt hostility, as well as
unemployment, mass incarceration, and the human consequences of
living in families and communities rendered dysfunctional by the
stress of day-to-day survival. Derrick Bell's advocacy of racial realism
has been criticized for leaving us with no alternative to despair,558 but
that is not the message I take from his stark assessment. I see it, in-
stead, as an opportunity to constructively confront the depressing
circumstances in which we find ourselves.55 9 Thus, for example, collec-
tive acknowledgment of the trauma induced by persistent and ongoing
dehumanization can trigger processes of healing and transforma-
tion.5 6 0 As Linda Tuhiwai Smith observes, it can be enormously
empowering to realize that often "such things as mental illness, alco-
holism and suicide, for example, are not about psychological and
individualized failure but about colonization or lack of self-determina-
tion," and to take more control over the ways in which such issues are
addressed.56 '
Changing our narrative requires moving from the debunking of
stories that attempt to negate our worth to relearning or constructing
stories that actually "give our lives meaning." 5 6 2 Such stories cannot
be constrained by the parameters of a colonial worldview that is linear,
hegemonic, and triumphalist. Meaningful stories require us to step
outside of that "box" and place ourselves within a fundamentally differ-
ent paradigm. Serious consideration of alternatives to the status quo
requires acknowledging that we live in a "pluriverse" of worldviews, as
CAPTIVITY: THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUs HAWAIIANS (Ward
Churchill & Sharon H. Venne eds., 2005).
557. See supra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
558. See, e.g., John A. Powell, Racial Realism or Racial Despair?, 24 CONN. L. REV. 533,
550 (1992).
559. Like Cheryl Harris, I find Derrick Bell's emphasis on the permanence of racism-
within American society as it is currently constructed-to be "tremendously hopeful, not
despairing-regenerative, not dark." Cheryl I. Harris, Bell's Blues, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 783,
784 (1993).
560. These are, in fact, "crucial strategies in any approach that asks a community to
remember what they may have decided unconsciously or consciously to forget." SMITH,
DECOLONIZING, supra note 106, at 147.
561. Id. at 154.
562. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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Gustavo Esteva and Madhu Suri Prakash remind us.5 6 3 Western civili-
zation is not necessarily the inevitable final stage of the entirety of
human history, and settler colonial regimes are but one of many ways
in which human societies can be organized. Both sovereignty and iden-
tity can be, and have been, constructed in ways that are layered and
overlapping, rather than exclusive. One can view lands and natural
resources as sites of responsibility rather than possession. 5 6 4 In order
to render decolonization thinkable, to develop theoretical frameworks
capable of accounting for contemporary realities and allowing us to en-
vision creative change, we must be willing to think-and live-outside
the constraints of paradigms in which the status quo is presumed to be
right, natural, and inevitable.
B. Thinking Strategically
Lorenzo Veracini observes that settler colonial narratives "move
forward along a story line that cannot be turned back."56 5 The settlers'
vision of establishing a new, superior, and more civilized society under-
girds their claims to legitimacy and justifies their assertion of
sovereign prerogative. This is reflected in the construct of American
exceptionalism, whose central thesis is that the United States repre-
sents the pinnacle of Western civilization and, therefore, the highest
stage of human progress to date.56 6 There is no endpoint to this vision;
settler colonialism ultimately succeeds when it has "ceased being
settler colonial" by virtue of permanently normalizing settler hege-
mony.5 6 7 Within this worldview, "the discontinuation of a settler
colonial circumstance remains unthinkable."5 68
563. ESTEVA & PRAKASH, supra note 510, at 115-16. See, e.g., Danielle M. Conway, In-
digenizing Intellectual Property Law: Customary Law, Legal Pluralism, and the Protection
of Indigenous Peoples' Rights, Identity and Resources, 15 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 207 (2009)
(arguing for a legal pluralism incorporating Indigenous paradigms of knowledge and
property).
564. See, e.g., WATSON, ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, supra note 125, at 149 (suggesting that we
"think about the condition of dispossession outside the 'logic of possession (as a hallmark of
modernity, liberalism, and humanism)"') (citation omitted); WILLIAM G. Roy, MAKING SOCIE-
TIES: THE HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION OF OUR WORLD Xv (2001) ("Not all societies divide
people into fixed races, assign everyone to only one of two sexes, or accord higher status to
those who accumulate wealth. Many societies treat time as a cycle more than a line ... Few
societies think of space in terms of abstract coordinates that can have meaning apart from
the activities that happen in particular places.").
565. VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 98.
566. See SAITO, MEETING THE ENEMY, supra note 136, at 18-34.
567. VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 23, at 22.
568. Id. at 104-05 (noting that this "narrative gap contributes crucially to the invis-
ibility of anti-colonial struggles in settler colonial contexts").
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Theory is crucial because it renders decolonization "thinkable."
In attempting to theorize strategically, it seems particularly useful to
identify the processes through which colonial structures of domination
and subordination are constructed and maintained. By understanding
settler strategies of elimination, subjugation, subordination and ma-
nipulation-the ways in which colonization is effectuated-we can
begin to develop, envision, and implement strategies to counter those
processes.569
If settler colonization's foundational requirement is the occupa-
tion of other peoples' lands, a key precept of any theory of decoloni-
zation will be the primacy of Indigenous struggles. As Patrick Wolfe
notes, "[n]o amount of good intentions or improved racial theorizing"
will alter the underlying colonial reality unless "accompanied by terri-
torial (re-)cession."570 While this may be a point that "many will wish
to deny, but none can refute," 5 71 any end run around this premise
leaves us engaged in "an exercise in settler nation building." 572 Within
this framework, as Veracini points out, "even well meaning processes
of indigenous and national reconciliation, or the incorporation of indig-
enous governance structures within the settler polity, ultimately
contribute to the erasure of variously defined indigenous sovereignties
and therefore to the reproduction of settler colonizing practices."5 7 3
In other words, if the structures that maintain the subordina-
tion, not only of Indigenous peoples, but also peoples of African descent
and immigrants of color, are an integral part of the settler colonial en-
terprise, if they are maintained to ensure the continued profitability of
the occupation of Indigenous lands, it is illogical to believe that they
can or will be dismantled until the legitimacy of that occupation is ef-
fectively challenged. From my perspective, this is why movements for
equal rights within the settler polity have not eliminated racial subor-
dination, and why it is in the interest of all peoples who wish to
dismantle racial hierarchy to embrace Indigenous decolonization as an
integral part of our own struggles for liberation.
This is the point at which we often encounter what I think of as
the "fear factor." In my experience, it is difficult to have rational dis-
cussions about decolonizing American society with anyone who is not
Indigenous because the very idea triggers a defensive reaction that
generally manifests as "but then we'd have to leave," quickly followed
569. See supra part IV (providing examples of such analyses).
570. Wolfe, Structure and Event, supra note 126, at 103.
571. Bell, supra note 2, at 373.
572. Veracini, Telling the End, supra note 155, at 211.
573. Id. at 211-12.
104 Vol. 10:1:1
TALES OF COLOR AND COLONIALISM
by "and I don't have anywhere to go." 5 7 4 As this reaction demonstrates,
it is useful for settler culture to project sovereignty and identity as all-
or-nothing propositions, leaving non-Indigenous peoples to imagine
that their disappearance is the only alternative to the status quo. Be-
cause this is not a thinkable alternative, it allows them to dismiss the
foundational issue of colonial occupation without even addressing it.
In fact, however, as Dean Saranillio observes, "[i]magined vio-
lence on the part of Indigenous movements is a common trope that
allows Native savagery to stand in for settler self-critique."5 75 It was
Anglo-American settlers, not American Indian nations, who imposed
their presumption of exclusivity, who arrived with a firm conviction
that they could live on this land only if Indigenous peoples were elimi-
nated. What decolonization entails is a relinquishment of the settlers'
claimed prerogative to encompass everything and everyone within
their state; in other words, the conviction that only they are self-deter-
mining.5 76 Indigenous nations are not calling for the departure of all
settlers or other migrants, "but rather accountability for their dis-
courses and practices that ultimately come at Native expense."5 77 The
presumption that relinquishing exclusive settler sovereignty equates
to a wholesale evacuation of the territory by non-Indigenous peoples
does not reflect any material reality but simply an inability to conceive
of living with, or within, others' polities.
What imagining decolonization does require is the capacity to
envision forms of social and political organization outside the settler
colonial paradigm. Paradigm shifts are, of course, disconcerting, but
they can also be immensely liberating.578 In supporting the ability of
Indigenous peoples to be self-determining, we open up the possibility
for all peoples on this continent to be self-determining. If we recognize
that the institutions that perpetuate racism and other variants of so-
cial, political, and economic exploitation are maintained by the ongoing
574. See Mari Matsuda, Are We Dead Yet? The Lies We Tell to Keep Moving Forward, 40
CONN. L. REV. 1035, 1041-42 (2008) (discussing the fears engendered by acknowledging Na-
tive Hawaiian sovereignty).
575. Saranillio, supra note 146, at 285.
576. "The western subject knows that it is self-determining because it compares itself to
'others' who are not. In other words, I know who I am because I am not you. These 'others' of
course are racialized." Andrea Smith, The Problem with "Privilege", ANDREA366 (Aug. 14,
2013), http://andrea366.wordpress.com/2013/08/14/the-problem-with-privilege-by-andrea-
smith/.
577. Saranillio, supra note 146, at 284.
578. See Delgado, Centennial Reflections, supra note 20, at 458-59 (discussing the rela-
tionship between paradigms and social power).
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colonization of this land, we can see that it is in our collective self-
interest to participate in its decolonization.
In other words, challenging the legitimacy of the occupation of
this continent, consistently and straightforwardly, is a necessary part
of our own liberation. This means not only supporting Indigenous ef-
forts to gain particular land rights within the strictures of settler
society, but also supporting Indigenous peoples' struggles for self-
determination more generally.579 Non-Indigenous peoples cannot pre-
scribe what Indigenous self-determination should look like, any more
than the U.S. government can dictate the terms upon which Indige-
nous peoples are "allowed" to be self-determining.58 0 To the extent we
impose our own value judgments on other peoples' exercise of their
right to self-determination, we are, in essence, invoking a variant of
Justice Brown's uncontrovertibly colonial assertion that we can rely on
Congress to protect U.S. "dependencies" in accordance with the "princi-
ples of natural justice inherent in the Anglo-Saxon character."58 '
The struggle for the liberation of all peoples thus requires, I be-
lieve, understanding-and acting upon-the principle that colonialism
cannot be dismantled so long as Indigenous peoples remain colonized.
While I see this as a necessary step, understanding and addressing the
subjugation of other peoples, including but not limited to peoples of
color, within settler society will also entail identifying and confronting
the strategies of elimination, subjugation, subordination, and manipu-
lation employed to maintain racial hierarchy and protect settler
privilege. This is a strikingly under-theorized dimension of settler colo-
nial studies and my purpose here is simply to point out that this
framework can be of great utility. The complex dynamics of racializa-
tion and institutionalized racism have been explored in law and in
virtually all social science disciplines. Building upon this work, if we
consider the ways in which any given example-say, racial profiling in
traffic stops-serves as a strategy of subjugation or subordination, we
can begin to build a conceptual framework that connects seemingly dis-
parate manifestations of racism.
By understanding the purposes served by such policies and
practices in the context of the settler colonial state, we can more cre-
579. For an illustration of this process, see Venne, The Road, supra note 467, at 572-74
(noting not only the struggles between Indigenous peoples and state representatives at the
United Nations, but discussions that Indigenous peoples had to have amongst themselves in
order to understand the importance, for example, of sea ice to the Inuit and trees to peoples
of the Amazon).
580. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
581. Downes, 182 U.S. at 280.
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atively envision remedial measures and assess their ability to
empower our communities rather than reinforcing the status quo. 58 2
Thus, for example, Andrea Smith proposes that, rather than engaging
in what amount to moral appeals to a legal system that has facilitated
genocide, slavery, and racism, we should divest the current legal sys-
tem of its moral authority and think strategically about how it can be
used to further a decolonizing agenda.5 83 She goes on to propose an
approach to gender violence in Native communities that incorporates
traditional means of fostering justice and accountability to the commu-
nity-rather than criminalization and incarceration -within a context
that recognizes decolonization as the ultimate goal.58 4 Similar ap-
proaches could, of course, be undertaken within any given community
and in response to a wide range of problems.
Andrea Smith's example illustrates not only the possibility of
exercising some degree of self-determination with respect to a particu-
lar issue, but the potential for envisioning entirely different bodies of
substantive law and systems of enforcement. Robert Cover's oft-cited
observation that "[n]o set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists
apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning" was refer-
enced earlier.58 5 Moving beyond this descriptive statement, he noted
that "[t]he position that only the state creates law . . . confuses the
status of interpretation with the status of political domination."58 6 In
other words, we can actively and collectively engage in the construction
of the law. The same, of course, could be said for developing political,
economic, and cultural institutions.
In this effort, we can look to international law. International
law does not provide us with any quick fixes, but its emphasis on
human dignity affirms that we cannot be free within social structures
that accord "rights" while crushing the human spirit, and it articulates
clearly that all peoples have the right to self-determination. Exercising
the right to self-determination can take an infinite variety of forms,
582. Lorenzo Veracini, Settler Colonialism and Decolonisation, 6 BORDERLANDS para.
26 (2007), available at http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol6no2_2007/veracini settler.htm
(" M]ulticultural remaking ... does not involve unsettling foundational settler narratives.
Multiculturalism allows for an expanded definition of who can claim belonging to the settler
body politic that leaves settler colonial structures unchallenged."). For an example of an
empowering process in action, see generally From Civil Rights to Human Rights and Self-
Determination? Proceedings of the IHRAAM CHICAGO CONFERENCE 2012 (2012).
583. See Smith, The Moral Limits of the Law, supra note 17, at 85.
584. Id. at 77-82; see also Christine Zuni, Strengthening What Remains, 7-Wtr KAN. J.L.
& PUB. POLY 17 (1997) (emphasizing the need to preserve, strengthen and incorporate In-
digenous principles of law and justice into tribal court systems).
585. Cover, supra note 152, at 4.
586. Id. at 43.
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from a community's demand for a stop sign at a dangerous intersec-
tion; to local control of policing, education, and/or healthcare services;
to the reorganizing of economically self-sufficient and politically inde-
pendent nations. The litmus test, as I see it, is whether any given
action empowers communities and promotes decolonization, or further
entrenches extant relationships of domination and subordination.
CONCLUSION
This exploration of the potential utility of settler colonial theory
in addressing issues of racial justice was motivated by my concern that
young people of color in the United States today continue to face the
deeply entrenched racial disparities and injustices that were the focus
of many movements in the 1960s and early 1970s, without the collec-
tive energy and vision that inspired activists of that era. Remembering
the impact that the global struggles for decolonization had on move-
ments for social change within the United States, I began by
considering whether the analysis of people of color within the U.S. as
internally colonized, frequently proffered a half-century ago, was theo-
retically unsound. Concluding that this perspective was not so much
unsound as incomplete, I have suggested that applying settler colonial
theory to the racial realism Derrick Bell urged us to embrace can pro-
vide a historically accurate basis for understanding how and why
racialized privilege and subordination have become so deeply institu-
tionalized in American society. My hope is that developing this
theoretical framework from a multiplicity of perspectives will help us
envision and implement liberatory alternatives to the status quo.
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